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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
DON HALVERSON,
Plaintiff / Appellant,
and
CHARLOTTE HALVERSON
Plaintiff
VS.

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
FOR THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official
capacities and in their individual capacities; DAN
PAYNE, in his official capacity and in his
individual capacity,
Defendants / Respondents.

Appealed from the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Latah
HON. JOHN R. STEGNER, DISTRICT JUDGE
..............................................

DON HALVORSON
PRO SE
RONALD J. LANDECK
TORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS

Filed this -- day of

-

.

,2009

STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK

BY

Deputy

SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 36825-2009
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)
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1
INTRODUCTION

Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims in this action because the
material facts of this case are not in dispute and all claims can be decided based on undisputed
facts as a matter of law. Despite the nature and extent of Plaintiffs' assertions, claims and
arguments, it is critical that a proper perspective be placed on this case. Plaintiffs' claims are
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lilrj

premised almost exclusively on two (2) events, the first being the District's widening of Camps
Canyon Road in 2005 and 2006 by "less than a foot or two when gravel was spread over the
entire portion of the traveled roadway.. .." and the second being the District's issuance of a
public right-of-way approach permit on or about March, 2006, to Plaintiffs' neighbors which was
revoked in June, 2006. See Facts below, par. 6 and 13-18. This conduct is not of the heinous
variety as the misguided legal attack of Plaintiffs' Complaint would have this Court believe.
This Brief will show that the District has, at all times relevant to this action, properly discharged
its statutory responsibilities to improve and maintain the public highway known as Camps
Canyon Road.
Also, importantly, Plaintiffs did not file a notice of claims under Idaho Code section 6-

901 et seq. arising out of the District's alleged "negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or
omissions and those of its employees.. .." until November, 2007, which was well beyond the 180
day limitation period from the date many of Plaintiffs' claims arose.
Regarding to the organization of this Brief, identification of Plaintiffs' claims is made
difficult because Plaintiffs' Complaint is intermittently conclusory, speculative, argumentative,
generalized, repetitive and disorganized and relies fundamentally on factual assertions that are
not admissible in evidence, primarily for reasons of lack of foundation and hearsay. The same
descriptors apply to the factual record produced by Plaintiffs in support of their numerous,
unsuccess~lpretrial motions. Defendants anticipate that similar, unfounded assertions will be
forthcoming in response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. These observations are
made to emphasize that particular attention will be required in the consideration of this Motion to
distinguish between material and immaterial evidence and between admissible and inadmissible
evidence.
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,

^

1

In this Brief and supporting affidavits, Defendants will identify and specify the relevant,
3

admissible, material facts of this case, demonstrate that there are no genuine issues as to those

A

3
3

facts and prove that summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Defendants and against

1
B

Plaintiffs on all Plaintiffs' claims in this action.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move for
summary judgment against any or all of Plaintiffs' claims. The standard for determining the
appropriateness of summary judgment, applied to a case in which the admissibility of evidence
was an important consideration, as is the circumstance in this matter in regard to Plaintiffs'
speculative, unfounded and hearsay assertions, is held by the Idaho Supreme Court to be as
follows.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor
of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Thompson v. Idaho
Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,529,887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994). "I.R.C.P.
56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial." Carrzell v. Barker ilfgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327,48 P.3d 651,
656 (2002) (citations omitted). "Affidavits supporting or opposing the motion
for summary judgment 'shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein."' Id. "The admissibility of the evidence contained in
affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment is a threshold question to be answered before applying the liberal
construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." Id. "Summary judgment is
appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case." Id.
Upon moving for summary judgment, the moving party must show the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Qzrirzlan v. Idaho Cornrn 'nfor Pardons and
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Parole, 138 Idaho 726,729,69 P.3d 146,149 (2003). The burden then shifts to
the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material facts does exist. Id.
The nonmoving party must come forward and produce evidence to set forth
specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The nonmoving party
must present more than speculation or a mere scintilla of evidence to create a
genuine issue. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 5 14, 5 17, 808
P.2d 851, 854 (199 1). Failure to do so will result in an order granting summary
judgment. Quinlan, 138 Idaho at 729,69 P.3d at 149.
Sprinkler Irrigation Company, h c . v. John Deere Insurance Company, Inc., 139 Idaho 691,695-

Further guidance for the trial court in regard to evidentiary decisions in summary
proceedings is given in relation to the appellate review standard. Evidentiary
rulings shall be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Perry v. Magic
Valley Reg'l. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50,995 P.2d 8 16 (2000). Upon review to
determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court inquires: (1)
whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether it acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal
standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Swallow v. Emergency Med. ofIdaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592,67 P.3d 68, 71
(2003) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,962 P.2d 1026 (1998); Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000
(1 991)).

Id. at 693, P3d at 762.
ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ("Facts")
Plaintiffs' claims in this action arise almost exclusively &om two (2) occurrences, the
first being improvements made by Defendant North Latah County Highway District (the
"District") in 2005 and 2006 to an area of Camps Canyon Road, located principally betureen
property owned by Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs7 real property") and Robert Wagner and Kate Wagner,
husband and wife ("Wagners' real property"), approximately 700 feet in length, and the second
being the District foreman Dan Payne's (i) issuance and revocation and (ii) reissuance of a
driveway approach permit to Robert Wagner in 2006 to access Wagner's real property.
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The admissible material facts relevant to Plaintiffs' claims are as follows:
1)

Camps Canyon Road was established as a public highway through public use prior to
1930, has retained its status to the present as a public highway under jurisdiction of the
District and is shown a public highway on the official map of the District's highway
system pursuant to Idaho Code Section 40-202(1). Affidavit of Orland Arneberg filed
herein on November 4,2008 ("Arneberg Affidavit"), par. 5 and 7. Affidavit of Dan
Carscallen filed herein on November 4,2008 ("Carscallen Affidavit"), par. 3 and 4. I
have been employed by Defendant North Latah County Highway District ("District")
since 1974 and District foreman since 1994. Since 1974, my duties for District
foreman have included maintaining and improving projects on Camps Canyon Road
with the primary difference being that, as foreman, I oversee and supervise the
District's work instead of doing it. At least since 1974, the District has maintained
Camps Canyon Road as needed by grading and/or adding gravel. Affidavit of Dan
Payne filed herein on November 4, 2008 ("Payne Affidavit"), par. 2 and 4.

2)

Although improved over the years, Camps Canyon Road follows the same approximate
centerline now that it has since the early 1930's. Arneberg Affidavit, par. 8; Payne
Affidavit, par. 8. Larry Hodge, licensed Idaho surveyor, opines that based upon a
comparison of aerial maps that the location and course of Camps Canyon Road has not
been changed between 1940 and 2004. Affidavit of Larry Hodge filed herein on
January 30,2009 ("Hodge Affidavit"), par. 5. John Dunn LPS, who surveyed for
Plaintiffs the Wagner real property, more particularly described in Instrument No.
501677, records of Latah County, Idaho, which is contiguous to real property owned by
Plaintiffs more particularly described in Instrument No. 42441 I, records of Latah
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County, Idaho, at the centerline of Camps Canyon Road, commented in his May, 2007
survey notes that:
Camps Canyon Road (County road) is shown with a 50 foot wide
prescriptive R/W. The physical location of the road is on a sidehill and
appears to be stable with little, if any, change occurring over time.
See Hodge Affidavit, par. 4(g).

3)

Absent special circumstances, which are not applicable in this case, such as when the
District has been deeded a public right-of-way less than fifty feet wide or when an
improvement predated the establishment of the public road, the District's public road
maintenance and improvement activities are undertaken based upon Idaho law that
states a public highway shall be not less than fifty (50) feet wide. In my opinion, this
minimum width is reasonably necessary to properly maintain a public highway in rural
Latah County that is safe and reasonably convenient for the public. Payne Affidavit,
par. 10.

4)

Absent special circumstances, which are not present in this case, if the District
undertakes improvenlents on a public road established by prescription, such as Camps
Canyon Road, those improvements will be made within the District's prescriptive
minimum fifty foot (50') wide right-of-way without permission of adjoining
landowners because such permission is not necessary as all of the District's work is
undertaken within its legal rights. However, the District's foremen will routinely make
an effort to inform adjoining landowners of planned improvement projects, particularly
major ones, as a courtesy and convenience. In 1996, the District followed this practice
when it undertook ilnprovements to Camps Canyon Road without seeking or obtaining
the permission fi-orn the landowner, Ed Swanson. At no time did Mr. Swanson
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improvements. Mr. Swanson was aware of those improvements and had no objection
to them. Second Affidavit of Dan Payne filed herein on January 30,2009 ("Payne
Second Affidavit"), par. 4; Arneberg Affidavit, par 10; Defendants' Second Record
Supplement, Items 2 and 3.
5)

In 1996, to improve road safety for increased public, vehicular traffic, the District
widened the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road on the north side (the side then
owned by Ed Swanson, Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest to Plaintiffs' real property) by
approximately 4 feet to its approximate present width by hauling in fill dirt from a
ditch cleaning project nearby and grading that dirt and adding some gravel onto the
road surface, and the District installed a culvert and covered the exposed bedrock in the
road with fill dirt. Payne Affidavit, par. 5.

6)

In 2005 and 2006, to improve road safety for increased public vehicular traffic, the
District widened the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road on its southerly side (the
side opposite Halvorsons' real property) by drilling and blasting bedrock, adding gravel
to level the road surface, sloping and seeding the banks on that side, extending the
culvert under the road by approximately four feet (4') and improving the ditch on that
southerly side of the road. Payne Affidavit, par. 6. Camps Canyon Road was widened
less than a foot or two in 2005 and 2006 on the Plaintiffs' side of the road when gravel
was spread over the entire portion of the traveled roadway following the improvements
to Wagners' side. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 4.

7)

After the District's improvements in 2006, the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road
does not exceed approximately 23 $4 feet in width in the general vicinity of Plaintiffs'
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real property at issue in this litigation and averages approximately 2 1 feet in width in
that same stretch. Payne Affidavit, par. 7.
8)

In addition to using and maintaining the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road and
in order to properly grade and drain the road for safe public travel, the District must
maintain the cut slope, which is the southerly side of Camps Canyon Road in the
vicinity of Plaintiffs' property and the ditch and culvert on that southerly side beneath
the cut slope, and the District must utilize the fill slope, which is the northerly side of
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property, for structural support
for the traveled surface of the road and for snow removal and storage in winter months.
Payne Affidavit, par. 9.

9)

A minimum 50 foot width is reasonably necessary to properly maintain a public
highway in rural Latah County that is safe and reasonably convenient for the public.
Payne Affidavit, par. 10.

10) The entire stretch of Camps Canyon Road used by the District for public highway
purposes in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property, including cut slope to fill slope lies
within a 50 foot wide right-of-way.

I I)

Sometime after 1996, Plaintiffs constructed a fence on the steep hillside on the full
(northerly) slope adjacent to the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road and, in
places, within fifteen feet (1 5') of the centerline of Camps Canyon Road. While the
fence does not interfere with the public traffic on the traveled surface of Camps
Canyon Road, the District's maintenance activities, primarily grading and snow
removal, are affected by the fence's placement. That is, given the steepness of the
slope on Plaintiffs' property, it is virtually impossible to properly maintain Camps
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Canyon Road without some gravel or snow reaching Plaintiffs' fence. Plaintiffs have
failed to relnove or reconstruct the fence outside of the District's right-of-way and, in
fact, Plaintiffs have now used their placement of the fence to support their claim that
the District has damaged and trespassed upon their property. To the contrary, the
District has been diligent in its efforts to avoid causing any damage to Plaintiffs'
misplaced fence or their property. Payne Affidavit, par. 12.
12) Since 2005 and 2006, the only significant activities that have been undertaken by the

District on Camps Canyon Road in the area of Plaintiffs' real property and Wagners'
real property are graveling, road grading and snow plowing. These activities are
essential to proper maintenance of all public roads. These activities and vehicular use
contribute to the movement of gravel particularly toward the sides of a road. In the
grading process, most gravel is brought back toward the road center, but inevitably
some gravel moves outward, which serves to stabilize and support the road but does
result in minimal, necessary widening of the road over time. Payne Second Affidavit,
par. 5.
13) On or about March, 2006, Robert Wagner, who was in the process of building a

residence, applied to the District using the District's standard form to obtain a permit
for an approach onto Camps Canyon Road from the Wagners' real property. Dan
Payne met with Mr. Wagner who showed me a post next to the road which he said
represented his southern property line. North of that post was an old driveway that
used to lead to a home and outbuildings on Mr. Wagner's property. At least 50 feet
further north of that driveway, Mr. Wagner had begun construction of a driveway
which he wanted to be the location of his approach permit. Dan Payne asked why he
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didn't want to use the old driveway onto his property, and he replied that his neighbor,
Plaintiff Don Halvorson thought it would encroach on his property. Mr. Wagner said
something to the effect the location he had selected was well north of the old driveway,
would "be safe" and not cause any problems with his neighbor. Dan Payne approved
his approach permit application for that location. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 6.
14) On or about April, 2006, Mr. Wagner told Dan Payne that Don Halvorson had

complained that the driveway approach was on the Halvorsons' real property. Mr.
Wagner then handed Dan Payne a copy of the legal description fiom the deed to his
property, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Dan Payne
met Mr. Wagner at Camps Canyon Road and used a measuring wheel fi-om that legal
description's point of beginning in Camps Canyon Road, which Dan Payne lined up
with Plaintiffs' fence, and measured "699 feet, more or less, along the County Road."
That distance was a great distance past the post Mr. Wagner had set for his
southeasterly comer and was south of the old driveway and approximately one hundred
feet south of the approach for which the permit had been issued. Payne Second
Affidavit, par. 7.
15) On April 12,2006, Dan Payne attended a meeting of the District commissioners where
Don Halvorson and Mr. Wagner were present and spoke about the driveway issue.
Dan Payne stated that he had measured the distance along the County Road and that, in
his opinion, the permitted approach was approximately 100 feet north of Mr. Wagner's
southern property boundary. Mr. Halvorson confirmed that the point of beginning Dan
Payne used that was based on his fence location was accurate. Dan Payne asked Mr.
Hah7orson why he thought the approach was on his property and, if so, what had
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happened to the 699 feet of road frontage shown on Mr. Wagner's deed. Mr.
Halvorson mentioned something about a "switchback" and that the road had been
moved, which Dan Payne knew to be false. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 8.
16) On or about June, 2006, Mr. Wagner told Dan Payne that Mr. Halvorson had produced
a survey and that he wanted Mr. Wagner to move his driveway. Mr. Wagner filled out
a new application and showed Dan Payne the location, which was at least one hundred
feet north of the first, permitted approach. Dan Payne approved this second application
on June 9,2006, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Payne Second
Affidavit as Exhibit B. Dan Payne revoked the first permit and threw it away as it was
no longer valid. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 9.
17) Mr. Wagner proceeded over the next weekend to construct the new driveway and he
had the rock used in construction of the first driveway pulled onto his property and had
the cut that was made for the first driveway filled in with soil. Payne Second Affidavit,
par. 10.
18) District has delegated to its foreman the responsibility to review and issue approach
permits. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 12; Second Affidavit of Dan Carscallen filed
herein on February 2,2009 ("Carscallen Second Affidavit"), par. 7.
19) Plaintiffs have not filed a petition with the District to initiate a validation proceeding
under Idaho Code section 40-203 A. Carscallen Second Affidavit, par. 8.
20) Plaintiffs filed a Tort Claim Notice with the District on November 6,2007. This is the
only tort claim notice filed by Plaintiffs with the District. Carscallen Second Affidavit,
par. 3.
2 1) Key public records related to this action are the following:
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b. Instrument No. 42441 1, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Plaintiffs' Deed" to
"Plaintiffs' real property").
c. Instrument No. 5742 1, records of Latah County, Idaho ("1 9 11 Deed").
d. 1940 aerial photo, with mapping annotations, records of Latah County, Idaho
("1940 aerial").

e. 2004 aerial photo, records of Latah County, Idaho ("2004 aerial").
f. Instrument No. 506484, records of Latah County, Idaho ("July, 2006 Sur~ey'~).
g. Amended Record of Survey, Instrument No. 5 138 19, records of Latah County,
Idaho ("May, 2007 Survey"), which describes the boundaries of the Wagners' real
property, being, for purposes of this Affidavit, the "2.78 A c t " parcel noted on the
May, 2007 survey contiguous to Camps Canyon Road.
Second Record Supplement filed herein on February 2,2009 ("Second Record
Supplement"), par. 2.
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the notice requirement of Idaho Code section 6-905 bars
certain of Plaintiffs' claims under Idaho Code sections 9-1 01 et seq.
Plaintiffs' only Tort Claim Notice ("Plaintiffs' Notice") was filed with the District on
November 6,2007. Carscallen Second Affidavit, par. 2 and Exhibit A. Plaintiffs' Notice
claimed damages to Plaintiffs' fence in 2004 and 2006, to Plaintiffs' real property related to the
District's issuance of a driveway permit to Wagners and construction of a driveway in 2006 and
for Wagners' trespass on Plaintiffs' real property beginning in 2005 and 2006. Plaintiffs'
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The Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code sections 6-901 et seq. ("ITCA") requires
claimants against political subdivisions to submit a written "claim" to the clerk or secretary of the
political subdivision within 180 days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been
discovered. Idaho Code 5 6-906. This 1SO-day period begins to run when the wrongfbl acts occur,
even if the plaintiff doesn't yet know, and could not even know the full extent of his injuries.
Mitchell v. Bingharn Mem. Hosp., 130 Idaho 420 (1997). All ITCA claims must be written. Idaho
Code 5 6-902(7). County highway district are political subdivisions for the purposes of the ECA.
Curl 17. Indian Springs Natatorium, Inc., 97 Idaho 637 (1976). Where the ITCA bars an action,
summary judgment is appropriate. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702 (Ct. App. 2004).
All of Plaintiffs' claims for damages against Defendants under ITCA, prior to May 8,
2007, being 180 days prior to the District's receipt of Plaintiffs' Notice on November 6,2007,
and all Plaintiffs' claims for which a notice of tort claim is required but which are not described
in Plaintiffs' Notice must be dismissed for failure to comply with the notice requirements
mandated by Idaho Code sections 6-905,907 and 908. Overrnan v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795,797,
654 P2d 888,890 (1982).
The barred claims include claims described in Plaintiffs' Notice for the reason that those
claims arose more than 180 days prior to Plaintiffs' filing, as follows: claims for damages to
Plaintiffs' fence in 2004,2005 and 2006 and claims for damages to Plaintiffs' real property,
including from construction of the Wagners' driveway in 2006 and claims for damages from any
alleged trespass, and/or nuisance f?om 1996 through May 8,2007. Complaint 5 1 1. E.
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The barred claims also include claims not described at all in Plaintiffs Notice, as
follows: claims that the District failed to survey and record surveys in 1996,2005 and 2006,
claims that the District failed to keep and/or maintain District records in 1996,2005 and 2006,
claims that the individual Defendants misrepresented information. See Idaho Code section 6907; Cook v. State ofIdaho, 133 Idaho 288,298,985 P.2d 1150, 1160 (1999).
District and the individual Defendants while acting within the course and scope of
employment are not liable for certain claims of Plaintiffs under Idaho Code sections 6904 and 6-904B.
The District and the individual Defendants are not liable for Plaintiffs' claims arising out
of alleged acts or omission of the individual Defendants, exercising ordinary care, "in reliance
upon or the execution or performance of a statutory.. .function...." Idaho Code section 6-904.
Plaintiffs have alleged numerous violations by Defendants of such statutory fbnctions, including
those statutes referenced in $8 11. K, 0, P. 7 and Q 8. of the Complaint, namely Idaho Code
sections 7-701 et seq., 40-203 A, 208,604,605,608, 1307, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1336,2012,2302
and 23 17,67-5232 and 8001 et seq.
ITCA establishes a "rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee
within the terms and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his
employment and without malice or criminal intent. Idaho Code section 6-903 (e). Plaintiffs'
Complaint does not set forth any facts that rebut this presumption or that show Defendants did
not exercise ordinary care in the performance of these functions. To the contrary, Dan Payne's
affidavits detail the District's due diligence in all operational matters related to this proceeding.
Facts, par. 1, 3,4, 6-9 and 11. All of these claims of violation of statutory duties fail against the
District and all individual Defendants and should be dismissed.
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Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have abused their discretion by creating improper
f

standards and policies regarding the District's management of prescriptive right of ways.
Complaint, $ J. These claims against the District's creation and implementation of policies
likewise fail under the express language of Idaho Code section 60-904 which imlnunizes the
Districts and the individual Defendant foreman and comlnissioners for the "exercise.. .failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.. .whether or not the discretion be abused."
Id. The legislature has provided such immunity from suit under the "discretionary fimction"
exception to ITCA. The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the "planning/operational" test for
determining whether this immunity exists, and, under this test, a party is immune fiom activities
involving "policy judgments and decision making." United PaciJic Railroad Company v. State
ofIdaho, 654 F. Sup. 1236, 1242 (1987) (Dist. Ct. Idaho) (citing Sterling v. Blo0172, 111 Idaho
21 1, 723 P2d 755 (1986). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims related to policy and standards issues
should be dismissed absent sufficient proof to overcome the presumption of no malice or
criminal intent.
Plaintiffs claim that the District's issuance of a driveway permit to the Wagners violates
the District's duties to Plaintiffs. Idaho Code section 6-904B(3), however, states, in part, as
follows:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and
scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without
gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which:

...
3. Arises out of the issuance.. .or revocation of.. .a permit.. .approval.. .or similar
authorization.

Idaho Code section 6-904B(3).
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The rebuttable prescription under Idaho Code section 6-903(e) that the individual Defendants
acted within the course and scope of employment and without malice or criminal intent applies
to the issuance of a permit. While the immunity of section 6-904B(3) could be breached upon
proof that rebuts the presumption or upon proof of "gross negligence or reckless, willful and
wanton conduct," there is substantial evidence on this record that Defendants used ordinary care
in the issuance and revocation. Plaintiffs' Complaint sets forth no admissible facts to the
contrary. Facts, par. 13-18. Plaintiffs' claims as to issuance of this permit should be dismissed.
Defendants have not exceeded their jurisdiction with respect to Camps Canyon Road, a
public highway established by prescription with a statutorily prescribed minimum width
of 50 feet.
The facts on this record establish that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway
established by prescription since at least 1911. Camps Canyon Road is referenced as a "County
Road" in the 1911 Deed, and, beyond that, by Orland Arneberg's recollections of the 1930's and,
more recently, by District foreman Dan Payne's continuous observations and work since 1974.
The minimum width of public highways established by user in Idaho has been 50 feet since 1887
Meservey v. Gullifovd, 14 Idaho 133,93 P.780,784 (1908); Idaho Code Section 40-23 12. The only
exception to this requirement was for those highways "consisting of a less width at the date of
enactment" of Section 932, Rev. St. 1887, in 1887. Mesewey, supra. Idaho law also holds that all
highways "may be as wide as required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of
the authority in charge of the construction and maintenance. Id. In a case that focused on the right
to install utilities beneath the surface area of a public road, the Idaho Supreme Court, relying on
Mesen~ey,rejected the argument "that public prescriptive easements should be construed as
narrowly as private prescriptive easements." Benfel v. County of Bannock, 104 Idaho 130,656 P.2d
13 83 (1983) at 133. The Court cited approvingly from Mesewey, for its holding that a 50-foot
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easement will be upheld because "common experience shows that width [is] no more than sufficient
for the proper keeping up and repair of roads generally." Bentel, supra, at 133, citing Mesewey,
supra at 148.
Mesewey states that "the right of the public is not limited to the traveled part, but such user
is evidence of a right in the public to use the whole tract as a highway, by widening the traveled part
or otherwise, as the increased travel and the exigencies of the public may require.. .." hfesewey,
supra at 784, citing Burr~owsv. Guest, 5 Utah 91, 12 P.847. Mesewey further held that "the right
acquired by prescription carries with it such width as is reasonably necessary for the reasonable
convenience of the traveling public.. .." Id. at 785. The Mesewey Court, too, stated that "it must be
borne in mind that the statute fixes the width of highways at not less than 50 feet, and common
experience shows that width no more than sufficient for the proper keeping up and repair of roads
generally. Id. Moreover, "it should be presumed that a public highway is of the prescribed width
unless the contrary is proven." H z m a h r v. Utah, 29 Utah 2nd322,324,509 P.2d 352,354 (1973).
Htrnsakev involved a highway which the landowner asserted was not of the prescribed statutory
width because it had been used as a parking lot and gas station and, therefore, the public highway
should be confined to the traveled path. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed with plaintiffs and held
that such evidence of use "does not rebut the presumed statutory width.. .." Id. at 325. That Court,
concurring with Mesewey, held:
This Court has reiterated that where the public has acquired the right to a public
hghway by user, they are not limited to such width as has been actually used. The
use carries with it such use as is reasonably necessary for the public easement of
travel.
Id.

The District has acted entirely within its legal authority in all matters pertaining to its
jurisdiction over Camps Canyon Road. Since the establishment of Camps Canyon Road as a public
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highway by user sometime prior to the early 1930's, the District, and its predecessor entities, have
not used or occupied more area than the minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho law. Payne
Affidavit, par. 5-12; Payne Second Affidavit, par. 2-5. Further, there is no evidence to prove the
contrary. Unlike Hurzsakev, there is not even evidence of competing uses, other than the fence
constructed by Plaintiffs after 1996 within the District's right of way. Of course, this effort to
confine the public road has no effect on the District's public highway rights as Plaintiffs cannot
acquire prescriptive rights against the public. Rich v. Buvdick, 83 Idaho 35,362 P2d 1088 (1961).
Plaintiffs' argument that the District's authority over the road is limited to a lesser width fails as a
matter of law.
Applying the statement of facts above to the public highway law of Idaho results in the
conclusion that the District has acted entirely within its legal authority in all matters pertaining to its
jurisdiction over Camps Canyon Road. Since the establishment of Camps Canyon Road as a public
highway by user sometime prior to the early 1930's, the District, and its predecessor entities, have
not used or occupied more area than the minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho law. Plaintiffs
have offered no evidence to the contrary in their previous submittals to this Court. They have
merely argued that the District's authority over the road is limited to a lesser width but, as a matter
of law, that assertion fails.
Plaintiffs' constitutional claims fail for the reason that the District has not exceeded its
statutory authority.
Because the facts on this record are that the District has the legal right to exclusive general
supervision and jurisdiction over the 50 foot wide public right-of-way of Camps Canyon Road,
because the District has not exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction and because such jurisdiction has
existed since 1911, the 1930's or 1974, depending on the required level of proof with any dictating

Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment -- I S

the same conclusion, Plaintiffs' taking claims fail as those claims cannot, by definition, be asserted
where there has been no taking or deprivation.
Plaintiffs' Complaint makes reference to inverse condemnation claims against Defendants
using various terms including "taking," "deprivations," misappropriation," "expansion,"
"encroachment," "use of our land," "realignment," "loss of our right to use and peacefblly enjoy,"
"seizure/confiscation," "extension," "loss of right to exclude others," "alteration," "widening and
relocating," and "crossing property line" ("inverse condemnation claims"). Complaint, §§ E, K, L,
0 and others. Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claims in connection with Camps Canyon Road

arise exclusively from (i) the District's 2005-2006 alleged "taking" of "less than a foot or two" by
the spreading gravel over Camps Canyon Road and (ii) the District's issuance of the Wagners'
driveway permit in March, 2006, which was revoked in June, 2006. Plaintiffs also assail the
District's policy of widening public, prescriptive road as an unconstitutional, impermissible use of
the District's authority.
No genuine issue has been raised in thts case about Camps Canyon Road's status as a
public, prescriptive highway. That it became a highway by user before 1911 or in the 1930's or
even as late as the 1970's is of no moment. The unrebutted proof is that it is a public highway
established by prescription. See Idaho Code section 40-202(3). There is also no question but that
Mesefvey and its progeny Idaho Code section 40-23 12, establish a minimum fifty (50) foot width

for public, prescriptive highways. Further, Plaintiffs have not offered any proof that any
circumstances existed at the point in time that Camps Canyon Road became a public htghway to be
of a lesser width.

In the recent case of Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Irzvestments, LLC, 145
Idaho 360, 179 P3d 323, in deciding a claim that asserted the acquisition of a prescriptive, public
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road pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-202(3) was an unconstitutional taking of property, the Idaho
Supreme Court held that section 40-202(3) was "not unconstitutional on its face." Id. at 369, P3d at
332. The Court then cited the limitations provision of Idaho Code section 5-224 in advising that the
"landowner has four years from the accrual of the cause of action to bring a claim of inverse
condemnation." Id.

Total Success, as applied to this case, instructs that the statute authorizing establishment of
public highways by prescription is to be given effect and that a landowner must assert any claims
adverse to the public right with four (4) years. Because no such claim was brought by a landowner
within four (4) years of the establishment of Camps Canyon Road many years ago, all rights of the
public, including in and to the statutorily established minimum fifty (50) foot width, became vested
and not subject to any future landowner's claim. Plaintiffs' claims assailing the District's
unconstitutional policies related to road maintenance and improvement fail for the same reason
because the law clearly permits the District to conduct its operations within the public, prescriptive
right-of-way, which the records establishes it has done. For these reasons, Plaintiffs' inverse
condemnation claims in all forms related to Camps Canyon Road should be dismissed as a matter of
law
Plaintiffs' remaining invase condemnation claim arises because a permit was issued to the
Wagners that, arguably, would have permitted the Wagners to cross Plaintiffs' real property before
reaching their own. District foreman Dan Payne took reasonable and appropriate actions to verify
that the permit issued to Plaintiffs' neighbors, the Wagners, was located on the Wagners' property.
While there .J an issue of fact regarding the boundary line between Plaintiffs' real property and the
Wagners' real property, that issue is not material to Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim.
Plaintiffs relied upon the June, 1996 survey, which was amended by the May, 2007 survey, in
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convincing Wagners that a portion of the Wagners' driveway approach crossed Plaintiffs' real
property and demanding that Wagners move their approach. Wagners acceded to that demand.
Facts, par 16. The permit was revoked, Wagners abandoned the initial driveway approach and the
alleged taking ceased. Further, as the permit on its face provides, the Wagners made a
representation that they owned the "property to be sewed," and it was the Wagners, not the District
that allegedly "took" and occupied Plaintiffs' real property. Under these circumstances, there was
no "taking" whatsoever by the District and, as discussed above, no liability under ITCA for such
issuance. Licensed surveyor Larry J. Hodge has opined that the Wagners were likely justified in
putting the first driveway where they did and, if so, that the District's grant of a permit was proper
in all respects. Facts, par 13 andl8; Wodge Affidavit, par. 6-10.
However, even if thts boundary issue were to be resolved in Plaintiffs' favor, the District's
conduct does not give rise to actions for damages, taking claims andlor due process violations. The
facts demonstrate that Dan Payne undertook due diligence in this matter in that he (i) received and
reviewed an application, which contains a representation that the applicant is the "owner" of the
"property to be served," (ii) personally inspected the approach, noting the lstoric driveway access
for t h s property and (iii) discussed the property boundary consideration with the applicant. The
District had every right to rely on this information in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over
the public right-of-way. The District used ordinary care and acted reasonably and in good faith in
all matters pertaining to this permit.
Plaintiffs allege violations of their substantive and procedural due process and equal
protection rights, although not specificallypled, but generally referenced under the lSf,5' and 14'
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, $5 1,2,3, 13, 14 and 17 of the Idaho State
Constitution as well as Idaho Code sections 40-203A and 208 and 42 U.S.C. $ 1983.
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Plaintiffs "predeprivation" due process claims fail for the same reason as the taking claims
and also because Idaho Code $ 30-203A provides a predeprivation process that allows any property
owner within the District system, a right "to initiate public proceedings to validate a highway or
public right-of-way" if the "location of the highway.. . cannot be accurately determined due to
numerous allegations of the highway.. .." among other provisions. Idaho Code $ 40-203A(1). This
statute speaks directly to Plaiiltiffs' circumstances, yet, as this Court has previously been advised
through a declaratoryjudgment filed by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs elected not to avail themselves of this
"predeprivation" remedy that Idaho law provides. Carscallen Second Affidavit, par. 8. The Idaho
Supreme Court has commented on this process as follows:
Idaho Code 5 40-203A entitles a resident or property holder within the county, who
is aggrieved by a decision of the board of commissioners in a validation proceeding
to judicial review I.C. 5 203A(4). ...
The Legislature has provided the method by which certain persons, or the board
having jurisdiction over the particular highway system, may initiate proceedings to
validate a road. I.C. 5 203A.
Thus, one can safely conclude that "[plroceedings for review" of county roadvalidation proceedings, as provided in I.C. $40-208, are to be characterized as
separate proceedings.. .these proceedings are the exclusive means by which a
validation decision can be challenged....

...one cannot challenge in a separate civil suit the action of a board where that
board has acted on matters within its jurisdiction.
Cobblev v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 135-134, 139 P.3d 732,735-736 (2006) (citations
omitted). Plaintiffs' efforts to force a validation decision "in a separate civil lawsuit" is proscribed
by these statutes and must be dismissed.
Neither does the District violate Plaintiffs' due process rights when no conduct by the
District has taken place that triggers a right to hearing. The District is well within its legal rights to
improve and widen a road without holding a public hearing when that improvement occurs withn
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the District's public right-of-way. Plaintiffs fail to understand that the District is empowered under
law to improve and even widen public highways so long as that activity does not occur beyond the
lawful, minimum 50 foot width of that highway. Moreover, even if the District's activities resulted
in the District making a claim to the roadway, it would not be a violation of Plaintiffs' due process
rights even if no notice was provided to them. Total Sz~ccess,Supra at 372, P.3d at 371. The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that adequate notice is provided by "the statute itself, I.C. 4 40-202(3),
which provides that highways include those used and maintained by the public for five years." Id.
See also Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967,970,703 P.2d 1342,1345 (1985).
Moreover, the courts have been reticent to apply a broad stroke requiring a hearing before
every deprivation of a person's rights. See Matthews v. EZdridge, 424 U.S. 3 19,335 (1976); see
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,268-9 (1970). The Matthews and Goldberg cases illustrate
that the degree of potential deprivation that may be caused by a particular decision is a factor in
assessing the validity of the process, as is the fairness and reliability of the process and the probably
value, if any, of the additional procedural safeguards. Id. A final factor in striking the appropriate
due process is the "public interest." This includes the administrative burden and other societal costs
that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing
upon demand in all cases.. .." Matthew, supra at 347. The administrative costs to the District in
matters such as the instant case would outweigh any safeguard. Moreover, this case is unique in the
District's history which is evidence that fms alleged problem does not need additional safeguards.
See Anleberg Affidavit, par. 10.
Therefore, given that Plaintiffs have not shown a deprivation, have an available
predeprivation remedy, and have not shown that a hearing is warranted under the due process
considerations of this case, Plaintiffs' claims in this regard fail and must be dismissed. In addition,
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42 U.S.C. § 1932 claims must be brought before the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims brougbt in Idaho courts is two years.
Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308; Idaho Code 8 5-219(4) (2005). In this case, Plaintiffs filed their
Complaint on March 3,2008. Therefore, to the extent the Court does not dismiss all Plaintiffs'
federal due process claims for the reasons set forth above, this Court should dismiss as untimely all
claims based on conduct that took place before March 3,2006.
Moreover, the issuance of a driveway permit does not require a due process hearing. Idaho
Code section 40-13 10 (8) expressly provides for delegation of that supervisory authority to the
board of commissioners. ("The highway district board of commissioners shall have exclusive
general supervisory authority, over all public highways.. .under their jurisdiction, with full power to
establish design standards, use standards.. .and to control access to said public highways.. ..'3; see
also Matthews, supra. This exercise of this express authority to "establish use standards" and
"control access" is what occurred in connection with issuance of the first driveway permit. Title 40
of the Idaho Code does not require that the District conduct a due process hearing for issuance of a
driveway permit. Other District actions do, including abandonment and validation proceedings,
which are not implicated in this case.
Plaintiffs' claims to abate nuisance should be dismissed as no trespass has occurred and the
alleged driveway nuisance has been abated.
Plaintiffs allege continuous torts of nuisance and trespass in relation to road widening for
whch there is no factual support in this record as discussed at length hereinabove and such
equitable claims should be dismissed. Plaintiffs allege a continuing tort of nuisance and trespass in
relation to the issuance of the Wagners' driveway permit, however, that permit was revoked by the
District and Wagners vacated the disputed area three (3) months after the initial permit was issued
and twenty-one (21) months prior to the commencement of this action. Plaintiffs' allegations in t h s
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regard are blatantly false and Plaintiffs' claim for equitable relief in regard to the driveway permit
should be dismissed.
Plaintiffs7remaining claims are infirm for various reasons and, as a matter of law, should be
dismissed.
Plaintiffs' remaining claims should be dismissed as a matter of law for various reasons.
First, Plaintiffs claim relief based on a number of theories that are not supported by law. Where the
Plaintiffs have failed to establish their prima facie case, summaryjudgment is appropriate. Gavzee
v. BavkZey, 121 Idaho 88 1 (Ct. App. 1992). A claim has been satisfactorily stated if it contains "a

concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief." Clark v.
OZsen, 110 Idaho 323 (1986) (citing Id. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)(2)). The complaint must be phrased as a
series of numbered paragraphs, each of which is limited to a single set of circumstances. Id. R. Civ
P. 10(b) Plaintiffs' claims, when taken together, are not concise, as required by Rule 8(a)(1)(2).
Plaintiffs' Complaint's length, disorganization, repetitiveness and lack of factual support render
Plaintiffs' Complaint unsatisfactory as Plaintiffs' claims are difficult to ascertain.
Plaintiffs complain of some conduct that does not support any cognizable claim - e.g., "the
conduct of the defendants.. .has been deliberate, flagrant, arbitrary, and offensive to the sense of
democracy and to the sense of good government...." (Plaintiffs' Complaint at 5 1I.U.)' "the lack of
any agency structure and the arbitrary disregard to resolve disputes and violations, the fomenting of
neighborly disputes.. .," (Id. at 5 E and see also, 5 E. 6., P., P.2, Q.f.xiii.(a), "negotiating in bad
faith" (Id.), "misrepresentation of statements and legal views and rulings.. .and questionable
applications of or statements.. .of standards (Id at § Q.f.xii; see also, 5 Q.f.xiii(b)), "violated the
doctrine of quasi-estoppel" (Id. at $Q.f.xiii(c)) and "testimony.. .flagrantly intended to thwart any
and all remedies.. ." (Id. at 5 R.(6).) .
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Other of Plaintiffs' claims fail to state any cause of action. Plaintiffs' Complaint
specifically alleges violation of at least three statutory criminal provisions: § 18-7001, malicious
injury to property; 5 18-7008, trespass; and, 5 18-7012 destruction of fences. Plaintiffs, as civil
litigants, have no authority to prosecute criminal offenses, and so these allegations facially fail to
state any claim.
Other Plaintiffs' claims fail for lack of any factual assertion and include those related to
District's alleged failure to train and failure to supervise, the claim for punitive damages and other
claims perhaps unmentioned as a result of the disorganization and complexity of Plaintiffs'
Complaint and the difficulty in ascertaining claims.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfilly request the Court's order granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs as to all claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Defendants move under Rule 1l (a)(l) I.R.C.P. and Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and
12-123 for an award of their attorney fees incurred herein as Plaintiffs' Complaint for the reasons
that Defendants are the prevailing parties and that Plaintiffs pursued this action unreasonably, that
Plaintiffs acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law and that Plaintiffs pursued claims not wellgrounded in fact and warranted by existing law, all as described above in this Brief
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of February, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifjr that on this 2nd day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ ]U.S.Mail
[ 1 Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ IFAX
[ XI Hand Delivery

T

Ro Id J. Landeck
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

1
) Case No. CV 2008- 180

1
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,

) AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY J. HODGE

1
1
1

)
)

1
)
)
)

1
)

Defendants.

1

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.

County of Latah

1

Larry J. Hodge, upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age, am competent to testify to the matters set forth
herein and make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY J. HODCE -- 1

2. I am licensed and work as a professional engineer and land surveyor in the State of
Idaho.
3. My firm, Hodge & Associates, Inc., of which I am President, has been retained by
Ronald J. Landeck, P.C., attorney at law, to provide expert, professional land surveyor advice to
and testimony on behalf of the North Latah County Highway District in this action.
4. In connection with these services, I have reviewed the following attached documents:
a) Instrument No. 501677, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Wagners' Deed" to
"Wagners' real property" as defined below).
b) Instrument No. 42441 1, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Plaintiffs' Deed" to
"Plaintiffs' real property").
c) Instrument No. 5742 1, records of Latah County, Idaho (:'I 91 1 Deed").
d) 1940 aerial photo, with mapping annotations, records of Latah County, Idaho
('"940 aerial").
e) 2004 aerial photo, records of Latah County, Idaho ("2004 aerial").
Instrument No. 506484, records of Latah County, Idaho ("July, 2006 Survey").

g) Amended Record of Survey, Instrument No. 5 138 19, records of Latah County,
Idaho ("May, 2007 Sun~ey''),which describes the boundaries of the Wagners'
real property, being, for purposes of this Affidavit, the "2.78 AC4" parcel noted
on the May, 2007 survey contiguous to Camps Canyon Road.

5. In my professional opinion, the locatiol~of Camps Canyon Road in the area between
Plaintiffs' real property and Wagners' real property has not been changed to any significant
degree, if at all, between 1940 and 2004.
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6. In my professional opinion, a more accurate and legally appropriate record of survey
of the boundaries of Wagners' real property, than the survey description contained in the May,
2007 Survey, would be to give effect to all of the distances set forth in Plaintiffs' Deed and
Wagners' Deed (which are identical distances despite references to "rods" and "feet" in
Plaintiffs' Deed which were converted to "feet" only in Wagners' Deed) fiom the point of
beginning on the County Road back to that same point of beginning. This results in recognition
of all distances described in these instruments. The May, 2007 survey, on the contrary,
recognizes all distances except (i) the distance of "699 feet, more or less, along the County
Road," which the May, 2007 survey shows as 468.6 feet and (ii) the connecting "due North"
distance of 104 feet, which the May 2007 survey shows as 156.54 feet.
7. In my opinion, not recognizing the "699 feet, more or less along the County Road"
and reducing that to 468.6 feet does not support the intent of the parties to the 1911 Deed.
Althougll the term, "more or less" is used in the 1911 Deed, that term, under generally applied
surveying standards, would not pennit a deviation of that magnitude. That is, principally, why I
believe the survey should incorporate the 699-foot distance along the County Road. Another
supporting principle is that the County Road is a de facto monument for surveying purposes and
the distance between the two points on that road should take precedence over other calls in the
1911 Deed.

8. Other evidence to support this opinion exists upon observation of the 1940 aerial
from the Latah County Assessor's records, which shows the southerly boundary of Wagners' real
property running on a southeasterly course and utilizes all distances described in these deeds. I
also note that configuration of Wagners' real property in the 1940 aerial includes the driveway
serving the Wagners' real property which was then apparently owned and occupied by "Charles
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E. Harris," as noted thereon. The distances that comprise the "3.4" acre parcel shown on the
1940 aerial, generally appear consistent with the distances set forth in the 1911 Deed, Plaintiffs'
Deed and Wagners' Deed.

9. My opinions are based on my 32 years work as a licensed surveyor and, in various
parts upon authoritative sources, including: (i) Writing Legal Descriptions, by Gurdon H.
Wattles and, in particular, p. 11.18 thereof which deals with ties and boundaries, wherein there is
a quote from Corpus Juris for the proposition "concerning course or distance.. .that the true rule
is that one or the other shall be preferred according to the manifest intention of parties and the
circumstances of the case;" (ii) a review of some pertinent Idaho case law, including Hogan v.
Blakney, 73 Idaho 274 (1 952), which states that "in interpreting and construing deeds, the
primary rule to be observed is that the real intention of the parties.. .is to be sought and carried
out whenever possible," and Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82 (1952), in which the Idaho
Supreme Court states that in the construction of deeds, the "general rule is that monuments,
natural or artificial, or lines marked on the ground, control over calls for courses and distances;"
and (iii) Clark on Suweying and Boundaries (Fifth Edition), and, in particular,

5 16.36, thereof

which states that the use of the "term 'more or less' will permit a slight deviation fkom the
measurement."
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The above statements are true to the best of my knourledge.
Dated this 29thday of January, 2009.

N TO before me this 29th day of January, 2009.

w e & -

NOTARY PUBLIC for the Statc of Idaho
My commission expires: 8-1 7- d 0 / 3

CERTIFICNE OF SERVICE
I hercby certifl that on

u

,2009, I caused a true and

correct copy of this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated
below:
DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537
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U S . Mail
] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
N H a n d Delivery

FAX NO. 2088824255

WRRRANTY DEED
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, J.9MES E. HUFF & PATRICIA A. HUFF TRUST, dated J u l y
4, 1999, the grantor?, do hereby grant, bargain, eel1 and convey unto:

ROBERT F. WAONER AND KATE A. WAGNER

husband and wife

P.O. Box 712
Troy, Idaho 83871
the grantees, the following described premises situated in Lacah County,
State of Idaho, to-wit:
SEE ATTACHED CONTINUED SCHEDULE A
TOGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments aIid
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, including a l l
water and water rights, ditch and dicch rights.
SUBJECT to reservations in United States patent, reotrfctive covenants,
existing and recorded rights-of-wayand easements, zoning and building
ordinances, and taxes and assessments as prorated between the parties
hereto.

TO HAVE AFTD TO HOLD the said premises, with cheir appurtenances unto
the eaid Grantees, their successors, heirti and assigns forever. Said
Grantors do hereby covenant to and with said Gr&?cees, that they are the
owners in fee simple of said prercises; that saia premises are f r e e from
all encumbrances except as hereinabove set forth and that they will
warrant and defend ths same from all lawful claims whatsoever.

!-%TED this ,&$&-day

of December, 2005

JAMES E. HUFF & PATRICIA A. HUFF TRUS"

.
county

,
f

op SAC&

-

SS

IT gd7;j

On this&
day a£ December. 2005, before me, =he
undersigned, a Xotary Public in and for said state, personally appeared
JAMES li. HUFF AND PATRICIA A. tiUFF, Trustees of the J M S E. & PATRICIA A.
HUFF TRUST, known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the
above and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed
the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereur.to set my hand and affixed my notarial

ComrnrWan # 1509727 1
~otaryP W ~ CaUfomia
:
f
Sacramento C
F

-

cz-Uc".

..

DEC-15-2005
..

THU

LATAHCOUNTYTITLE

FAX NO. 2083824255

P O 4 #0.1(156-8

A11 Polioy Q e m

The land referred to in this policy is situated i n rhe S t a t e of
Idaho, County of Latah and is described as follows:
The NE1/4sW1/4, SW1/4NE1/4, NW1/4sEl/a and the ~ 1 / 2 ~ E 1 / 4 N W l /of
4
section 15, Township 39 North, Range 3 West, B.M.

AND a parcel o f land located i n the SE1/4NEL/4
being more particularly described as follows:

o f said Section 15,

a point where the public toad passes through the West
line of said S E 1 / 4 ~ ~ 1 / 4the
,
same being South 201 feet, more or le66,
of t h e Northwest corner of said SE1/4NE1/4; thence due South 418
feet$ thence due East 379.50 feet; thence due North 104 f e e t , mare or
l e s s , to the County Road; thence in a Northwesterly direction 699
feet, more or l e e s , along the Co~lr,tyRoad to the POINT OF BEGINNING.

BEGINNING a t

rcrurrhtlr
R)(Y

QlUtl d

I-.

ALL HEn PY TEESE PRESGIRS:

That A. &bard S w a m o n md G l a d y s Swanson, husband and r i f e of
1021 G r l n l U o d Road, Troy. Idaho 83871, Grantor (sl f o r and I n
c d a s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e sum of T m D o l l a r s ($10.001, and o t h e r good
and valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n , Fn hand paid, the r e c e i p t oE r h i c h is
Srreby actnovledgeb, b these p r e s e n t s g r a n t , bargain, s e l l . convey
and warrant unto Donard ..I
Emloorson and C h a r l o t t e R. Halvoreon.
huband and wife of 1550 L l t t l e Bear Road, Troy, Idaho 63871,
Grantees, the following described r e a l property s i t u a t e d i n the
S t a t e of Idaho, County o f Latah t o wit:

See schedule .cg a t t a c h e d hereto and incorporated herein by
reference.
hereditaments and appurtenances
t o g e t h e r vith a11 te-nts,
t b c r e u n t o belongioq, o r i n anyuise appertaining. and G r a n t o r l s )
oorspsnt and warrant that the above-described premises are f r e e and
clear tram a l l l i e n s . and cncu&trances,excepting those of r e c o r d ,
and t h a t they will and t h e i r b c i r s , e x e c u t o r s , a h l n l s t r a t o r s and
.asipna shall forever warrant and defend a fee simple and
merchantable t i t l e t h e r e i n , a g a i n s t a11 lawful denands, except
w r a n c e s of record.
t h i s Warranty Deed
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICML DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
VS.

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

)
) Case No. CV 2008-180
)
) SECOND AFFIDAVIT
) OF DAN CARSCALLEN
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Latah

) ss.
)

Dan Carscallen, upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age, am competent to testify to the matters set forth
herein and make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN -- 1

2. I am the Secretary of the North Latah County Highway District ("District") and, as
such, custodian of and responsible for the District's official records.
3. A certain Tort Claim Notice, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A, was hand-delivered to me at the District on November 6,2007, by Plaintiff Don
Halvorson. This is the only tort claim notice that the District has received fi-om Plaintiffs.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the District's standard
Application and Permit to Use Public Right-Of-Way-Approaches and General Provisions that
District foremen require be completed by applicants and approved before approaches can be
constructed onto District highways and right-of-way.
5. Attached as Exhibit C hereto is a true and correct copy of a Manual for Use of Public
Right of Way Standard Approach Policy prepared by the Local Highway Technical Assistance
Council, a State of Idaho legislative agency. The District has adopted this Manual and the
District's foremen use this Manual, including the standardized Application and General
Provisions set forth on pages 10 and 11 of the Manual, in the review and issuance of approach
permits.
6. As stated in Section 1.B. on page 2 of the Manual, the authority of the District to
regulate the use of public right-of-way is found in:
3. Section 40- 1310, Idaho Code, gives highway districts supervisory
authority over access to the public right-of-way under their jurisdiction.
4. Section 50-1330, Idaho Code, gives highway districts authority over
the public streets and public right-of-way under their jurisdiction.

Further, Sections 1.B. and 1.C. of the Manual describe the permit process for controlling access
onto the public right-of-way. (See Exhibit C, page 8.)

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN -- 2

7. At all times relevant to this action the District's Commissioners have delegated the
issuing of such approach permits to the District's foremen who are employees of the District.
Idaho Code section 40-13 10 (1) expressly allows the District's Commissioners to delegate this
supervisory responsibility to the District's employees.
8. The District has determined that $750 is a reasonable fee, as permitted under Idaho

Code section 40-203 A, to cover the cost of validation proceedings under said section 40-203 A,
and has adopted that as the fee for a petitioner to initiate a validation proceeding. At no time
have Plaintiffs submitted a petition for validation to the District or paid the required fee.
9. At no time relevant to this action have Plaintiffs filed any petition or other request
with the District that, in my opinion as District Secretary with advice from legal counsel, would
require publication of notice and a public hearing under applicable law.
10. I have been present at all meetings of the District Commissioners which Plaintiffs, or
either of them, attended since 2006. At no time was any commissioner or other representative of
the District disrespectfkl in any manner to Plaintiffs.
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 3othday of January, 2009.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of January, 2009.

NOTARYPUBLIC for the State of Idaho
My commission expires: 8 - /7 -a
1
3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ ]U.S.Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ XI Hand Delivery
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North Latah County I+ighGy District
1132 White Ave.
Moscow, Idaho, 83843

November 1, 2007

Tort Claim Notice
Claimant's Name: Don and Charlotte Halvorson
Current Address: 1290 American Ridge Road (address current for the last 6 months)
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
Telephone Numbers: Home-(208) 289-5602
Cell-(208) 669-0909
E-mail address: sprnqbrkranch@huqhes.net

INCIDENTIS INFORMATION
Dates: Fall of 2004 until spring of 2007
Location of Incidents: Latah County, Idaho NESE Section 15 T39NR3WBM
Name of road: Camps Canyon Road
Responsible Agency: North Latah County Hiqhwav District
Type of Damagellnjury: Economic and non economic
Description of ComplainVs or IncidenVs:

1.
-

During road maintenance an unnamed employee of the NLCHD
pushed a wind fallen tree through our fence in the fall of 2004. Under the
color of law, and without ordinary care said employee willfully, recklessly,
wantonly and with gross negligence damaged our fence and was the direct,
proximate, and legal cause of the violation our property rights. Our fence is
rightfully built and rightfully positioned and neither our fence nor the buffer
between the road bed and our fence is under the authority of the NLCHD.
Further our pasture is not the repository for the NLCHD's unwanted debris.
Names of witnesseslinvolved parties
1. Jon Van Houten (he sawed the tree out of the road)
Troy, ldaho 83571
(208) 835-5311
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2. Joe Yockey (he saw the grader go by and heard the wires creak)
1061 Claypit Road
Troy, ldaho 83571
(208) 835-6831
2. During the years of 2005 and 2006 the NLCHD has widened Camps
Canyon Road and has, under the color of law, confiscated our land along
an1/8 mile stretch of the north side of the road in the Northwest corner of
NESE of Section 15 and has encroached upon cur fence. Confiscation
took place without just compensation or due process.
3. Under the color of law, the NLCHD, without ordinary or reasonable
care, and with willful, reckless or wanton conduct, or with gross
negligence, and both in acting in bad faith and negotiating in bad faith,
confiscated a portion of our property by issuing a permit for a driveway
access in March 2006 and without revocation of said permit did hold to
possession of said property for a determined period of time. We allege
that the NLCHD was the direct, proximate, and legal cause of the
deprivation of our constitutionally protected property rights, that our
property was taken from us without due process or equal treatment
under the law, and that our property was taken for non public use.
Further, the NLCHD, failed to remedy the taking and in so failing to act
has not returned the property to us. Further, the NLCHD misrepresented
the facts and situation of the previouslhistoric driveway.
Names of witnesseslinvolved parties
I.Bob and Kate Wagner
Troy, ldaho 83571
(208) 835-4215
4.
Under
the
color
of law, and both in acting in bad faith and in negotiating
in bad faith the NLCHD did permit and advocate the construction of a
driveway across our property and were the direct, proximate, and legal
cause of creating a nuisance which, did damage both in loss of soil and in
disfiguration of the landscape, resulted in the loss of enjoyment of our land,
and fomented a neighborly dispute. Further, in failing to revoke and
remedy this nuisance the NLCHD necessitated actions to abate this
nuisance. These actions and the consequential bad feelings which have
arisen from these actions would have been totally unnecessary if the
NLCHD, its commissioners and its employees had not abdicated
their public interest responsibility and had acted reasonably and with
ordinary care. Further the NLCHD misrepresented the facts and situation of
the previouslhistoric driveway.
Names of witnesseslinvolved parties
I.Bob and Kate Wagner
Troy, ldaho 83571
(208) 835-42 15

-
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5. During the widening of the road, under the color of law, the 'NLCHD
-

employees pushed a compaction roller through our fence and altered the
runoff drainage from the road, undermining the corner support post of our
fence and eroding land in the summer of 2006. Under the color of law,
without ordinary care, and with willful, reckless or wanton conduct, or with
gross negligence, the NLCHD was the direct, proximate and legal cause
of damage to our fence and to our ground (erosion). In this action the
NLCHD has taken additional land for runoff drainage from the road.
6. During their widening of the road, under the color of law, the NLCHD
buried the wires of our fence during the summer of 2006. Under the color
of law, the NLCHD, without ordinary care, and with willful, reckless or
wanton conduct, or with gross negligence were the direct, proximate and
legal cause of damage to our fence. Further, future damage is foreseeable
due to the lack of buffer between the road bed and the fence.
7. [Jnder the color of law, the NLCHD, the NLCHD commissioners, and/or
the employees of the NLCHD have with deliberate indifference
in officially sanctioned acts and omissions or in the manner of inadequate
employee training, and in spite of the obvious need for such training have
deprived us, of our constitutional rights. Our rights to own, and to enjoy
and to restrict access to our land has been deprived by these acts
and omissions, in any and in total as stated above, by the NLCHD, the
commissioners of the NLCHD, and! or the employees of the NLCHD. The
NLCHD, the commissioners of the NLCHD, andlor the employees of the
NLCHD are the direct, proximate, and legal cause of the deprivation of
these rights. In clearly established laws the NLCHD, the commissioners of
the NLCHD, in their individual and in their official capacities, as stated
above have deprived us of these constitutionally protected rights. These
actors have done so without ordinary care, and done so recklessly,
intentionally, willfully, wantonly, and with gross negligence, and without due
process and equal treatment of the law.

AMOUNT OF CLAIM
1. Cornpensatow damages for I ) the taking and holding of our private
property (driveway access) in the sum of
$150/day during the time the deprivation of our
property rights took place.
($150 X 579 days=$86850) This is the amount
accrued to 11/1/07. No final disposition was
ever given by the NLCHD.
2) for the value of the land taken by road widening
of 2005 and 2006 in the sum of $1000.
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2. Damages to fence for all complaints in total in the sum of $1250.
3. Damaqes to land due to construction of driveway access for loss of top soil,
alteration and disfiguration of landscape and subsequent erosion in the amount of
$3000.
4. Legal costs in the amount of $500.
5. General or consequential damages (abatement costs) in the amount of $5150.
6. For the loss of the enjoyment of land in the amounts of $25000.
7. Erection of a barrier to prevent further intrusion of soil, gravel, and lor snow
during routine maintenance onto our land and damage to our fence.
8. Survey of the entire length of Camps Canyon Road as it crosses the NESE
SectionlSN39WBM and demarcation of the NLCHD right-of-way to be described
as follows: From east to west the right-of-way shall extend from the present
center of the road 25 feet to the north of the center line and 25 feet south of the
centerline for the distance covering the east half of the NESE Sectionl5N39WBM.
For the west half of the NESE Section 15N39N3WBM the right-of-way shall be
considered to be the north edge of the road bed except in such instances that the
road bed encroaches on or comes within 3 feet of the fence. In these instances
the right-of-way shall be 3 feet to the north of the present fence. For what
remaining distance lies between the half way mark and the property line with the
Wagners on the south side of the road bed the right-of-way shall be whatever the
old prescriptive right-of-way may remain effective.
9. Return the drainage at the corral to its 1996 position.

Don Halvorson

11/1/07
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APPLlCATlON AND PERMIT 10 USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY

-- APPROACHES

COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SITE DURING CONSTRUCTION
PUBLIC ROAD SURFACE TYPE: (DIRT) (GRAVEL) (PAVEMENT)
Start Date:

NOTICE
This permit shall not be valid for excavation
until, or unless, the provision of Idaho code,
Title 55, Chapter 22 have been complied
with.
PRIOR T O EXCAVATION, CALL ONE
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE

Est. Completion Date:
Road Name:
Location:
Sight Distance:

Telephone No.

Posted Speed:

II

APPROACH
Single Residence
Multiple Residence

NO.Served

Business type

I

WIDTH

1-800-342-1 585

SURFACE TYPE

ESTIMATED ADT

(VEHICLE COUNT)

Must meet the requirements of North Latah County Highway District (NLCHD)
Approach Policy and 549-222, ldaho Code.

Agriculture

I

Explain:
ATTACH SKETCH OF PROPOSED WORK AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS:
SPECIAL PROVISIONS:
Other

See reverse side for General Provisions.
I CERTIFY THAT I AM THE OWNER OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPOSED PROPERTY TO BE
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEREON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE, THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MADE A PART OF
THlS PERMIT.
APPLICANT-PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT
NAME OF PERMITTEE
I

ADDRESS

SIGNATURE OW NERI AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

CITY STATE ZIP

DATE

L

I

SUBJECT TO ALL TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND PROVISIONS SHOWN ON THIS FORM OR AnACHMENTS, PERMISSION IS HEREBY
GRANTED TO THE ABOVE-NAMED APPLICANT TO PERFORM THE WORK DESCRIBED ABOVE.
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT USE
TEMPORARY PERMIT
Tentative approval subject to inspection of installation.

Approved
Date:
Corrections Required:

FINAL PERMIT
R e j e c t e d

Date:

Date:
By:

NLCHD Authorized Representative

Approved by:
NLCHD Authorized Representative
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NORTH UTAH COUNTY HIG

DISTRICT

GENERAL PROVISIONS

2. The NLCHD may change, amend or terminate this permit or any of the conditions herein enumerated if permittee
fails to comply with its provisions or requirements as set forth herein.

3. Approaches shall be for the bona fide purpose of securing access and not for the purpose of parking, conducting
business, or servicing vehicles on the public right-of-way.
4. No revisions or additions shall be made to an approach or its appurtenances on the public right-of-way without
the written permission of the NLCHD.
5. The permittee shall furnish all material, labor and equipment involved in the construction of the approach and its
appurtenances. This shall include furnishing approved drainage pipe of a size specified on permit (12 inch
minimum) curb and gutter, concrete sidewalk, etc., where required. Materials and workmanship shall be good
quality and are subject to inspection and approval by the NLCHD.

6. The NLCHD reserves the right to require the permittee, its successors and assigns, at any time, to make such
changes, additions, repairs and relocations to any approach or its appurtenances within the public right-of-way
as may be necessary to permit the relocation, reconstruction, widening, drainage, and maintenance of the
roadway andlor to provide proper protection to life and property on or adjacent to the roadway.
7. Approaches shall conform to the plans made a part of this permit. Adequate drawings or sketches shall be
included showing the design, materials, construction requirements and proposed location of the approach. All
approaches shall be in accordance with Exhibits 9 and 13 of the Manual for Use of Public Right of Way Standard Approach Policy.

8. During the construction of the approach(es), such barricades, signs and other traffic control devices shall be
erected and maintained by the permittee, as may be deemed necessary by the NLCHD. Said devices shall conform
to the current issue of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Parked equipment and stored materials
shall be as far from the traveled way as feasible. Items stored within 30 feet of the traveled way shall be marked
and protected. The NLCHD may provide barricades (when available) upon request.
9. In accepting this permit, the permittee, its successors and assigns, agrees to hold the NLCHD harmless from any
liability caused by the installation, construction, maintenance or operation of the approach(es).
10. If the work done under this permit interferes in any way with the drainage of the roadway, the permittee shall
wholly and at his own expense make such provision as the NLCHD may direct to take care of said drainage
problem.
11. Upon completion of said work herein contemplated, all rubbish and debris shall be immediately removed and
the roadway and roadside shall be left neat and presentable and to the satisfaction of the NLCHD.
12. The permittee shall maintain at his or their sole expense the structure or object for which this permit is granted
in a condition satisfactory to the NLCHD.
13. Neither the acceptance of this permit nor anything herein contained shall be construed as a waiver by the
permittee of any rights given it by the constitution or laws of the state of Idaho or of the United States.
14. No work shall be started until an authorized representative of the NLCHD has given written notice to the
permittee to proceed, except in case of an emergency when verbal authorization may be given with a written permit
and fee required within five (5) working days.
15. This permit shall be void unless the work herein contemplated shall have been completed before 30 days
unless otherwise arranged with local road foreman.
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MANUAL FOR
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STANDARD APPROACH POLICY

Local Highway Technical Assistance Council
3330 Grace St.
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September 1997
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LOCAL HIGHWAY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COUNCIL
3330 Grace,St.
BOISE, IDAHO 83703

MANUAL FOR
USE OF PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY
STANDARD APPROACH POLICY

PREFACE
This document is one of several produced by the Local Highway Technical Assistance
Council, (LHTAC) in an attempt to assist the Local Highway Jurisdictions in controlling
the use of their public rights-of-way. It is the intent that the document be applicable to
city, county, and highway district jurisdictions equally, regardless of size.
It is hoped that the Local Highway Jurisdictions will officially adopt this document and
incorporate it into their city, county, or highway district operational activities. If your
present standards exceed those presented in this document, it may be appropriate to
adopt the more restrictive of the two. These standards are a suggested standard and
may be modified to meet the needs of each Local Highway Jurisdiction.
LHTAC welcomes any comments, questions, and suggestions you may have
concerning this manual.
Additional copies of the manual can be obtained by sending a check or money order for
$5.00 to LHTAC, 3330 Grace St., Boise, Idaho 83703.
Electronic copies of this manual and others can be obtained by containing LHTAC at
1-800-259-6841 or 1-208-344-0565, or E-mail at Ihtac@micron.net, or by writing to
LHTAC at the above address.
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NOTICE
THIS APPROACH DOES NOT HAVE A

T AS REQUIRED BY THE

PLEASE CALL

FOR

INFORMATION WITHIN 10 DAYS OR
APPROACH MAY BE REMOVED.
DATE:
CONTACT:
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GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

1.

SECTION I

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
A.

INTRODUCTION

The efficiency and safety of modern streets and highways are directly related to
the number of approaches, the design of approaches, the character of
roadside interference and roadside obstacles. Uncontrolled approaches
nullify carefully planned safety and maintenance features of highways.
Highway frontage property owners have certain rights of access to and use of
public right-of-way. The traveling public has a right to safety, freedom of
movement, and the efficient expenditure of highway funds.
The Local Highway Jurisdiction, (LHJ) is responsible for reviewing each
application for an approach to see that operational efficiency and safety of
the highway are not unduly compromised when granting access to the
property owner. Operationally unsafe approaches should not be granted.
Alternate means of access should be developed.
The number of approaches should be kept to the minimum required to handle
the anticipated volume of vehicles.
B.

PERMIT REQUIRED

To help preserve the highways as constructed and provide responsible growth
where allowed, any applicant planning to construct an approach to access
the public right-of-way for any purpose shall obtain an approved
"Application and Permit to Use Right-of-way (Approaches)." See Exhibit
3.
NO WORK OF ANY NATURE SHALL BE PERFORMED ON PUBLIC RIGHTOF-WAY UNTIL AN APPROVED PERMIT HAS BEEN ISSUED. In an
emergency, approval may be given in advance of processing the permit.
The permit process should be discussed with the applicant regarding the type of
permit application and the type of access control in effect for the roadway
segment where the permit is requested.
Applicant shall be informed of local policies and rules concerning approaches
and shall pay for any changes or adjustments of highway features or
fixtures brought about by actions, operations or requirements caused by
the applicant.
The authority to regulate the use of the public right-of-way of Local Highway
Jurisdictions (LHJ) is cited as follows:

June 1995

7 of 4 2
EXHIBIT C

1:7>

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

C.

SECTION I

1.

Section 50-314, ldaho Code, gives the cities authority over the
streets and alleys within their jurisdiction.

2.

Section 31-805, ldaho Code, gives counties authority over the
public streets and highways within their jurisdiction.

3.

Section 40-1310, ldaho Code, gives highway districts supervisory
authority over access to the public right-of-way under their
jurisdiction.

4.

Section 50-1330, ldaho Code, gives highway districts authority over
the public streets and public right-of-way under their jurisdiction.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISSUING PERMITS

The issuing of permits may be delegated to a staff member of the governing
authority. Otherwise, all permits will be issued by the elected officials of
the governing authority.
D.

s49-221, IDAHO CODE

49-221 . Removal of traffic hazards.
Please look for updated ldaho Code referenced in this manual at:
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II.

SECTION II

DEFINITION OF TERMS, (See Exhibits 1 and 2 - Figures II,A,A and II,A,B)
A.

TERMS

-

ACTUAL COSTS As used in Section III,B and III,F of this manual, these
costs are those incurred by the Local Highway Jurisdiction, (LHJ) for
inspection personnel, (public or private) and for contractual services to
have plans reviewed when these reviews are beyond the capability of the
LHJ. LHJ costs would include wages, (loaded rate) travel, subsistence,
and other expenses incurred. Other fees would be for personal services
invoices. The intent is to recover LHJ costs only.

-

APPLICANT Any person, persons, corporation, partnership, or other
singular or plural individuals making application to the LHJ for an
approach.

-

APPROACH The section of the public right-of-way between the outside
edge of the roadway shoulder and the public right-of-way line which is
designed as an approved roadway for the movement of vehicles between
the public roadway and the abutting property.

-

APPROACH FLARE The curve radius connecting the approach to the
outside edge of the roadway shoulder. Sometimes referred to as the fillet.

-

APPROACH SKEW ANGLE The acute angle between the highway
centerline and the extended approach centerline.

-

APPROACH TRANSITION
The area from the edge of an urban
approach sloped to match the curb and border area elevations.

-

APPROACH WIDTH
Width of the approach excluding flares or
transitions measured along the curb line or outside edge of shoulder in
urban sections and perpendicular to approach roadway in rural sections.

-

BORDER AREA The area outside the roadway, auxiliary lanes and
shoulders, constructed and maintained as wide, flat, rounded, and as free
from physical obstructions and practical.

-

CONTROLLED ACCESS HIGHWAY A highway where rights of abutting
landowners or others to access, light, air or view - in connection to a
highway - are partially or fully controlled by public authority.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS

CORNER CLEARANCE - At an intersecting street or highway, the
distance measured along the outside edge of shoulder or curb line,
between the beginning or end of the intersecting street or road approach
flare and extension of the nearest private approach edge, excluding flares
or transitions.

-

DISTANCE BETWEEN APPROACHES The distance measured along
the curb line or outside edge of shoulder between the extensions of the
near edges of adjacent approaches, excluding the flares or transitions.

-

FLARE TANGENT DISTANCE OR TRANSITION TANGENT DISTANCE
The distance, measured along the curb line or outside edge of shoulder,
from the extension of the approach edge to the end of the approach flare
or transition.

-

FRONTAGE The distance for which a separate property is contiguous to
public right-of-way measured along the curb line or outside edge of
shoulder, between frontage boundary lines of the property.

-

FRONTAGE BOUNDARY LINE A line perpendicular to the highway
centerline that passes through the point of intersection of the property line
and the public right-of-way line.

-

HIGHWAY The entire width between the boundary lines of every way
publicly maintained when any part is open to the use of the public for
vehicular travel, with jurisdiction extending to the adjacent property line including sidewalks, shoulders, berms, and rights-of-way not intended for
motorized traffic. The terms "public street" and "public right-of-way" are
interchangeable with highway.

-

JOINT USE APPROACH An approach shared by two adjacent property
owners for service and connecting both properties.

-

LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION (LHJ) The city, county, or highway
district having authority over the public right-of-way.

-

PERFORMANCE BOND A document issued by a bonding company
authorized to do business in the state of Idaho. The LHJ may allow
substitution for the bond by an irrevocable Letter of Credit issued by a
financial institution, or a cash deposit.
PRIVATE APPROACH
residential property.

-

An approach used for access to a private
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-

PROPERTY LINE CLEARANCE The distance measured along the curb
line or outside edge of shoulder between the frontage boundary line and
the extension of the nearest edge of the approach, excluding flares or
transitions.

-

PUBLIC APPROACH An approach used by the public for access to a
public, commercial, or industrial facility.

-

PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY A right-of-way open to the public and under
the jurisdiction of an LHJ, where the LHJ has no obligation to construct or
maintain said right-of-way for vehicular traffic. A term used to define a
specific space.

-

ROADSIDE A general term denoting the area adjoining the outer edge of
the shoulder.

-

ROADWAY That portion of a highway improved, designed or ordinarily
used for vehicular travel, exclusive of sidewalks, shoulders, berms and
rights-of-way. A divided highway has two (2) or more roadways.

-

SETBACK The horizontal distance measured at right angles to the
highway centerline between the right-of-way line and permanent fixtures,
i.e., fuel-pump islands, signs, display stands, buildings, etc.
STANDARD APPROACH HIGHWAY - All highways within the local
jurisdictions not having controlled access restrictions.
STOPPING SIGHT DISTANCE - Distance along a roadway that an object
of specified height is continuously visible to the driver. For approaches
the driver's height is 3.5' from roadway surface and the object height is
1.5' from the roadway surface.
STREET
above.

-

Interchangeable with definition for HIGHWAY as described

-

TEMPORARY APPROACH A temporary approach will require a permit
in conformance with this Manual. The permit will contain a time certain for
removal of the approach. In general, it should be for not more than a
three (3) month period.
TRAVELED WAY - The portion of the roadway for the movement of
vehicles, exclusive of ditches and roadside areas.

of
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SECTION II

B.

MEANINGS OF "SHALL," "SHOULD," "MAY," AND "WILL"

•

SHALL - A mandatory condition. Where certain requirements in the
design or application of the device are described with the "shall"
stipulation, it is mandatory when an installation is made that these
requirements be met.

-

SHOULD An advisory condition. Where the word "should" is used, it is
considered to be advisable usage, recommended but not mandatory.

-

MAY A permissive condition. No requirement for design or application is
intended.

-

WILL A mandatory condition. Can be used interchangeably with the
term shall and connoting the same meaning.
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ELLUSTRATION OF DEFINITIONS
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PERMITS

Ill.

SECTION Ill

PERMITS
A.

GENERAL RULES FOR APPROACHES

General requirements are listed on Exhibit 3, Application and Permit to Use
Public Right-of-way, Approaches. Additional requirements are a s follows:
1.

The location, design, construction, and operation of all approaches
should comply with the design principles and geometric restrictions
established in this manual. The approach should be designed for
the actual and future property access requirements.

2.

Alleys should generally conform to approach
maintaining sidewalk continuity across the approach.

3.

Urban and rural approaches shall conform to standard drawings

4.

The LHJ should encourage the construction of joint-use
approaches for the access to adjoining properties - if not prohibited
by local ordinance, and providing the application for a joint-use
approach is signed by both property owners. Permittees may
record the joint-use approach permit signed by both parties with the
County Recorder after final permit approval by the LHJ. This would
insure that both parties would continue to have use of the approach
until the agreement is modified.

5.

The LHJ reserves the right to require the Permittee, its successors
or assigns, to make any changes, additions, repairs or relocations
to any approach or its appurtenances within the public right-of-way
for necessary relocation, reconstruction, widening, or maintenance
of the highway and/or to provide proper protection of life and
property on, or adjacent to, the roadway.

6.

Generally, no part of the public right-of-way shall be used for:

standards,

a)

the parking of vehicles except in authorized parking areas

b)

the servicing, refueling, repairing of vehicles except for
emergencies.

c)

displays, sales, exhibits, business signs, etc.
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APPLICATION AND PERMIT TO USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY
APPROACHES
COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SITE DURING CONSTRUCTiON
PUBLIC ROAD SURFACE TYPE: (DIRT) (GRAVEL) (PAVEMENT)
I

Start Date:

I

NOTICE
This permit shall not be valid for excavation
until, or unless, the provision of ldaho code,
Title 55, Chapter 22 have been complied
with.
PRIOR T O EXCAVATION, CALL ONE
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE

Est. Completion Date:
Road Name:
Location:
Sight Distance:
Posted Speed:
APPROACH
Single Residence
Multiple Residence

WIDTH
No. Served

Business type

SURFACE TYPE

ESTIMATED ADT

(VEHICLE COUNT)

Must meet the requirements of Local Highway Technical Assistance Council,
(LHTAC) Standard Approach Policy and §49-221, ldaho Code.

Agriculture
Other
Explain:
ATTACH SKETCH OF PROPOSED WORK AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS:
SPECIAL PROVISIONS:
See reverse side for General Provisions.
I CERTIFY THAT I AM THE OWNER OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPOSED PROPERTY TO BE
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEREON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE, THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MADE A PART OF
THlS PERMIT.
NAME OF PERMITTEE
APPLICANT-PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT
I

ADDRESS

SIGNATURE OWNER/ AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

CITY STATE ZIP

DATE

I

i

1

SUBJECT TO ALL TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND PROVISIONS SHOWN ON THlS FORM OR ATTACHMENTS, PERMISSION IS HEREBY
GRANTED TO THE ABOVE-NAMED APPLICANT TO PERFORM THE WORK DESCRIBED ABOVE.
FOR LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION USE
TEMPOWRY PERMIT
Tentative approval subject to inspection of installation.

Approved
Date:
Corrections Required:

FINAL PERMIT
R e j e c t e d

Date:

Date:
Approved by:
LHJ Authorized Representative

EXHIBIT C
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SECTION I l l

A deposit in a n amount to b e determined by t h e Local Highway Jurisdiction, (LHJ) (minimum $200.00) shall
accompany this application. If proper construction or repair is m a d e a n d accepted within ten (10) days, t h e
deposit will b e refunded. If proper construction or repair is not completed within ten (10) days, the LHJ m a y

m a k e repairs and a s s e s s t h e deposit. A $25.00 administrative f e e is non-refundable.
T h e LHJ m a y change, a m e n d or terminate this permit o r any of t h e conditions herein enumerated if permittee
fails to comply with its provisions or requirements a s s e t forth herein.
Approaches shall b e for the bona fide purpose of securing a c c e s s a n d not for the purpose of parking, conducting
business, or servicing vehicles on the public right-of-way.
No revisions or additions shall b e m a d e t o a n approach or its appurtenances on the public right-of-way without
t h e written permission of the LHJ.
T h e permittee shall furnish all material, labor a n d equipment involved in t h e construction of t h e approach and its
appurtenances. This shall include furnishing approved drainage pipe of a size specified on permit (12 inch
minimum) curb and gutter, concrete sidewalk, etc., where required. Materials and workmanship shall b e good
quality and a r e subject to inspection a n d approval by t h e LHJ.
T h e LHJ reserves the right to require t h e permittee, its s u c c e s s o r s a n d assigns, a t a n y time, to m a k e s u c h
changes, additions, repairs a n d relocations t o any approach or its appurtenances within the public right-of-way
a s may b e necessary to permit t h e relocation, reconstruction, widening, drainage, a n d maintenance of the
roadway and/or to provide proper protection t o life a n d property on o r adjacent to the roadway.
Approaches shall conform to the plans m a d e a part of this permit. Adequate drawings or s k e t c h e s shall b e
included showing the design, materials, construction requirements a n d proposed location of t h e approach. All
approaches shall b e in accordance with Exhibits 9 and 1 3 of t h e Manual for Use of Public Right of Way Standard Approach Policy.
During the construction of t h e approach(es), s u c h barricades, s i g n s a n d other traffic control devices shall b e
erected and maintained by t h e permittee, a s m a y b e d e e m e d n e c e s s a r y by t h e LHJ. Said devices shall conform
to t h e current issue of t h e Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Parked equipment and stored materials
shall b e a s far from the traveled way a s feasible. Items stored within 3 0 feet of t h e traveled way shall b e marked
a n d protected. T h e LHJ may provide barricades (when available) upon request.
In accepting this permit, the permittee, its s u c c e s s o r s a n d assigns, a g r e e s to hold the LHJ harmless from any
liability caused by t h e installation, construction, maintenance or operation of t h e approach(es).
If t h e work d o n e under this permit interferes in a n y way with t h e drainage of t h e roadway, t h e permittee shall
wholly and a t his own e x p e n s e m a k e s u c h provision a s the LHJ m a y direct to take c a r e of said drainage
problem.
Upon completion of said work herein contemplated, all rubbish and debris shall b e immediately removed and t h e
roadway and roadside shall b e left n e a t a n d presentable a n d to the satisfaction of the LHJ.
T h e permittee shall maintain a t his or their s o l e e x p e n s e the structure or object for which this permit is granted in
a condition satisfactory to the LHJ.
Neither the acceptance of this permit nor anything herein contained shall b e construed a s a waiver by the
permittee of any rights given it by t h e constitution o r laws of the s t a t e of Idaho or of the United States.
No work shall b e started until a n authorized representative of the LHJ h a s given written notice to t h e permittee to
proceed, except in c a s e of a n emergency when verbal authorization m a y b e given with a written permit and fee
required within five (5)working days.
This permit shall b e void unless the work herein contemplated shall have been completed before
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR ISSUING PERMITS

The Application and Permit to Use Public Right-of-way should be completed by
the issuing agency rather than the applicant.
Only the original copy of the application is needed. Copies for LHJ use may be
duplicated as required. The applicant receives a copy of the temporary
permit during construction, then is give the original of the final permit after
approval of the LHJ.
The LHJ may request additional information for some specific approaches prior
to or during processifig of the applications. This request normally involves
traffic operations and plans for some commercial approaches.
Applications shall be signed by the owner or his authorized representative.
A sketch should be provided by the applicant showing the locations (by highway
station or other local means) of existing and proposed approach changes,
location of other proposed work to be done within the public right-of-way,
and highway signs in the area of the approach, i.e., a copy of reduced
project plan sheets is sufficient. Two copies of the prints, drawings or
sketches are required. Cost of relocating any highway signs shall be
borne by the permittee.

A special provision should be added to permits for inspection reimbursement
for permits requiring large amounts of work on the right-of-way; those
which severely impact traffic; or those using sizable amounts of inspection
time.
The following special provision could be used:
"The

shall be reimbursed for inspection
(LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION)

including actual costs."
The

"temporary permit" portion should be signed by the authorized
representative of the LHJ when issuing. After the facility is completed, the
"final permit" portion should be signed by the LHJ - if acceptable.
1.

Assignment of Numbers to Permits and Receipts

Permits should be numbered by the fiscal year and the sequence
numbers started over each year with 001.
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Example of Assigning Numbers:
The first permit issued in fiscal year 1995 (FY95) would be 95-001.
A single numbering sequence should be used for both the
Application and Permit to Use Public Right-of-way
(Approaches) and (Utilities) forms.
C.

TRAFFIC CONTROL FOR PERMITS TO USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY

The safe, efficient passage and protection of vehicles and pedestrians during
any work within the public right-of-way covered by permit is very important
and shall be the responsibility of the permittee. During the progress of the
work, barricades, signs and other traffic control devices shall be erected
and maintained by the permittee in conformance with the current Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, Part VL, latest edition. See Exhibits 4
and 5 - Figures III,C. - A and B.
D.

OBTAINING RIGHT-OF-WAY VIA THE LOCAL PLANNING ACT OF
1975

Planning and zoning authorities may require that additional land needed to
accommodate acceleration/deceleration lanes, corner radii, etc., be
granted to the applicable LHJ by appropriate instrument as a condition for
approving any rezoning, special use permit, or subdivision request.
The following are needed to accomplish granting of property:
1.
A comprehensive plan for the citylcounty must be in effect.
($67-6508, 1 .C.)
2.
The transportation component of the plan should have the location
and widths of the major thoroughfares identified.
($67-6508, I.C.)
3.
When platting a subdivision, $50-1310, Idaho Code, provides for
dedication of public right-of-way.
In special cases, a permanent easement (least desirable) can be granted when
building setback or other problems preclude other forms of dedication.
Instruments conveying land for public right-of-way use should be granted
to and accepted by the appropriate city, county, or highway district and
recorded with the County Recorder.
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E.

APPROACHES FOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS
Before an approach permit is granted, a traffic-impact study may be required of
all new developments which will generate over 100 cars per hour (total
two-way) during the peak hour, or a lesser volume if requested by the
LHJ.
1.

2.

The study should include data on the following:
a)

Existing peak hour traffic volumes and conditions.

b)

Oireetionai distribution estimates of added traffic.

c)

Projections of added traffic volumes for all appropriate
critical hours.

d)

Determination of needed improvements, traffic controls,
approach locations and their design and the impact on
nearby traffic control.

e)

Identification of any additional highway right-of-way which
might be required.

The results of the impact study should enable the responsible
agencies having jurisdiction to:

a)

Verify the need for capacity improvements along access
streets and critical intersections.

b)

Consider the effects on the local transportation system.

c)

Enable the LHJ to check the access design.

d)

Determine a fair and equitable means of cost-sharing
between the developer and the public agencies for needed
intersection or access improvements, including added traffic
lanes and traffic control devices.

The developer is required to coordinate the study with both the LHJ and the local
planning agency andlor building department which controls issuance of
building permits for the development if they are separate agencies.
The developer shall provide and pay for the study and the LHJ, or its agent,
should review the study. See Section III,F, Application Fees, for details
on the Special Traffic Studies Fee.
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APPLICATION FEES

Application fees for the various types of public right-of-way use permits
issued by the LHJ shall be a s follows:
1.

Approach Applications
a)
Standard Approach Policy
Partial and Full Control Access
b)

2.

Agricultural Use and Other Non-Permanent Use

3.

Special Traffic Studies or Appraisal Fee

Actual Cost

4.

Inspector Fee

Actual Cost

5.

Performance Bond

$20.00

(Furnished by Applicant
when required)

In addition to the application fee, the LHJ may require payment of the estimated
cost of any studies or appraisals when large development plans must be
reviewed and/or extensive LHJ time is expended on a traffic study or
review. These fees may be charged at the discretion of the LHJ.
Estimated costs would include wages, travel, subsistence and other
expenses incurred. The intent is to recover LHJ actual costs only.
Applications may not be processed before payment of the non-refundable
application fee.
Application fees may be waived for the following (waiver of the fee does not
waive the need for a permit)
Government Agencies
Approaches resulting from right-of-way negotiations
Future approaches shown on plan - if installed according to
plan.
Agricultural use of right-of-way a s part of right-of-way
agreement.
Approach width changes on standard approach sections, if safety
and drainage are not adversely affected.
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Those instances where a direct benefit to the LHJ is gained. An explanation
justifying the waiver of fee shall be made on the application or attached to
it. Examples would be: Allowing an adjacent landowner to level the public
right-of-way along with adjacent property to remove earth obstructions and
improve safety; plant and. maintain grass; and non-obstruction
landscaping on the right-of-way.
Inspection fees may be charged at the discretion of the LHJ when substantial
inspection time will be required. The fee would include wages, (loaded
rate) travel, subsistence and other expenses incurred. The intent is to
only recover LHJ costs. When the inspection fee is to be assessed it shall
be stipulated under the application special provision.
A performance bond may be required of an applicant at the discretion of the LHJ.
The purpose of this bond is to guarantee completion of the work in
accordance with the requirements of the permit. The bond amount should
be large enough to cover costs to correct potential damage to the highway
system the permittee might cause. The bond must be executed by a
surety company authorized to conduct business in Idaho. The bond must
be executed and incorporated into the permit file before the permittee is
authorized to commence work.

The Performance Bond will be returned to the Permittee following the final
approval of the facility by the LHJ.
G.

SUBSTANDARD APPROACHES

If a substandard approach is constructed, t h e permittee shall be given ten (10)
days to upgrade t h e approach to the prescribed standards on the permit,

or have a plan of action approved by the LHJ with a completion date.
Permits shall be revoked for approaches which are not upgraded to the
prescribed standards and action taken to remove the approaches.
Exhibit 6 - Figure III,G, "Notice" may be used to post an illegal approach if the
owner or the owner's representative cannot be found at the site. If the
owner does not respond to notifications, the LHJ may send a certified
letter (with a return receipt requested from the post office) to the owner
advising of the illegal approach or encroachment and give ten (10) days to
obtain the permit. In case of an illegal approach jeopardizing the safety of
the traveling public, the LHJ may install appropriate temporary traffic
control devices at their discretion.
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Un-approved approaches may be removed by the LHJ and legal action initiated
to collect the removal cost, 940-2319, Idaho Code. The above ten (10)
day requirement may be reduced if a hazardous situation is created by
permittee or party and immediate corrective work is ordered by the LHJ
when time is of the essence.
H.

MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITY

Once the approach has been constructed and approved, the LHJ will maintain
the approach as follows, unless otherwise provided:
@

o

Paved Public Apprsaek
line.

-

rvlainiained to the public right-of-way

Paved Private Ap~roach- Maintain to end of radii, permittee
maintains beyond radii.
Gravel Public Approach to Paved Highway - Permittee installs
an asphalt wedge sufficient to protect the roadway pavement edge
(three (3) to six (6) feet back from the edge of road for the width of
the approach). It is desirable to pave the approach to the right-ofway line when the road is reconstructed. The LHJ maintains to the
right-of-way line.
Gravel Public Approach to Gravel Highway
right-of-way line.

- Maintained to

the

Gravel Private Approach to Paved Hiahway - Permittee installs
an asphalt wedge sufficient to protect the roadway pavement edge
(three (3) to six (6) feet back from the edge of road for the width of
the approach). The permittee maintains beyond the wedge.

1.

APPEAL PROCESS

Applicants denied an approach permit or final approval by the authorized staff
member may appeal to the appropriate city council, county
commissioners, or highway district commissioners. The decision of the
LHJ shall be final.
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SECTION IV

DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Design principles for the border area, setbacks, approach locations, base and surfacing,
and drainage must meet minimum standards set by the Local Highway
Jurisdictions or as shown in this manual.

A.

BORDER AREA

The border area may require re-grading andlor landscaping when adjacent
property and approaches are developed. Border area work shall ensure
that adequate sight distance, proper drainage, desirable slopes for
maintenance operations and a pleasing appearance are present. (See
Exhibit 7 - Figure IV,A.)
The border area shall be free of encroachments and treated as necessary to
prevent vehicular use by ditching, special grading, use of concrete or
bituminous curbs, fencing, guard rail, guide posts, etc., as long as the
devices do not impair adequate sight distance or constitute a hazard to
pedestrians or vehicles.
6.

SETBACK

Businesses that are located adjacent to the highway cannot lawfully serve patrons
in vehicles that are parked or standing on the public right-of-way.
Improvements on private property adjacent to the public right-of-way to
serve patrons shall be setback from the roadway so that stopping, standing
or maneuvering of vehicles on the public right-of-way is not necessary. A
minimum setback of fourteen (14) feet from the public right-of-way line is
required. When a certain number of parking spaces per square footage of
building are required, the parking spaces cannot be included within the
public right-of-way.
Sufficient parking and or storage area to prevent the stopping of vehicles on the
approach or the backing up of traffic onto the traveled way, especially for
parking lots, garages, drive-in cafesltheaters, truck terminals, etc., should
be provided off the public right-of-way. Business traffic flow should be
designed to exit the main highway onto a local road or street before
entering the business and then exit the business onto the main highway
whenever possible.
Poles, signs, displays, etc., that restrict the sight distance of a vehicle entering or
leaving the property should not be installed.
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SECTION IV

APPROACH LOCATIONS

Approaches shall be located so as not to create undue interference with, or hazard
to, the free movement of normal roadway or pedestrian traffic, or cause
areas of congestion. Approaches must be located where the roadway
alignment and profile are favorable, i.e., away from sharp curves, steep
grades, andlor where the sight distance would not be adequate for safe
traffic operations. Approach locations that restrict or interfere with the
placement and proper functioning of traffic control signs, signals, lighting, or
other devices must also be avoided.
At all approaches the sight triangle depicted in Exhibit 7 - Figure IV,A., shall be
protected.
Minimum sight distances for approaches should not be lower than the stopping
sight distance on wet pavement (150 feet at 25 mph, 200 feet at 30 mph,
225 feet at 35 mph, 325 feet at 45 mph, 400 feet at 50 mph, and 450 feet at
55 mph). Recommended sight distances are 710 feet at 35 mph, 915 feet
at 45 mph and 1130 feet at 55 mph. The recommended distance would
allow a 50 foot truck to make a left turn from an approach and clear the
near lane before a vehicle in the near lane had to slow down, A downgrade
prior to the approach increases the sight distance requirement.
All approaches serving primarily truck traffic shall use a curb return approach in
accordance with Exhibit 8 - Figure IV,C. The radius shall be adequate to
accommodate the truck turning movements, and the approach width shall
be forty (40) feet.
Private approaches onto arterial highway and collector highways should be
designed and constructed to provide forward vehicular movement for
ingress and egress to the adjacent properties. Approaches should be
limited such that a minimum separation of three hundred thirty (330) feet
center to center of approach is achieved. If unusual conditions prevent
approach locations as specified above, the Applicant may request special
consideration by the LHJ. All approaches should conform to the
requirements in this policy.
Failure to comply with minimum requirements and/or recommendations may be
sufficient cause for the LHJ to deny an approach location, prohibit specific
approach usage, or revoke an existing approach permit.
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D.

SECTION IV

BASE AND SURFACING

The applicant must supply, place, and properly compact the approach fill and base
material. All base material should consist of crushed sand-gravel, or
crushed sand and rock mixtures containing sufficient granular fines to fill the
voids between the larger gravel and stone, and to permit compaction.
In curb and gutter areas, approaches should be paved to the back edge of the
sidewalk or right-of-way line, whichever is the least. (See Exhibit 9 - Figure
IV,D)
In areas without curb and gutter, the approach base and surfacing should consist
of an adequate depth of granular material to protect the roadway edge. The
LHJ may require the property owner to furnish and place asphalt surfacing
when necessary for maintenance or operational purposes. The surfacing
should normally extend a minimum distance of twenty (20) feet from the
outside shoulder line, or to the public right-of-way line, whichever is the
least. Casually used field approaches may extend a lesser distance; a five
(5) foot minimum is recommended. Commercial approaches are normally
required to be surfaced. (See Section III,G., for required paving and
maintenance.)

E.

DRAINAGE

All approaches should drain away from the roadway - except in areas having curb
and gutter. Generally, approaches in areas having curb and gutter should
be graded so that adjacent properties do not drain to the roadway unless
existing storm drain system capacity is demonstrated to be adequate within
current design criteria. Approaches should also be constructed so they do
not impair the drainage within the public right-of-way, alter the stability of the
roadway subgrade, or materially alter the drainage of the areas adjacent to
the public right-of-way.
Culverts and drop inlets should be installed where required and should be the type
and size specified by the LHJ. Where the border area is re-graded and/or
landscaped, the border area should have sufficient slope, culverts, and drop
inlets for adequate drainage. Slopes, where practical, should be a 4:l
maximum.
Culverts should be installed in accordance with Exhibit 10 - Figure IV,E.
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F.

CATTLE GUARDS
Standards)

SECTION IV

-

(See LHTAC Manual for Highway and Street

Section 40-2310, ldaho Code, regulates the installation of cattle guards
on local highways and should be referenced when the question arises.
LHJ's are encouraged to place them on private property when necessary
on private approaches.
Section 40-203(5), ldaho Code, speaks to obstruction of the public rightof-way and the misdemeanor offense involved.

J u n e 1995 3 3 of 4 2
EXHIBIT C

1199

DESIGN PRINCIPLES

SECTION IV

June 1995

34 of 4 2
EXHIBIT C

ILL3

GEOMETRIC RESTRICTIONS

V.

SECTION V

GEOMETRIC RESTRICTIONS
A.

GENERAL

The following geometric restrictions shall be considered on each Application and
Permit to Use Public Right-of-way Approaches:
Number of Approaches
Approach Alignment
Approach Width
Corner Clearance
Property Line Clearance
Distance Between Approaches
Approach Transitions and Flares
Approach Grades
Volume of Traffic Using Approach

B.

NUMBER OF APPROACHES

The number of approaches should be the minimum number required to adequately
serve the needs of the property. The Standard Approach Policy should be
that not more than two approaches be allowed for any single property tract
or business establishment frontage. Traffic circulation on the property,
parking and access to other streets shall be reviewed and adjusted to
provide a minimum number of approaches. The LHJ shall evaluate each
case on an individual merit and allow or disallow additional approaches
based on the evaluation.
C.

APPROACH ALIGNMENT

Single approaches should intersect as closely as possible at right angles to the
roadway. When two approaches are used on one frontage for access to
both directions of travel on the travel-way, each approach may be placed at
skew angles between 70' and 90' (desirable). (See Exhibit 12, Figure V,H,
page 33)

D.

APPROACH WIDTH

An approach shall be wide enough to properly serve the anticipated type and
volume of traffic. Minimum widths should be used only when space
limitations must be considered.
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Standard Approach Widths:

Residential
Agricultural
Commercial (one-way)
Commercial (two-way)
StreetlHighway

Minimum
Twelve feet (12')
Twelve feet (12')
Fifteen feet (15')
Twenty feet (20')
Twenty-eight feet (28')

Maximum
Thirty feet (30')
Forty feet (40')
Thirty feet (30')
Forty feet (40')
Forty-eight feet (48')

A design speed of 10 mph minimum and a recommended 15 mph is desirable.
The width shall be within the specified limits, except that approaches in
speed zones that are over 35 mph shall be at least a twenty (20) feet
wide minimum.
A joint-use approach should use the maximum dimensions of a single approach.
An approach that is adjacent to a public alley may include the alley, if
approved by the LHJ; however, the width of the combined approach shall
not exceed forty (40) feet.
Commercial approaches in urban areas with volumes exceeding fifty (50) vehicles
per hour during a total of any four (4) hours per day should be designed to
public highway standards using a curb radius or fillet radius of twenty (20)
feet minimum, and a recommended thirty (30) feet on high volume
approaches. An approach divider is recommended for a commercial
approach to improve operation of the approach. Special approaches
serving shopping centers or other major traffic generators shall not be
restricted to the width requirements, but shall be designed to serve the
traffic; i.e., both a right turn and a left turn lane, divider and entrance lane.
These special approaches shall be designed by a professional engineer
licensed in the state of Idaho.
E.

-

CORNER CLEARANCE ( See Exhibit ?I
Figure V,E.)
1.

Approaches should be located as far as possible from intersections
to:
a)

Preserve visibility at the intersection.

b)

Allow a vehicle that is leaving the approach to enter the
desired traffic lane before entering the intersection.

c)

Permit a vehicle crossing the intersection to enter the
approach in an orderly, safe manner with a minimum of
interference to through traffic.
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SECTION V

Facilitate the installation of traffic signs, signals, and lighting where
required.

If traffic volumes exceed 250 vehicles per hour, or if the intersection is
signalized, the corner clearance shall be at least twice the minimum
requirement. Any approach within a limited left or right turn may also
be restricted to a right turn in and a right turn out, in addition to the
minimum corner clearance requirements.
Less than the minimum distance may be permitted by special
circumstances; however, the approach transition or curb flare shall
not encroach upon the curb or pavement edge forming the corner
radii of the intersection.
Corner clearances are as follows:
With Curb and Gutter

Minimum

Recommended

Entering Side of lntersection

Corner Radius + 20 ft.

Corner Radius + 40 to 60 ft.

Exit Side of Intersection

Corner Radius + 10 ft.

Without Curb and Gutter

Minimum

Entering Side of lntersection

Corner Radius + 40 ft.

Exit Side of Intersection

Corner Radius + 20 ft.

Recommended

Corner Radius + 20 to 40 ft.

-

See Exhibit 11 Figure V,E., Corner Clearance Diagram for further details.

F.

PROPERTY LINE CLEARANCE

Minimum property line clearance should be five (5) feet for curbed or urban
approaches and equal to the approach radius. A minimum of twenty (20)
feet for all other highways is recommended, unless a joint-use approach is
installed. The approach shall not extend within the clearance distance
except when existing physical features such as a house or garage, etc.,
require that the approach be located closer to the property line. Field
approaches may be allowed adjacent to the property line when required for
proper utilization of the field; however, joint-use approaches are
recommended whenever the property line allowance is made.
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G.

SECTION V

DISTANCE BETWEEN APPROACHES
The minimum distance between approaches shall be ten (10) feet for curb
and gutter sections and for developed urban areas where curb and gutter
do not exist, but are warranted. The minimum distance between
approaches for other areas is forty (40) feet except as stated in the
following paragraph. In curb and gutter areas with sidewalks, a minimum
sidewalk distance between approaches of eight (8) feet at back of sidewalk
shall be provided for pedestrian refuge. Where parking is allowed along the
highway, the distance between approaches shall be short enough to
discourage parking or long enough to provide multiples of parking spaces.

All approaches serving primarily truck traffic shall use a curb return approach in
accordance with Exhibit 8 - Figure IV,C. The radius shall be adequate to
accommodate the truck turning movements, and the approach width shall
be forty (40) feet. Private approaches onto arterial or collector classified
highways shall be designed and constructed to provide forward vehicular
movement for ingress and egress to the adjacent properties. Approaches
shall be limited such that a minimum separation of 330 feet center to center
of approach is achieved. If unusual conditions prevent approach locations
as specified above, the applicant may request special consideration by the
LHJ.
H.

APPROACH TRANSITIONS AND FLARES
In curb and gutter sections, the transition connecting the edge of the approach to
the curb shall be as specified in Exhibit 9 - Figure IV,D.
In sections not having a curb and gutter, the circular arcs or approach flares should
connect the outside edge of the approach to the outside edge of the
roadway shoulders, as specified in Exhibit 12 - Figure V,H. The approach
flare tangent distance should not exceed twenty (20) feet.
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1.

SECTION V

APPROACH GRADES

On curbed sections, the approach grade should conform to Exhibit 9 - Figure IV,D.
If the maximum allowable slope is not great enough to bring the approach
to the level of the sidewalk, a depressed sidewalk should be installed. The
connection between the original sidewalk and the depressed sidewalk shall
be made through a warped section, the slope of which shall not vary more
than six percent (6%) from the longitudinal grade of the original sidewalk.
All new curbs or sidewalks should be constructed to the line and grade of
the existing curb or sidewalk with every effort to construct a sidewalk that is
uniformly graded and free of dips. The maximum gradient limits beyond the
outer edge of the sidewalk shall be the same as for uncurbed approaches.
On uncurbed sections, the approach grade should be a minus two percent (-2%)
for at least six feet (6') beyond the outside shoulder line in order to provide
proper drainage in a ditch section of twenty feet (20') in a fill section, as
specified in Exhibit 12 - Figure V,H. Beyond this point, the maximum grade
for commercial approaches should be a plus or minus six percent (2 6%).
The maximum grade for all other types of approaches should a plus or
minus eight percent (2 8%) in flat terrain, a plus or minus twelve percent (2
12%) in rolling terrain and plus or minus fifteen percent (2 15%) in
mountainous terrain.

J.

MAILBOX TURNOUTS

Mailbox turnouts may be combined with or may be independent of
approaches in rural areas. It is desired to have the mail carrier stop out
of the travel-way whenever possible for safety reasons. The approach
applicant should be required to construct a mailbox turnout at the same
time if a mail box will be installed. Turnouts with a minimum width of
eight (8) feet {ten (10) feet desirable) from the edge of the travel-way are
recommended. See Exhibit 13 - Figure V,J, or refer to the Manual for
the Location, Support and Mounting of Mailboxes, published by LHTAC
April, 1997. Mailbox supports should not be larger than 4-inch by 4-inch
wood posts, 1%-inch metal pipe or 1%-inch angles (2.3 pounds per foot)
for safety reasons. The box-to-post attachment should be strong enough
to resist separation when hit. No massive metal, concrete, stone or other
hazardous support should be allowed. Deficient installations should be
corrected.
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,

)
) Case No. CV 2008-1 80
)
) SECOND AFFIDAVIT
) OF DAN PAYNE

VS.

1

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in h ~ individual
s
capacity,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

1

STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Latah

) ss.
)

Dan Payne, upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am a Defendant in this matter, am over eighteen (18) years of age, am competent to
testify to the matters set forth herein and make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.
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2. I have been employed by Defendant North Latah County Highway District

("District") since 1974 and District foreman since 1994. Since 1974, my duties for District
foreman have included maintaining and improving projects on Camps Canyon Road with the
primary difference being that, as foreman, I oversee and supervise the District's work instead of
doing it.
3. Absent special circumstances, which are not present in this case, when the District

undertakes improvements on a public road established by prescription, such as Camps Canyon
Road, those improvements are made within the District's prescriptive minimum fifty foot (50')
wide right-of-way without permission of adjoining landowners because such permission is not
necessary as all of the District's work is undertaken within its legal right-of-way. However, the
District's foremen will routinely make an effort to inform adjoining landowners of planned
improvement projects, particularly major ones, as a courtesy and convenience. In 1996, the
District followed this practice when it undertook improvements to Camps Canyon Road in that
the District did not seek permission from landowner Ed Swanson who owned what is now the
real property owned by Plaintiffs. At no time did Mr. Swanson either dedicate or gift any rightof-way to the District in connection with the 1996 improvements. Mr. Swanson was aware of
those improvements and merely had no objection to them.

4. In 2005 and 2006, Camps Canyon Road was widened slightly, meaning less than a
foot or two on Plaintiffs' side of Camps Canyon Road when gravel was spread over the entire
portion of the traveled roadway following the improvements on Wagners' side of the road.
5. Since 2005 and 2006, the only significant activities that have been undertaken by the
District on Camps Canyon Road in the area of Plaintiffs7real property and Wagners' real
property are graveling, road grading and snow plowing. These activities are essential to proper
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maintenance of all public roads. These activities and vehicular use contribute to the movement
of gravel particularly toward the sides of a road. In the grading process, most gravel is brought
back toward the road center, but inevitably some gravel moves outward, which serves to stabilize
and support the road but does result in minimal, necessary widening of the road over time.
6. On or about March, 2006, Robert Wagner, who was in the process of building a
residence, applied to the District using the District's standard form to obtain a permit for an
approach onto Camps Canyon Road from the Wagners' real property. I met with Mr. Wagner
who showed me a post next to the road which he said represented his southern property line.
North of that post was an old driveway that used to lead to a home and outbuildings on Mr.
Wagner's property. At least 50 feet further north of that driveway, Mr. Wagner had begun
construction of a driveway which he wanted to be the location of his approach permit. I asked
why he didn't want to use the old driveway onto his property, and he replied that his neighbor,
Plaintiff Don Halvorson thought it would encroach on his property. Mr. Wagner said something
to the effect the location he had selected was well north of the old driveway, would "be safe" and
not cause any problems with his neighbor. I approved his approach permit application for that
location.
7. On or about April, 2006, Mr. Wagner told me that Don Halvorson had complained
that the driveway approach was on the Halvorsons' real property. Mr. Wagner then handed me a
copy of the legal description from the deed to his property, a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit A. I met Mr. Wagner at Camps Canyon Road and used a measuring
wheel from that legal description's point of beginning in Camps Canyon Road, which I lined up
with Plaintiffs' fence, and measured "699 feet, more or less, along the County Road." That
distance was a great distance past the post Mr. Wagner had set for his southeasterly corner and
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was south of the old driveway and approximately one hundred feet south of the approach for
which the permit had been issued.
8. On April 12, 2006, I attended a meeting of the District commissioners where Don

Halvorson and Mr. Wagner were present and spoke about the driveway issue. I stated that I had
measured the distance along the County Road and that, in my opinion, the permitted approach
was' approximately 100 feet north of Mr. Wagner's southern property boundary. Mr. Halvorson
confirmed that the point of beginning I used that was based on his fence location was accurate. I
asked Mr. Halvorson why he thought the approach was on his property and, if so, what had
happened to the 699 feet of road frontage shown on Mr. Wagner's deed. He mentioned
something about a "switchback" and that the road had been moved, which I knew to be false.
9. On or about June, 2006, Mr. Wagner told me that Mr. Halvorson had produced a
survey and that he wanted Mr. Wagner to move his driveway. Mr. Wagner filled out a new
application and showed me the location, which was at least one hundred feet north of the first,
permitted approach. I approved this second application on June 9,2006, a true and correct copy
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. I revoked the first permit and threw it away as it was
no longer valid.
10. Mr. Wagner proceeded over the next weekend to construct the new driveway and he
had the rock used in construction of the first driveway pulled onto his property and had the cut
that was made for the first driveway filled in with soil.
11. To the best of my knowledge, Plaintiffs have not complained about the June, 2006
permit or Mr. Wagner's second driveway.
12. As foreman for the eastern subdistrict of the District, the District commissioners have
delegated to me the responsibility for the review and issuance of approach permits for my
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subdistrict. I follow District standards, including the applicable Local Highway Technical
Assistance Council Manual, in the review and issuance of approach permits.
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 30th day of January, 2009.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of January, 2009.

NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho
My commission expires: F- 17-3.013
CERTIElUTE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that (3n this

~4day9
~ k w t i ~
of hmary, 2 09, I caused a true and correct copy of

this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537
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APPLICATION AND PERMIT TO USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY

-- APPROACHES

COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SiTE DURING CONSTRUCTIUN
PUBLIC ROAD SURFACE TYPE: (DIRT) (GRAVEL) (PAVEMENT)

!
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Start Date:
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st. Completion Date:
Road Name:
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Sight Distance:
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NOTICE
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This permit shall not be valid for excavation
until, or unless, the provision of ldaho code,
Title 55, Chapter 22 have been complied
with.
~,i,!
PRIOR TO EXCAVATION, CALL ONE
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE
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\

APPROACH
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Multiple Residence
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(VEHICLE COUNT)

Must meet the requirements of Local Highway Technical Assistance Council,
(LHTAC) Standard Approach Policy and $49-221, Idaho Code.
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I

Other
Explain:
ATTACH SKETCH OF PROPOSED WORK AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS:
SPECIAL PROVISIONS:

.See
, reverse side for Approach Design and attached Special Provisions and Information Sheet.
I CERTIFY THAT I AM THE OWNER OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPOSED PROPERTY TO BE
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEREON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE, THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MAdE A PART OF
THIS PERMIT.
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FP-Y (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,

)
)

1

)
)
VS.
)
)
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
)
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR )
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
)
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
)
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual )
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and )
-o;c..
in PIS iiicti\+dud ilapsilt
LY,
)
Defendants.
)
00-

Case No. CV 2008-180
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

>

Defendants North Latah County Highway District, Orland Ameberg, Richard Hansen,
Sherman Clyde and Dan Payne, through their attorney, Ronald J. Landeck, P.C., move this Court to
enter summaryjudgment against Plaintiffs on all claims set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant
to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs further move for an award of attorney
fees under Rule 11 (a)(l) I.R.C.P. and Idaho Code sections 12-120, 121 and 123.
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This Motion is supported by the pleadings, affidavits and record supplements on file, along
with the affidavits, record supplement and Brief filed on February 2,2009, in conjunction with this
Motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of February, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.

By:

%dio*li(lrh
I
Rorfald J. Landeck
~ t t & n e for
~ s Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ IFAX
[ XI Hand Delivery

Ro ald J. Landeck

Y'

Defendants' Motion For Summary J u d ~ e n--t 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON and CHARLOTTE I-IALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

)

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-08-00 180

VS.

)

ORDER SETTING HEARING

1

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY )
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
1
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH
)
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, )
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their
)
official capacities, and their individual
)
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official
capacity and in his individual capacity,

1

Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY O R D E E D that the above-entitled case be set for hearing on
Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Surnmary Judgments on Tuesday, the 3rdday of March, 2009, at the
hour of 9 9 0 a.m., Pacific Time, at the Nez Perce County Courthouse, Lewiston, Idaho.
DATED this

4P-

day of February, 2009.

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge

ORDER SETTING HEARING

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the
foregoing
ORDER
SETTING
HEARING was mailed, postage
prepaid, by the uncle igned at
Lewiston, Idaho, this
day of
February, 2009, on:

LB
1

Don and Charlotte Halvorson
11 290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, ID 83537

Ronald J. an deck
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham
P.8. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843

ORDER SETTING HEARING

CASE 140
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

1

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
VS.
)
)
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
)
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR )

Case No. CV 2008-1 80
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF
AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS
SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009

THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
1
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
)
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual )
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and )
in his individual capacity,
1
Defendaats.

1
)

I. INTRODUCTION.
Defendants submit this Answering Brief and Objections to Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment and Other Motions submitted January 26, 2009 (collectively "Plaintiffs'
Motions"), which make twenty-one (2 1) separate motions. Of those 2 1 Plaintiffs'
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FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER IMOTIONS SUBMITTED
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Motions, sixteen (16) are motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 I.R.C.P. (collectively
"Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions"). The remaining five (5) motions (collectively
"Plaintiffs' Other Motions") include one (1) declaratoryjudgment motion (Plaintiffs' Motions, par.
1.20), two (2) discovery motions (Plaintiffs' Motions, par. 1.12 and 1.18), one (1) motion for leave
to amend (Plaintiffs' Motions, par. 1.17) and one (1) motion to enlarge time (Plaintiffs' Motions,
par. 1.21). For efficiency, Defendants' will address Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions
separately from Plaintiffs' Other Motions.
11. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON ALL OF PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THERE ARE
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDE ENTRY OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS.
Generally:
Plaintiffs have not set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial or that
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on any of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs'
Summary Judgment Motions.are conclusory, repetitive, generalized, speculative, conhsing and
disorganized. Further, Plaintiffs rely fundamentally on factual assertions that are not admissible in
evidence, primarily because those assertions constitute hearsay or are made without personal
knowledge. Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions also duplicate, in great part, motions and
briefing previously filed by Plaintiffs in this action, which motions have already been denied by this
Court, yet Plaintiffs have again pursued these same claims without supplementing this record with
additional, admissible facts. Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions serve only to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of this litigation in violation of Rule
11(a)(l) I.R.C.P.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' S m a r y Judgment Motions ultimately fail because Defendants have
shown through Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed herein that there are no genuine
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED
JANUARY 26,2009 -- 2
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issues as to the material facts of Plaintiffs' claims and that summary judgment is appropriate in
favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on all Plaintiffs' claims in this action.
Alternatively, affidavits submitted by Defendants that are part of this record set forth
specific facts which, construed in a light most favorable to Defendants, at the very least clearly
preclude a determination that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to any of
Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment. Defendants, however, urge the Court to determine that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this action and that Defendants are entitled to
prevail as to all of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment as a matter of law and to enter
summary judgment in favor of Defendants as the non-moving party as to all such motions.
Summary Judgrnent Standard:
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Conway
v. Sontag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470,472 (2005), citing Infanger v. City ofSalmon, 137

Idaho 45'44 P.3d 1100 (2002).
"A motion for summary judgment urges the trial court to hold that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to jud-ment as a matter of law.
I.R.C.P. 56(c). However, if the court determines, after a hearing, that no genuine issues of
material fact exist, the court may enter judgment for the parties it deems entitled to prevail as a
matter of law. Thus, in appropriate circumstances, the court is authorized to enter summary
judgment in favor of non-moving parties. E.g., Rasrnusorz v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102
Idaho 95, 625 P.2d 1098 (1981); Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 583
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED
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P.2d 997 (1978). Similar authority exists under the federal counterpart to I.R.C.P. 56. See
generally 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

5 2720 (1973)."

Barlow 's,

Incorporated v. Bannock Cleani~zgCorporation, 103 Idaho 3 10,312,647 P.2d 766,768 (Ct.
App. 1982).
Admissible Facts and Incorporation of Prior Affidavits and Briefs:
Specific facts admissible in evidence, from which the Court should determine that there are
no genuine issues of material fact, are contained in the Third Affidavit of Dan Carscallen filed
concurrently herewith and the Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendants' Second Record Supplement in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Affidavit of Larry Hodge, Second Affidavit of Dan Payne, Second Affidavit of Dan Carscallen,
Defendants' Answering Brief to Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment filed September
19, October 6, and October 21,2008, Affidavit of Dan Payne, Affidavit of Orland Arneberg,

Affidavit of Dan Carscallen, Defendants' First Record Supplement in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment filed September 19, October 6 and October 2 1,2008, all of
which were previously filed herein and all of which are incorporated herein by this reference not
only for purposes of the factual record but, as appropriate, also for the legal analysis of issues
addressed in this Answering Brief A concise statement of dispositive, admissible material facts not
at genuine issue is set forth on pages 4 - 12 of the Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Analysis of Plaintiffs' Due Process and Takin. Claims:
Fifteen (15) of Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions, being those found in paragraphs 1.1,
1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.13, 1.13, 1.15, 1.16 and 1.19 arerelatedin that eachis
based, in principal part, on Defendants' alleged interference, in one alleged form or another, with
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED
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Plaintiffs' property rights and/or violation of Plaintiffs' due process rights under federal andor state
law and constitutions arising from (i) the District's widening of Camps Canyon Road and/or (ii) its
temporary issuance of a driveway permit to Plaintiffs' neighbor. These issues are more specifically
addressed on pages 12-26 of the Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
and are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.
Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.14 summary judgment motion, in effect, requests, without submittal
of additional facts, reconsideration of the Court's Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motions for
Surnmary Judgment filed December 8,2008. These issues are also specifically addressed in
Defendants' Answering Brief to those motions which is incorporated herein as if set forth in full.
In summary response, the District and individual Defendants have, at all times relevant to
this action, conducted and discharged the District's duties and responsibilities in accordance with
settled law in Idaho as to the establishment, use, maintenance and administration of prescriptive
public highways. Plaintiffs' have not produced any admissible, material facts to raise a genuine
issue to the contrary, rather, Plaintiffs have made factual assertions that either do not establish the
District's breach of any legal duty or that lack personal knowledge and are, therefore, inadmissible.
Analysis of Plaintiffs' Idaho Administrative Procedure Act Claim:
Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.11 summary judgment motion asserts a claim under Idaho Code
sections 67-5201 et seq., the Idaho Administration Procedure Act ("IAPA?'), seeking judicial review
of "agency" action. This motion should be denied for the reason that this issue has not been
asserted in Plaintiffs' complaint. This motion should also be denied because the District is not an
"agency," as that term is defined under Idaho Code section 67-5201(2), and the actions or inactions
of the District in the "acquisition, establishment and alterations to Camps Canyon Road," as urged
in the motion, are not subject to or within the purview of IAPA unless made applicable by some
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIOXS SUBMITTED
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other statute, whch is not the case. Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 859,993 P.2d 617,
622 (Ct. App. 2000).

111.

OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' OTHER MOTIONS.

Plaintiffs' Paragraph 1.12 Motion Is Without Merit and Should be Denied:
Although Plaintiffs variously cite Rules 26,36 and 37 I.R.C.P. as authority for their
paragraph 1.12 motion, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs in support of this motion complain only of the
District's recordkeeping practices and its alleged destruction of a revoked driveway access permit.
These alleged facts do not support a claim for discovery abuse under Rules 26,36 and/or 37
I.R.C.P. There is no showing on the face of this motion that the District has failed to answer an
interrogatory propounded to it or failed to permit inspection of a requested document. Plaintiffs
have simply failed to allege a violation of a rule of discovery.
Plaintiffs also rely upon the "spoliation" doctrine in seeking relief in regard to this motion.
Plaintiffs argue that the District has failed to keep records of alterations of Camps Canyon Road, to
survey Camps Canyon Road and to record agreements with private landowners. Plaintiffs cite to
Idaho Code sections "40-608,40-2302,40-605 and 40-13 10, amongst others" in support of this
argument, yet none of these statutes support Plaintiffs' position. Plaintiffs read into the law what
they want, but that is not how the law is interpreted or applied. Under Idaho law, the commissioners
of a highway district "have exclusive general supervision and jurisdiction over all
highways.. .within their highway system.. .." Further, "the highway district shall have power to
manage and conduct the business and affairs of the district." Idaho Code section 40-13 lO(1).
Plaintiffs have not shown that any alleged acts of Defendants in regard to this motion violate any
Idaho statute.

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED
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The spoliation doctrine also applies only in situations in which a party does not want the
evidence available to an adverse party. Courtney v. Big 0 Tires, 139 Idaho 821, 824, 87 P.3d 930,
933 (2003). Plaintiffs' assertion, that the District's alleged failure to maintain written records of
agreements with private landowners, presumably the alleged agreement with Plaintiffs' predecessor
in 1996, or failure to survey alterations on Camps Canyon Road invokes the spoliation doctrine, is
without merit. There is not even a scintilla of evidence that the District has done anything in regard
to its recordkeeping to keep information from Plaintiffs. "Moreover, the circumstances of the act
must manifest bad faith. Mere negligence is not enough, for it does not sustain the inference of
consciousness of a weak case." Id. (citing McCormick on Evidence, 4thEd. 5 265, pp. 189-194,
[1992]). Again, there is not the slightest proof or inference of bad faith. As to the singular event of
the initial Wagner driveway permit having been discarded or not being locatable, the District has
admitted the permit was issued. There is no dispute as to that fact. Plaintiffs' theory in pursuing
this motion is without merit and the motion should be denied.
Plaintiffs' Paragraph 1.18 Motion Should Be Denied:
Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.18 motion is not accompanied by the "certification" required under
Rule 37(a)(2) I.R.C.P. that "the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the
party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action." Id.
Whle a so-called Plaintiffs' First Certification of Compliance with I.R.C.P. Rule 37(a) was filed
with the Court on January 26, 2009, this document fails to set forth the required "good faith"
information. Rather, that document is a self-serving dissertation not relevant to the "certification"
required prior to bringing a motion to compel. Defendants' counsel first became aware that
Plaintiffs were pursuing a Rule 37 motion as to any discovery matter in this case when Plaintiffs'
Motions were delivered to counsel after having been filed. Because Plaintiffs failed to provide the
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
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required certification, the motion should be denied and Plaintiffs should be required to do as Rule
37(a)(2) mandates.
Further, as to the merits of the motion and without waiver of the objection set forth above,
Defendants assert that each and every interrogatory, request for admission and request for
production of documents referenced in Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.18 motion and as contained in
Plaintiffs' Vxrd Record Supplement was answered as required by applicable discovery rules.
Plaintiffs have not even attempted to demonstrate why Defendants' responses are allegedly evasive
or insufficient. The only mention of this discovery motion in Plaintiffs' Brief is set forth on pages
151-154 which specifically addresses only two (2) interrogatories and one (1) request for admission
to Defendant Orland Arneberg. There do not appear to be any other specific references to this
motion in Plaintiffs' Brief despite the list included as part of the paragraph 1.18 motion itemizing
numerous, other discovery responses appended to Plaintiffs' Third Supplement. In addition, as to
the only three (3) responses that Plaintiffs do discuss in their Brief, Plaintiffs merely engage in
argument over the application of those disclosures to the law of the case which does not support the
motion to compel. Plaintiffs have completely failed in all respects to justifjr the prosecution of a
motion to compel.
Plaintiffs' Paragraph 1.20 Motion Should be Denied:
Although Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.20 motion is brought under Rule 57 I.R.C.P. and seeks
declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C 5 1983, it is in fact the same motion, referencing the same alleged
facts, the same authorities and the same relief that was requested under Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment'Adjudication of the Issue of the Cause of Action Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 filed
October 21,2008 ("Plaintiffs' October 21 Motion"), which was denied by this Court in its Opinion
and Order filed December 8,2008. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in support of Plaintiffs' October 21
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
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Motion read, in part, "[ilt is now, as a matter of law, then that Plaintiffs' petition t h s court to
declare their rights, status, immunities, andlor privileges under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and such Federal and
State of Idaho constitutions.. .." This language also constitutes the substance of Plaintiffs'
paragraph 1.20 motion.
This matter, therefore, has been previously and l l l y briefed and ruled upon. There is no
need to waste counsel's time and the Court's time dealing with a previously decided issue that is
brought forward again with no additional citation of authority and no additional factual support.
Defendants incorporate their prior submittals in this matter and respectfully request that the Court
deny this motion for the reasons expressed in the Court's Opinion and Order of December 8,2008,
as to Plaintiffs' October 21,2008 Motion and also for the reasons that, if this declaratoryjudgment
claim should survive Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, which Defendants opine it
should not, judicial economy, convenience, efficiency and expediency will be served by
determining this matter at trial, as was also explained by the Court in its Opinion and Order filed
June 9,2008, deciding related declaratory claims made by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' Para.maph 1.17 Motion Does Not Request Specific Relief and Should be Denied.
Plaintiffs again waste the resources of Court and counsel by making the paragraph 1.17
motion under Rule 15(b) I.R.C.P. to amend their Complaint in this action without specifying the
substance of any proposed amendment to their Complaint. It would appear that Plaintiffs are
attempting to assure themselves of the opportunity to pursue any possible or potential legal claims at
any time they desire in this process without providing proper notice of those claims to Defendants.
Such an approach is not countenanced under Idaho law and for good reason. An informative
decision of the Idaho Supreme court illuminates the underlying rationale for not allowing this
haphazard approach to litigation:
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
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Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court was not limited to deciding
the case on the issues as Eramed by the pleadings. However, the court's authority
under I.R.C.P. 15(b) and, consequently, I.R.C.P. 54(c), to determine a case upon
unpleaded theories is limited by the proviso in I.R.C.P. 15(b) that for the court to
consider unpleaded issues those issues must have been "tried by express or implied
consent of the parties.. .." Although I.R.C.P. 15(b) permits a court to base its
decision on a theory fully tried by the parties, an issue not tried either express or
implied consent cannot be the basis for the decision. See, e.g., 6 Wright & Miller
Fed. Practice & Procedure, Civil s 1493 (1971).
The requirement that the unpleaded issues be tried by at least the implied consent of
the parties assures that the parties have notice of the issues before the court and an
opportunity to address those issues with evidence and argument. Cook v. City of
Price, Carbon County, Utah, 566 F.2d 699 (10"' Cir. 1977); Cox v. Frernont County
Public Building A u t o , 4 15 F.2d 882 (10"' Cis. 1969); Utness v. United States,
23 F.R.D. 279 (D. Alaska 1959).
"Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because
evidence relevant to that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must
appear that the parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue."
MBI Motor Co., Inc. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 71 1 (6' Cir. 1974).

Where the proof taken at trial is relevant to the pleaded issue in the case it would be
manifestly unjust for the court to decide the case on theories not considered by the
parties which may be inferentially proven by the evidence.

MK. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 346,349-350,612 P.2d 1192, 1196-1197 (1980).
Plaintiffs' errant attempt to circumvent Idaho pleading rules should be surnrnarily rejected.
Plaintiffs' Para.ua~h1.21 Motion to Enlarge Time Should be Denied.
Plaintiffs erroneously cite Rule 7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. in support of what appears to be a motion to
amend the deadlines and/or, possibly, the trial date set forth in the Court's Order Setting Case for
Trial and Pre-trial Conference filed September 5,2008, as amended by the Court's Amended Order
filed November 20,2008. Plaintiffs do not support this motion with any showing of good cause. It
is noted that a portion of the petition seeks an enlargement of time to "name expert witnesses,"
which act was required by the Amended Order to be done on or before December 3 1,2008, and a
request for relief fiom such failure requires that a motion be granted under Rule 6(b) I.R.C.P. upon
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
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demonstration of "excusable neglect." No such showing of excusable neglect has been attempted or
made by Plaintiffs in this motion and, accordingly, that relief is not warranted.
Defendants respecthlly request that tlvs motion be denied in its entirety.
IV. DEFENDANTS MOVE FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.
Defendants move for an award of attorney fees against Plaintiffs, as follows:
1. In regard to Plaintiffs' Motions, or any of them, under:
(i)

Rule I 1(a)(l ) I.R.C.P., on the grounds that Plaintiffs' motions, or any of them, are not
well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or of a good faith argument
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law and that Plaintiffs' motions,
or any of them, were interposed for an improper purpose, including to harass and to
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, as more fcllly discussed in this Briefi
and

(ii)

Idaho Code section 12-120 (1) on the grounds that Defendants are the prevailing
parties; and

(iii) Idaho Code section 12-121 on the grounds that Defendants are the prevailing parties
and that Plaintiffs' motions were pursued unreasonably or without foundation, as
more fklly described in tlvs Brief; and
(iv) Idaho Code section 12-123 on the grounds that Plaintiffs' motions, or any of them,
serve merely to harass Defendants and are not supported in fact or warranted under
law or by a good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing
law, as more fully described in this Brief.
2. In regard to Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.12 and 1.18 motions, under Rule 37(a)(4) I.R.C.P. on the
grounds that the making of these motions, or either of them, was not substantiallyjustified.
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAmTTIFFS'MOTIONS
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3. In regard to Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions, or any of them, under Rule 56(c)
I.R.C.P. on the grounds that good cause exists to impose attorney fees against Plaintiffs, as
more fully described in this Brief
DATED this 13th day of February, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certiQ that on this 13th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ XI U.S. Mail
[ 1 Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ 1 FAX (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery
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CLERI( OF D1SiE:i;T COURT

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

)
)

Case No. CV 2008-1 80

?
Plaintiffs,
VS.
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, S H E M A N CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO STRIKE AND BRIEF

1
1
)

1
)
)
)

1

Defendants North Latah County Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard Hansen,
Sherman Clyde and Dan Payne, through counsel, move this Court to strike portions of Plaintiffs'
Affidavit filed herein on January 26,2009, as follows:

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE iZND BFUEF -- 1

1. All statements attributed to any person othei-than Plaintiffs and all testimony offered by

Plaintiffs as to a matter without their personal knowledge of the matter in paragraph 8,
which are either inadmissible hearsay or lack adequate foundation.
2. All statements attributed to Mr. Wagner in paragraph 9, which are inadmissible hearsay.
3. All statements attributed to Mr. Munson in paragraph 10, which are inadmissible hearsay.
4. All statements attributed to Patsy Wagner and Gary Osborn and all testimony offered by

Plaintiffs as to a matter without their personal knowledge of the matter in paragsaph 13,
which are either inadmissible hearsay or lack foundation.
5. All testimony offered by Plaintiffs in paragraph 14, which are inadmissible hearsay.

6. All statements attributed to Mr. Wagner in paragraph 15, which are inadmissible hearsay.
Defendants also move to strike from the record factual assertions by Plaintiffs made without
their personal knowledge or that constitute inadmissible hearsay set forth in Plaintiffs' Motions for
Pai-tial Summary Judgments and other Motions submitted January 26,2009, and Brief, the specific
identification of which in Plaintiffs' rambling, 173-page document are too numerous to efficiently
mention.
This Motion is based, in part, upon Rules 56(e) and (g) I.R.C.P. which require that evidence
submitted in summary judgment proceedings "shall set forth facts.. .admissible in evidence."
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants request the Court strike those items listed above as
inadmissible and/or not to be considered in connection with Plaintiffs' pending Motions for Partial
Summary Judgrnent and other Motions submitted January 26,2009.
Defendants request oral argument in support of this motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of February, 2009.
RONA&J.

LAhIDECK, P.C.
I

BY:

4I C L ~ ~ C - L L

id.uL~.i\

~ o $ l d J. Landeck
DEFEP\rDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE

BRIEF -- 2

i
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE WALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 300 1
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, I

1

DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

) Case No. CV 2008-1 80
)
) THIRD AFFIDAVIT
) OF DAN CARSCALLEN

Plaintiffs,

1
1

VS.
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,

)
)

1
)
)
)

1
)

Defendants.

1

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.

County of Latah

1

Dan Carscallen, upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am over eighteen (1 8) years of age, am competent to testify to the matters set forth
herein and make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge.

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN -- 1

2. I am the Secretary of the North Latah County Highway District ("'District") and, as
such, custodian of and responsible for the District's official records.
3. Attached to this Affidavit are true and correct copies of documents maintained by the

District in its public records as follows:
1)

Minutes of Regular Meeting of the District Board of Commissioners on July 9,
1986, including a copy of District Resolution No. 2, Series 1986.

2)

Affidavit of Publication of District Resolution No. 2, Series 1986.

3)

Affidavit of Publication of Proposed Official Map of Public Highway System
in North Latah County Highway District, Latah County, Idaho (This is only a
partial copy, in two pages, of the Proposed Official Map, the actual copy on file
with the District's records being a complete copy of the published document).

4)

Minutes of Regular Meeting of the District Board of Commissioners held on
August 13,1986.

5)

Minutes of Regular Meeting of the District Board of Commissioners held on
August 29, 1986.

6)

District Resolution No. 3, Series 1986.

The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 9th day of February, 2009.

SWORN TO before me this 9th day of February, 2009.
@
, -?

& .c Z/&?,

\
+f,I.
c:t'
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho
My commission expires: X - / 7-2013
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ XI U.S. Mail
C ] Federal Express Standard Ovemigbt Mail
[ 1 FAX (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery

ap

Ron d J. Landeck
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NORTII I.rtTAIf COUNTY
EIIGII\VAY DISTItICT
LATAH COUNTY, IDAIIO
ItESOLUTION NO. 2, SERIES 1986
A RESOLUTION O F INTENTION
TO ADOPT T H E ACCOMPANYING MAP AS THE OFFICIAL
MAP 01: TffE NOIlTlf LA?'AH
COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT
SYSTEM FOLLOWING PUBLIC
(3,
1986 TO
l-IEARING O N
DETERMINE T H E I'UBLIC INTEREST.
BE 1T RESOI.VED by the Board
of Cornmissioners of the North Lntah Coitnty ITighway District of btah County. Idaho:
NOTICE is hereby given that the
Board of Commissioners of North
I n t a h County Highway District
("District") has catised the m a p accompanying this Resolution No. 2,
Serics I986 to be prepared showing
each hightvay in the District's jjurisdiction and that the District's Board
of Commissioners intcnds to adopt
tire map a s the official m a p of the
District highway system a s requircd
by Idaho Code Section 40-202 upon a
Cinrlinji th;it rhc prlhlic irltcresr ivill

..

.

_.

C

_.

A public hearing will b e held to
determine whether t h e public interest will be served by adoption of the
m a p a s the official m a p of the District highway system and a t \vhich
all interested persons may b c heard.
T h e public hearing is to b e held a s
follows:
DATE: Wednesday, August 13,1986
TIME: 7:30 p.m.
PLACE: Nor-tf~ f,?tah County Highway Uistrici offices iI32 'iilhi:e ilvenue, hloscow, Idaho 838.13
i l f t c t ihe public hcrtriilg, the District's Board of Commissioners s l ~ a l l
adopt the map. tvith arly charigcs or
revisions considered by thein to be
advisable in the public interest, a s
the official map of the District highway system,
DATED this 3rd day of July, 1986.
Nortit Latall County flighway District Iloard of Commissioners:
Orland Arncberg. Chairman
Sherman Clyde, Commissioner
'iVayne Fiemmelinan, Commissioller
ATTEST: Merle King
District Secretary

ITEM 2

"

Affidavit of
Publication
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Latah

ss.

NORTH LATAH COUNTY
HIGHWAY DISTRICT
LATAH COUNTY, IDAHO
RESOLUTION NO. 2, SERIES 19

-,

i&

A RESOLUTION OF I N T E N T I O ~ ~
TO ADOPT T H E ACCOhlPANYING:%cC
MAP AS T H E OFFICIAL
T H E NORTH LATAH
HIGHWAY DISTRICT
FOLLOlVING PUBLIC HEA
AUG. 13, 1986 TO DETERM
PUBLIC INTEREST.

Ray Rosch
being first duly sworn, on oath,
deposes and says:
That h e is the printer of The
IDAHONIAN, a newspaper of
general circulation, printed and
published daily except Sunday a t
Moscow, Latah County, Idaho, in
compliance with Sections 60-106,
60-107, and 60-108 of the Idaho
Code p d the amendments thereto; that the notice of which the
annexed is a full, true and correct printed copy was published
in the regular and entire issues
of said newspaper and not in a
supplement thereto, upon the following dates:

the same being the dates designated for the publication of said
Iegal n c .

E m

subscrib& and sworn to before

v-PJ

n e t h i s 3 0 day of

ay District offices 1132 White Avec hearing, the Disommissioners shall
ith any changes o r
red by them to be
public interest, a s
of the District high-

Notary Public,
residing at Moscow, Idaho

ndeck, Westberg & Gould
s f o r North Latah County
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The r e g u l a r m e e t i n g

0-f t h e N~:trth L a t a h County Highwar D i s t r i c t
h e l d a t t h e M c ~ s c u w Off i r e ctn Aug. 1 3 ,
Board uf C o r r ~ r n i s s i t ~ n e rwas
s
1986 a t 7:30 P.M..
P r e s e n t were @ha.irman Or1 and A r n e b e r g ,
commi ssi o n e r Sherman C l r d e Wayne Hemme 1 man, f oremans H a r ~ dl
S t u b b s , Ralph P a y n e , Dave Andersen and M e r l e King.

,

The m i n u t e s ct+ t h e r e g u l a r m e e t i n g an J u l y 23, 15'86 were
approved.
Sherman C l r d e made a mot i on and Wayne Hemme 1 man secczr~ded i t tct
p a y t h e bi 1 1 5 a s 1 i s t e d
t h e back ctf t h i c, p a g e . I he mist i on was
passed.
1 x 1

The b i d s t o p a i n t t h e P o t l a t c h R i v e r B r i d g e were opened a t 7 : 0 0
a n d went a s f u l l o w s ; George Germer b i d $tlP75.OU t o p a i n t t h e
b r i d g e . E a r l R u s s e l l Const b i d 9 f S 3 3 . U U t o p a i n t t h e b r i d g e .
Hadge and A s s a c . s a i d t h e y w i l l taKe t h e b i d s a n d l o ~ kthem o v e r
and t h e n l e t them know t h e i r d e c i s i o n .

The pub1 i c h e a r i n g t o adt2pt an a f f i c i a . 1 map f o r t h e Murth Latah
Coun t r H i ghway D i s t r i c t shorhri ng t h e r o a d s t h a t t h e H i gh~.~!a:i
D i s t r i c t is g~zting t o m a i n t a i n and be 1 i a b l e f o r w a s h e l d a t 7 : 3 0
F.M.. T h e r e were appro>:irnatel;v -Fort;.. prop1 e a t t e r ~ t j i r t g t h e
m e e t i n g . Ron Landeck t h e Highway D i s t r i c t s a t t ~ z t r n e r s t a r t e d o u t
t h e m e e t i n g by e s p l a i n i rig t h a t t h e ntap st~ctihted t h e r o a d s t h a t t h e
H i g h w a . ~D i s t r i c t is g o i n g tt:~ m a i n t a i n a n d be 1 i a b l e f o r and
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t h e i r was a 1 i s t r e a d of r o . 3 . d ~t h a t w e r e l e f t o f f of t h e map
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B i l 1 B a r t l e t ask abuut the road t h a t goes on f u r t h e r t o the
p r o p e r t y he p u r c h a s e d i n T42,H4W,SIP,20,17 t h a n what t h e m a p
shows. B i 1 1 w a n t s t o Krttz~w w h r t h e r o a d w a s l e f t o f f of- t h e map.
Foreman H a r a l d S t u b b s s a i d t h a t he ha+ n e v e r done a n y mainter13.nce
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d o e s nett knok.~what happened be-Fore t h a t .
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L a r r y Lacy a s k a b o u t g e t t i n g h i s rc1a.d p u t o n t h e map. He s a i d h e
h a s dune a l o t cl+ wc~rk tztn t h e r o a d a n d h a s a t t e n d e d s e v e r a l
m e e t i n g s a.sking f o r t h i s t c ~be done. L a r r y gctt a. l u t of s u p p o r t
from B a r b r a H z t r r i s o n . Fc~rernan H a r o l d Stubbs. s a i d he h a s n o t
m a i n t a i n e d t h e r o a d i n o v e r 14 year e x c e p t f o r csne c o u r t e s v
grading.

Lee L i s h e r p r e s e n t e d t h e Commissioners w i t h a l e t t e r l i s t i n g some
r o a d s t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n were l e + t o f f csf t h e m a p . The r u a d s a r e
t h e Long C r e e k Road, g a l l a r d H i l T R c ~ s d , a n d t h e r o a d qctirlg ttz1
Lar-ry Lac y s

.

James Cooly a s k some q u e s t i o n s or[ l i a b i l i t y ant3 hot/.^ a p e r s ~ r ~ 1 of 3

w o u l d K ~ I I Y A i f a raad i s a c o u n t y r o a d
a n s w e r e d s o m e 0 4 h i.2. q u e s t i o n s
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T e r r y W a l s e r s s k Earl L a n d e r k .3.bout t h e d i
a ro.3.13.

Me1 T a g g a r t g a v e t h e Cummi ssi c x n e r s s o m e
d e s c r i p t i ~ z s n so f a rc,ad t h a t w e n t u p t h e
P a r k t h a . t ws,s r e p l a c e d b y t h e r n 3 . d t h 2 . t
p i 1e 1 rf t f r o m t h e d r e d g e . A sp~skesrnanf
o b j e c t . 5 . ~ I Z I a r t y t h j r l g be i n 1 3 t j c ~ r t e t o t h e

nett. R G ~L a - n d e e k
ff

e r e n t w a y s to ab3rltj~n

d

131 d p e t i t i o n s a n d road
P a l o u s e R i v e r ab~ctveL a i r d
g o e s o ~ e rt h e t a i l
o r J a m e s Sue1 sai d h e
rJ r o a d <M:533:3?!.

in6

S h e r m a n C l r d e a s k t h e p e o p l e i f t h e y w a n t e d t h e c o u n t y 512
m a ; r r t a i n a1 1 of t h e i l l d r a a d s i n t h e c o ~ ~t:>>.
r t Most pECtp1 e t h a t
5.p0Ke u p d i d n ' t t h i nb: t h e y s h o u l d .
Scemecine s a i d t h e y t h u u q h t t h e Highwa::.* D i s t r i c t s h t : ~ u l d p u t a 1 1 I Z I ~
t h e o l d r i g h t a+ w a y s o n t h e m a p . J a m e s D u e r s p o K e u p a n d s a i d h e
d i d n ' t w a n t any o f t h e t a x p a p e r s d c ~l a p s s p e n t on r e s e a r i h i n g
a1 1 o f t h e o l rf r o . 3 1 3 ~ .
B a r b r a H a r r i s a n s a i d s h e w a n t e d t h e C o m m i s s i ~ n e r st u go o u t a n d
l o o k a t L a r r y L a c y 5 r12a.d. S h e r m a n C l y d e s a . i d t h e y w o u l d ,
Fictrd T r a i l

ask i +

t h e C o ~ ~ r t t ; yc a n e s c a p e a n y 1 i a b i l i t y ,

T e r r y W a l s e r s h u w e d t h e C ~ m m i s s i u n e r sa rc13.d t h a t w a r l e + t u f f
t h e m a p . T h e C o m m i s s i o n e r s a d d e d t h e raad t o t h e m a p .

oi
-#d

Les P i x l e y a n d M i l d r e d P i x l e y a r k a b o u t t h e r o a d t h a t g c ~ e sa n
p a s t t h e M a r s h a l R a a d t ~ t h e Vart H u 1 3 h e s e s t a t e . T h e C ~ z ~ r n m i s s i c t n e r s
s a i d t h e y w i 1 1 c h e c k a n d s e e i f t h e rrtad s h ~ ~ u ih ad v e b e e n p u t g=sn
t h e map.
B i 1 1 B a r t 1 e t aid h e w a n t e d ~ I Z I
o n r e c o r d 4 h a . t h e p r c ~ t e s t e dh i s
r o a d n o t b e i n g 1 i s t e d u n t h e map.
~ I = I

T e r r y W a l s e r s a i d t h a t t h e r o a d 4 h a . t gt:les t o t h e O r i l e y p l a c e
t h a t r-l_rrts t h r o u g h t h e ! . 4 a l s e r p l a c e s f i r s r ~ l ~nJo t h e o n t h e rrrap s.nd
w a n t s i t t a k e n o f f . Fopeman H a r o l d S t u b b s s a i d t h a t h e P;ficiws t h e
c i i u n t y h a s w t z t r k e ~ j I:I~
t h e r o a d f o r a t 1 e a s t 28 ;..r a r s T e r r y w a s
t o l d t h a t h e w a u l d h a v e tct p e t i t i n n t h e r c ~ a dc l o s e d .

.

R o n L a n d e c k r e a d 1 e t t e r s r e r e i v e d film L o 1 a C l y d e , F r a n c i s
D u p o r t t , E e n f r e w , B e n n e t t L u m b e r Co., Me1 T a . g g a r t , J o e s e p h
E r e c k n e r , Ron M a h o n e y , J a m e s C o o l e y , a n d L e e t i s h e r . A1 l 1 s t t e r s
a r e en f i l e .
G r a n t M o r t o n f r o m t h e P l a n n i n g a n d Z n n i r ~ q C u r n m i s s i ~ ~un. t a n t s
H i g h w a y D i s t r i c t t o w a i t u n t r i l t h e y c.2.n g i v e t h e m w r i t t e n
t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e t h e y make a dec i s i I Z I ~ I .
T h e t - c w a s a 1 1 ~ of
t discijs.z.ion t h a t
about various things.

w.3:~.

going

cltn

the

c,im?ll tarteuu-;l;i

2
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T h e r e i s . a w r i t t e n t r a n s c r i p t of

t h e m e e t i n g u n ii l e .

T h e Cctmmi ssi s r i e r s c l n s e d
p ~ ~ i bc l h e 2 . r i rig a t 9 : 5 0 P.M. and w i 1 ?
t a k e w r i t t e n t e s t i m o n y u n t i l t h e i r n e x t m e e t i n g un hug. 27.
Sherman Clyde made a m o t i o n a n d Wayne Hemme1rna.n s e c a r i d e d i t 4 0
h a v e Gu i 1 f o r I n s u r a n c e g e t 1 i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e -For t h e Hi g h w a r
D i s t r i c t f o r a p p r o x %420110.00 T h e m o t i o n wa-3 p a s s e d ,
,
Wayne Hemmel man rn.2de a m o t i on and ! S h e r m a n C l y d e s e c o n d e l j i t t c ~
g e t t h e e l e c t r i c a l s e r v i c e i . ~ , ~ ~drobn:e i n a1 1 t h r e e rrew fsu i 1 d i n g s .
T h e mot i ~ n w a s p a s s e d .
Be i
P.M..

n o f u r t h e r b u s ; n e 5 . 5 t h e m e e t i riq w a s a d . - i 1 3 u r n e d

ffha i r m a n

i 1:07

\.J
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ITEM 5

T h e r e g u l a r m e e t i n g of t h e N o r t h l a t a h 121:ri~nty Hiiqhw.3.y
District
Baa.rJ o f Csmmi
i grteps w a s h e l
a t t k f e Mo.s.c~wI]+ f i c~ an k u t ~ . Zs5,
1'78.5 a t 7 : 3 E i P . M . .
P r e s . e r i t w e r e C h a i rm3.n 1 3 r l
Arneberg,
c o r n m i s s i o n e r !3herman C I ~ ~ 3 2
W a,y n e H r m m p l r i t a n , fnrem.3.rt.s. Harol 13
S t u k t t ~R~a~l p h P a y n e , D a v e & r l ~ d e r s ~ =a~rni d H e r ] e I< i n q .
T h e m i n i ~ t e sof
approved,

t h e r p g u t . 3 . r m e e ~ i n gt=,n ~ u g . 112, 1 3 8 , ~w~e r e

T h e 8 1 ~ t d g e tH e a r i n -s w a s h e l t d
7 : 3 0 P.I..l.. C h a i r r r r a r i i ~ l r l a r ~ d
A r r ~ ~ b e ra gs k i f t h e r e w3.s s . r ~ y c o m m e n t s $:n
i
t h e k t i ~ d g e t . T h e r e w3.s
n o n e . SI-1erm.3.n C l y d e m a d e .3. m a t i o n art13 Wa;c,r~e Hemmelrnan sect:tnded
i t
to p a s s a n d .s.dt=hpt t h e budqe t a s a d v e r t i se13. T h e m o t i o n waz.
p .3.5:5e d

.

E d d f r - o m H a d q e a n d A s s o c , a t t e n d e d t h e m e e t i n g a n d 5..3.id t h a t t h e
t i i d f r o m E a r l R i ~ . ~ . s e l tl o p a i n t t h e F o t l a . t i = t i Rii..>er E r i d s- e i s i n
r l l r d e r a r i d b r o u g h t t h e r o r ~ t r - a c t . % .i n t i 1 be .;.igned.
i:a..fayrte Hemrnelmart
made a m a t i o n a n d Sherma.rt C l y t j e s e c o n d e d i t ~ I Z I a c c e p t E a r l
T h e m o t i art 1;.!.3.s p a s s e d .
R u s s e l l s b i d a n d t o s i grt t h e c o n t r a c t - ; .

The p u b 1 i c h e a r i n g t o t a k e w r i t t e n t e s t i r n a n y f o r t h e a d o p t i o n o f
an 12-ff i c i 31 m a p
13gterled. R o n L a r l d e c k t h e H i qhw.3.y D i str=i ~ : t s
a t t o r n e y r e a d 1 e t t e r s r e c e i v e d f r c t m t h e $ 0 1 l ~ ~ *rtq
. . i i pel:ipl e . M r . 4.5
M~E.. Palmer, Cl
F r e n c h , Dean E l 1 i o t , B i l l B a r t l e t t , Eyrctn
Fi t c h , p e t i t i o n f ~ z t r rt3a.d r e f e r r e d t o as M e c k e l Rclad, a.nd p e t i t i c~rt
f r q m Me1 T a g g a r t f o r r c s a d # 4 6 0 . L e t ter.2. a r e on f i l e ,
i

f

f

i

g

r

d

T h e B a r t l e t t s a n d C o o l e y s a r i d a c o u p 1 +? o t h e r p e ~ lpe a t t e n d e d t h e
m e e t i n g a n d a s k a f e w q u e s t ion^. b u t t h e i r i.!.!as ri13 mrl1r-e o r a l
t e s t imonr taken.
~ a j - 0 l 13 S t u t t t t s c h e c k t h e poad,2 En
t:
tj-ie
Ctz~rnmi s s i u n e r s h.3.d S c ~ r e m a r H
map m a r k e d e x h i b i t B c o l o r e d i n hrawrt a n d say i f t h e y have b e e n
rna.intained b y t h e Higt1wa.y [ j i s t r i c t . H 2 r o l t - J 5.ait-J t h a t t h e
r o a d i n h i s d i s t r i c t t h a t has. h e e n m a . i n t a i n e t 3 s i n c e 1972 is. t h e
f i r s t q u a r t e r m i l e a f t h e E a r t l e t t R a a ~ j . T h e C i = t m m i . ~ . ~ . i o r ~ ears~k.
C.
a
e c . M e r l e K i n g tcg 1ctciK a t t h e r e r n . 3 . i n i n g ro.3.d.s m a r k e d i n b r o w n o n
t h e m a p a n d s a y i f t h e y h a v e beer1 m a i n t 2 . i n e d by t h e di.:.tr i c t .
M e r t e s a i d t h a t t111b e s t I Z I ~ h i s k r l a w l e d g e t h a t t h e j-na.1j.3 i n t h e
Moscow D i s t r i c t h.3.ue n s t k ~ e t nm a j j - l t . % . i r l e d ~ . i r ~ chee s t a . p t e d wt3r-k
h e r e i n 1967 and s i n c e 1972 i n t h e D e a r y [ > i s t j - i c f - .
r-

a h e r r n a n C l y d e m a d e a mt=it i o n a n d Wa;r>r~e Hemme 1 m.3.n s e c o n d e l - J i t
adczlpt t h e m a p m.3,rked as e x h i b i t A w i t h t h e ,:h~.nges m a . r g e d
YF.1 lo!.<.a
! s t h e i i f f i c i a l High~,,ray D i s t ~ i c tm a p zrttj t u S ~ Q F I ~
R e s a l i ~ t i o nt.lo.3 S e r i e s 1P:36 th.2.t: i s .3.tta,-tIetj t o t h e t131:k +
I
:
p a g e . T h e m a t i ,=tri wa.5. p a ~ . ~ . e l ~ .

to

w,i.~.

M i k e M c G a h n a.nd
P r e r e l f r o m t h e C i t y Q + M o 5 . c ~a~t t~e n t j e d t h e
m e e t i n g artd w a . n t e d S h e C i 4 : r S t3f MCI~CKEW
arfd t h e H i 9 h w a . y D i s t r i c t 4 , ~
cfo a . j c l i n t o i 1 i n g j t z l b rlrn t-lt.O,'eiv.;r, ...jo.'.~.pfj S t , a n i j D s t , Shprma-,
C l y d e made a m c t t i o n a n d !.l.2.:i.rte Hi.mirr1eim.3.r! s e c s r i d e d i t
I~,:I a j c j i n t
a i l i n g jots o n P l r . Veisz.! a.nd J o s e p h t & i ~t.qi
t 1 2 ctlp,-li' or1 [? s t t l e f a r e
t h e y d o a n y w o r k on i t . T h e r n t z ~ t i a r w
~ a s Fias-%.~d.
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R o n Landecli s a i d t h a t D w a i r f Waterm.3.r1 w.s.rit.5 t h p Hightg.3.y D i s t r i c t
t o w a i v e t h e 9 1 0 0 r e v i e w f e e f ~ z *~ .~ t ~ ~ . r ~ ~ -~ ~rt:~a~js,
= ~ j - j i rW
l ia~r r , e
Hemme Iman rns.de a m a t i on a n d S h e r m a r ~ C1 y d e s e c a r r d e d i t r i o t t , >
w a i ve t h e 4 e e . T h e
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mtztt
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ITEM 6

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT
Latah County, Idaho
RESOLUTION NO. 3, Series 1986
A RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ACCOMPANYING HAP AS THE OFFICIAL
MAP OF THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT (5'DISTRICT'f)
SYSTEM
RECITALS :
1.

Idaho Code Section 40-202 (1)(a)(b) provides as follows:

(a) The board
of county or highway district
commissioners shall cause a map to be prepared showing
each
highway
in their
jurisdiction,
and
the
commissioners shall cause notice to be given of
intention to adopt the map as the official map of that
system, and shall specify the time and place at which
all interested persons may be heard.
(b) After the hearing, the commissioners shall adopt
the map, with any changes or revisions considered by
them to be advisable in the public interest, as the
official map of the respective highway system.
2.

On August 13, 1986, after legal notice was given, a

public hearing was held at which all interested persons were
heard regarding the adoption of the official

the District

highway system.
August

continuation

the public

hearing was held, at which written comments were received from
the public and staff comments were received regarding the public
input at the August 13, 1986 hearing.

Thereafter, the District's

Board of Commissioners approved this resolution.
RESOLUTION

1
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BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of

I

-

omm missioners of the North

Latah County Highway District of Latah County, Idaho:
Upon review of all testimony and evidence, the District's
Board of Commissioners makes the following findings of fact:
A.

The map accompanying this ~esolutionNo. 3, series 1986

describes each highway within the jurisdiction of the North Latah
County Highway District.
B.

Each highway described on the accompanying map has been

maintained

regularly

by

the

District

since the

~istrict's

organization in 1972.
C.

Those roads which any member of the public requested be

included on the accompanying map and were not so included have
not been maintained by the District since at least 1972 and,
further, no m e n h e r of the public produced evidence indicating
public maintenance for five (5) consecutive years immediately

prior to 1963.
D.

The public interest is served by the adoption of the

accompanying map as the official map of the North Latah County
Highway District System.
E.

The adoption of the accompanying map as the official

map of the North Latah County Highway District System shall in no
way impair, hinder or affect private rights of access on roads
within the boundaries of the North Latah County Highway District
System, the rights of access to which have been obtained by
public or private use or both.
RESOLUTION
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NOW THEREFORE, the map accompanying this Resolution No. 3,

Series 1986, is adopted as the official map of the North Latah
County Highway District System, which o f f i c i a l map bears our

signatures and i s on file at the offices of t h e North Latah
County Highway District, 1132 White Avenue, Moscow, Idaho 83843,

DATED this .2/

day of September, 1986.
North Latah County Highway District
Board of Commissioners:

,

V

S

h

i

l

~

.
j
& c;- --

Clyde, (C&n"1":sikner

2.drr~.~~%&r&%. *.**"+
Wa@e
Hemtimen, Commissioner
p,;*/&
L
.,

Attest:

~ & l e
Xing, Oistrict Secretary
Prepared by:

Ronald J. Landeck
Siebe, Landeck, Westberg & Gould
Attorneys for North Latah County
Highway District
P.O. Box 9 3 4 4
Moscow, I D 83843

RESOLUTION
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883- 1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
VS.

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

)
) Case No. CV 2008-1 80
)
) DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE
) OF EXPERT WITNESSES

1
1

)
)

1
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants, through counsel and pursuant to the Court's Amended Order Setting Case for
Trial and Pre-Trial Conference, hereby disclose Defendants' expert witnesses whom Defendants
reserve the right to call as expert witnesses at the trial of this matter, as follows:

DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT IVITKESSES -- 1

1. Larry J. Hodge
Hodge & Associates, Inc.
405 S. Washington St.
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 882-3520
(licensed professional engineer and licensed professional land surveyor)

2. John L. Dunn
Rim Rock Consulting, Inc.
115 South Washington St., Suite 3
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-5339
(licensed professional land surveyor)
3. Susan Peterson
Latah County Clerk/Auditor/Recorder
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-2249
4. Pat Vaughan
Latah County Assessor
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-5710
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of February, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.

\,

By:

DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT QrITNESSES -- 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 13th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ XI U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ 1 Hand Delivery

fl
Ro ald J. Landeck

DEFEh-DANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPSRT WITNESSES -- 3

2009 FEB 1 7 AH ll : 31

Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)

Case No. CV 2008- 180

Plaiiltiffs

PL-4INTIFFS' ANSWERING

vs.

BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS'

North Latah County Highway District; Board of

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

Commissioners for the North Latah County

JUDGh4ENT AND REPLY TO

Highway District, Orland Arnehesg, Richard

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING

Hansen, Sheman Clyde, in their Official

BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

PARTIAL SUMMARY

Individual Capacity

)

JUDGMENTS AND OTHER

Defendants

)

R4OTIONS SUBMITTED

'I

JANUARY 26,2009

I. Introduction
This Answering Brief to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is supported by Ed
Swanson's Affidavit, Ole Hanson's Affidavit, Joe Yockey's Affidavit, Plaintiffs' Fourth Record
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF 'F0 DEFENDANTS9 MOTION FOR SU,VMARY
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO DEFENDAN: S' ANSWERIXG BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL STJMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009
1
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Supplement, Plaintiffs' Affidavit is Support of Plaintiffs Answering Brief to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment and Reply to Defendants' Answering Brief and Objections to Plaintiffs
Motions for Partial Summary Judgments and Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009.
Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims. However, the Court has
already given sufficient reason for denial of Defendants' Motion-

'-Specifically, the

determination of the width of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road must be addressed." (see
Opinion and Order On Plaintiffs Motions For Summary Judgment And Defendants' Motion For
Protective Orders, For Enlargement Of Time And For Attorney Fees (hereafter Opiniorz), at 9).
The width of the Camps Canyon right of way has not been factually determined-this
undisputed. The Court confirms this. Plaintiffs allege this has harmed theni-they

is

have not

been afforded due process. However, Defendants claim they are authorized "to improve" and "to
maintain", each or either of which includes as Defendants state adding additional width to the
road surface and supporting structures of a claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way (see
Defendants ' BrieJ; at 7 par. 6; see Payne Second Afidavit, pars. 4 and 5 ) without a factual
determination of the width of the easement. It is here, on the undisputed facts that no evidentiary
hearing has been held and that Defendants say it is witliin their policies/customs that they are not
required to give Plaintiffs an evidentiary hearing that Plaintiffs petition for Partial Summary say
based on these undisputed facts that this dispute requires due process. Without the evidence in
the record, Defendants findings and conclusions are arbitrary and capricious and Defendants'
actions and/or failures to act in these matters are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of the
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal (see Complaint pp. 8-25). There is also the issue of the
first Wagner driveway access and the challenge faced by the 'IVagners in building a driveway
access when confronted with an 8 foot embankment left by Defendants 1996 alterations to
Camps Canyon Road (see Plaintijj' Fourth Recor-dSupplement, Item No. 3, at 17 (photo
showing the remains of the 8 foot embankment at the surveyed east property line after the
Wagners had built new driveways on either side of it-the

first to the east and south of the
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property line and the 2"d to the west of the property line); see Ole Hallson Affidavit at 2, par. 7
(the east property line was well known to people working on both sides of it)).
Camps Canyon Road has always been an alternative canyon short cut having an early
start as a road (see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 19 (Standard Atlas of
Latah County Idaho circa 1914 shows Canips Canyon Road as well as other roads in Camps
Canyon)). However, its early beginning fizzled and it remained a wagon trail (see Plaintiffs '

Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 18 (Metsker Map of circa early 1950's shows Camps
Canyon Road only extending west of Little Bear Ridge Road to and stopping at the 3+/- acre
parcel)).

Canzps Carzyorz Road has been an unrecordedprescriptive right ofway for over 120
years, probably 130 years or more. However, if Plaintiffs make this statement, it is conclusory.
Camps Canyon Road has been a prescriptive right of way since before 1930. Likewise, if
Defendants make this statement it is conclusory. To establish a public prescriptive way requires
a public evidentiary hearing as it is on the public's testimony that the NLCHD record is made on
which the supposedly impartial NLCHD Commissioners make findings and conclusions. It was
created by public use and its use can only be supported by the evidence the public brings (see

Homestead Farms v. Board of Comnz 'rs Teton County, state of Idaho, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P 3d
630 (2005); and can only be done by Defe~ldalltsunder certain circumstances (see Galvin v.

Canyon County High. Dist. Aro. 4, 134 Idaho 579, 6 P.3d 829 ("Section 40-203A may ollly be
used to validate an existing highway or public right of way about which there is some kind of
doubt. It does not allow for the creation of a new public rights")..
Contrary to Defendants' claim that there are two events from which Plaintiffs' claims
arise (see Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion For Sununary Judgment (hereafter

Defendants ' Brief), at 2), there are many events from which Plaintiffs' allegations arise. There
are, however, two sides of Camps Canyon Road; and as such, there are two ongoing issues from
which these allegations arise. The issues arise from the Defendants making two claims adverse
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to Plaintiffs property and liberty rights of which the Defendants claim they are authorized to do
and are rightful in denying Plaintiffs due process. On both sides of the road Defendants claim
they are authorized to invade and occupy Plaintiffs' land and to do so without the civil
procedures of public hearings and of eminent domain or the positive guaranties of the 5thand

idth

Amendments of the Constitution of the U.S. to the Plaintiffs and/or without any of the statutory
safeguards and/or remedies for erroneous deprivations. In both instances Plaintiffs claim
Defendants are in wrongful possession of Plaintiffs' land and that this improper interference with
Plaintiffs7 property rights is particularly egregious on the south side of the road as the
Defendants have allowed the invasion and occupation of a third party (see Loretto v.
Telepror-lpter Manhattan CATVCorp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned
that an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a "stranger" invades and occupies the
owners' property, and that such an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation on
the use of the property).
Defendants do not retreat from their claims. Further injury has occurred and both issues
remain as threats of further irreparable harm. As Defendants claim in their Brief in support of
their Motion, they contiilue to hold to these claims (Dqfendants ' Brief), at 2 ("'This Brief \\.ill
sl~owthat the District has, at all tiines relevant to this action, properly discharged its statutory
responsibilities to improve and maintain the public highway known as Camps Canyon").
Defendants' "[discharge of their] statutoly responsibilities to improve" is an autocratic self
proclamation of Defendants' misplaced "prescriptive right" and is in excess of the authority the
legislature has intended the NLCI-ID have to maintain Camps Canyon Road, or for that matter
any unrecorded prescriptive right of way (see PIaintifJs ' Fourth Record Sapplenzent, Item No. 3,
at 1 (Photo of neighbor's fence along Little Bear Ridge Road, fence now lies buried under gravel
by the diligent il~aiiitenanceof the Defendants (see Defendants' Brief at 9, par. 11)). Defendants
have lost sight of their responsibilities to the public (i.e. following the rules) and it appears they
have come to believe that they are tlze Public (see Defendants Affidavits in recent Plaintiffs'
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petitions for partial summary judgment (Defendants try to hold a public validation proceeding
without the public, by their own testimony and to even establish Camps Canyon Road as
"public" by their own decree. Placing Camps Canyon Road on their map requires public
testimony not solely the Defendants')). The injuries for which Plaintiffs bring suit we related to
this lack of public input and specifically the denial of the opportunity for Plaintiffs to respond to
Defendants' adverse actions in regards to Plaintiffs' property. The issues Plaintiffs bring are
matters of was due process required in these actior~s/failur.es to act,
Defendants deny that these matters are matters requiring due process; and furthermore,
Defendants state that these exertions of their governmental power are matters of Defendants'
policy (see PlaintIfJs ' Third Record Supplenier7t, Itein No. 20, at 8-9 ("The District's policy for
improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho Code $40-2312 and the
holdings of i14eservey... ") and based on law. Summary judgment is the order of the day and it
belongs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have said that their land has been wrongfully taken and therefore
their collstitutional rights have been violated. Defendants do not deny these actions, as they
readily admit that these actions are a nlatter of their policies or customs (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth
Record Szqplen7ent, Item No. 3, at 3 and 6 (in the late fall of 2005, but mostly in 2006
Defendants pushed dirt and gravel illto Plaintiffs' buffer (there was 5-1 0 feet of space between
the road support and Plaintiffs' fence before this) and covered the wires of Plaintiffs' fence); see
Pluii?tlffss'Fotlrth Record Szrpplement, Item No. 3. at 5 (in 2006 in order to widen the road,
Defendants filled the old drainage ditch and pushed tlie old compaction roller into Plaintiffs
fence and created a new drainage ditch which has undermined Plaintiffs fence and caused
additional erosion); see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Supylenzent, Item No. 3' at 4 (the first Wagner
driveway access was issued for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' propel-ty). They attempt to
defend their exertions of governmental power by saying they were reasonably negligent and/or
the state legislature made then1 do it, under statutory a~ithority.Being reaso~lablynegligent is not
rationally based to a legitimate governme~~tal
interest, therefore their only valid defense left is
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that someone else (the state legislature or the Wagners made them do it). Plaintiffs allege
Defendants are the direct, legal, proximate and substantial cause of these damages of and
invasions into Plaintiffs" property and that these damages and invasions are within the scope of
responsibility of Defendants' actions/failures to act (see Complaint).
Plaintiffs are not here to say that the Defendants can not widen the road if they believe
that it is necessary, even if the only reason may be that they may lose state and/or federal funding
if they don't. Their reasoning in this regard, however correct or misguided it may be, is not the
issue. Likewise, Plaintiffs are not here to say, considering the alterations to Camps Canyon
Road, that it was not the better idea to put a driveway access heading east through the grassy
draw rather than going north as the historic driveway approached Camps Canyon Road. What
Plaintiffs are saying is that the actionslfailures to act in these issues are improper interference
with Plaintiffs' property rights. The Defendants cannot simply move Camps Canyon Road
anywhere they want without going through certain civil procedures; nor can they sinlply bury
Plaii~tiffs'fence and/or fill Plaintiffs' buffer wit11 gravel and dirt to increase the width and/or
support of Camps Canyon Road, even if it is within the right of way without certain civil
procedures as Camps Canyon Road is an unrecorded prescriptive right of way and there are laws
prohibiting damaging Plaintiffs fence and trespassing and creating nuisances on Plaintiffs' land.
Defendants cannot simply give permission for the neighbors to take Plaintiffs' land for a
driveway access regardless of which party, the Wagners or the Defendants, prefers it that way.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs and Defendants agree these interferences are not random acts.
Also, almost in the same breath in which Defendants claim that the issues for wliich
Plaintiffs allege harm are matters of their policy, that is, that these alleged wrongful exertions of
Defendants governmental power are "not unauthorized", Defendants suggest these claims arise
under the ITCA. However, Plaintiffs point out that these interferences were not only matters of
policy, final policy makers approval andor official decision; but also, these interferences were
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of the Defendants' discretion and/or illegal and these
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iilterferences have resulted in the invasion of Plaintiffs property (see Complaint). Therefore,
Plaintiffs deny that ITCA offers an adequate remedy. However, without waiver of this denial,
Plaintiffs continue.
When Defendants absolutely confirmed that they were in no way going to coilsides the
matters of which Plaintiffs alleged they were being harmed (to give Plaintiffs' due process in
these matters), and that Defendants were not going to take any evidence to consider the
underlying issue of limits of Camps Canyon Road (allow an evidentiary hearing) unless
Plaintiffs paid them a $750 fee, and when Defendants said Plaintiffs7only other choice was to
get a lawyer, then Plaintiffs, within 30 days of that final decision that the Defendants had no
viable agency remedy for Plaintiffs' con~plaillts,filed a tort claim notice with the clerk of the
NLCHD (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplei~zer~t,
Item No. 6, at 5-8 (At the 6/16/07 meeting of
the Commissioners, Defendants give Plaintiffs choice of fee or to get a lawyer, even though
Plaintiffs say they will represent themselves); see also Plaintiffs ' Third Record SzqJplement, Item
No. 9, at 20, (Defendants deny Plaintiffs' request to talk directly

their counsel as Plaintiffs

would not have to pay ally inoney if they didn't have a lawyer); see also Defendai?ts ' Brief; at 2
(Plaintiffs file a tort claim notice in November, 2007)). In the alternative, Plaintiffs plead that
Plaintiffs' tort claim notice gave Defendants adequate and timely notice. Defendants were given
fair warning of Plaintiffs objectioil to Defendants actions 011 4/12/06 and kept Defendants abreast
of Plaintiffs objections throughout the whole time until Plaintiffs filed the Tort Claim Notice
when Defendants indicated that there were no agency remedies they ~vouldconsider.
Defendants have been given the information for them to initiate ididation yroceedillgs
on their own resolution (see Ha1-r.i~v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497 (1990); see also Tirare v
Idaho Stcrte Tax Coinnz '17, 98 Idaho 477, at 383 (1977) (the Defendants had clearly not fulfilled
their statutory obligations and were estopped from denying a refund). Establishing an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way by public hearing is the job of the Defendants and they ha\-e
permission to do so, if legal establishment is in doubt (see Idaho Code $ 40-203a (1)).
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Defendants have abused their discretion and violated the law, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
were required under Idaho Code tj 40-203a to initiate validation proceedings under their own
resolution on 4/12/06 when the legal establishment of the road was questioned as the Defendants
had acted upon their findings and conclusions. Defendants continue to threaten imminent
irreparable harm and the trespass and nuisance go unabated (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record
Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 4 and 7 (Wagners first driveway access left the land scarred, bare of
vegetation and exposed to erosion and the pike of rocks still remain minimally on Plaintiffs land
as well as scattered over it); (see Plaintiffs' Fourth RecordSupplernent, Item No. 3, at 3, 5 , and 7
(intrusion into Plaintiffs' buffer has not been abated nor has the injuries to Plaintiffs' fence)).
Defendants continue to threaten more irreparable harm ((see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record
Supplemerzt, Item No. 3, at 8 and 9 (Defendants continue to intentionally push snow illto
Plaintiffs' fence, winter of 2007-8); (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 10
(damage of Plaintiffs' fence and gravel contained in snow removal is several feet beyond
Plaintiffs' fence indicating Defendants intentions to place the snow on the fence, spring of 2008);
(see Plaintiffs ' Fou~tlzRecord Suppler;lze~t,Item No. 3, at 11 (winter of 2006-7, notice the space
between the car tracks and the fence; adequate room for snow without necessary darnage to the
fence)). Furthermore, on neither side of the road have the Defendants said they could not legally
or would not conti~luetheir activity (Defendants say they impliedly revoked the first Wagner
driveway access permit. They have not defined what that means. Are abutting land owners
impliedly restricted to one access to the road? They have not said that they would not again
issue a permit in the same place. Indeed their Brief indicates they deny negligence; and, that it is
not only plausible but valid (reasonable) for them to do to issue the permit.) Furthermore,
Defendants have no good faith immunity (see Owen v. Irzdependence, 445 U.S.622 ("c) The
application and rationale underlying both the doctrine whereby a municipality was held im~nune
from tort liability with respect to its "governmental" functions but not for its "proprietary"
functions, and the doctrine whereby a municipality was immunized for its "discretionary" or
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"legislative" activities but not for those which were "ministerial" in nature, demonstrate that
neither of these common-law doctrines could have been intended to limit a municipality's
liability under 1983. The principle of sovereign immunity from which a municipality's immunity
for "govemnental" functions derives cannot serve as the basis for the qualified privilege
respondent city claims under 1983, since sovereign immunity insulates a municipality fiom
unconsented suits altogether, the presence or absence of good faith being irrelevant, and since the
municipality's "governmental" immunity is abrogated by the sovereign's enactment of a statute
such as 1983 inaking it amenable to suit. And the doctrine granting a municipality immunity for
"discretionary" functions, which doctrine merely prevented courts fiom substituting their own
judgment on matters within the lawful discretion of the municipality, cannot serve as the
foui~dationfor a good-faith immunity under 1983, since a municipality has no "discretion" to
violate the Federal Constitution. (d) Rejection of a construction of 1983 that would accord
municipalities a qualified immunity for their good-faith constitutional violations is compelled
both by the purpose of 1983 to provide protection to those persons wronged by the abuse of
goverlunental authority and to deter future constitutional violations, and by considerations of
public policy. In view of the qualified immunity enjoyed by most government officials, many
victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert
a good-faith defense. The concerns that justified decisions conferring qualified immunities on
various government officials - the injustice, particulasly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting
the official to liability, and the danger that the threat of such liability would deter the official's
willingness to execute his office effectively - are less compelling, if not wholly inapplicable,
when the liability of the municipal entity is at issue")).
As this Court has said, the issue of the width (and one can include the location, use, and
character) of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent past, pewades the ongoing issues on both
side of the road. This issue of the width of the easement-the

legal establishment of it-is

complicated by the undisputed alteration in Camps Canyon Road in 1996 (see Plaintiffs Asdavit
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at 2, par. 8; Ed Swanson Afldavit, at 2-3, pars. 5-12; see Ole Hanson AfJiduvit, at 1-2, pars. 2-8:
see Joe Yockey AfJidavit, at 2, pars. 4-8; see Plaintijfs ' Third Record Supylentent, Itern No. 1, at
3, Request For Admission No. 3, subpart c.; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 2,

at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 3; see Plailztiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 16- 17,
Interrogatory Nos. 40 - 34; (Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road several times and
altered the centerline; see Second Payne Affidavit at 2 and 3)). Whatever the eventual outcome
of the factual determination Defendants disturbed the status quo in 1996 and are claiming the
same thing they did then which is not plausible. Defendants again starting in the late fall of 2005
to disturb the status quo. Plaintiffs do not disagree with the court that the limits of the Camps
Canyon right of way need to be factually determined. However, this only confirms that a dispute
exists and does not then answer when such factual determination is required. On the issue on the
north side of the road and the widening of Camps Canyon Road, is governed by I.C.

9 40-605

and/or I.C. 5 40-1310, and/or I. C. 5 Title 40-Chapter 20, and/or T.C. 5 Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or
the 5''' and 1 4 ' ~ m e n d m e n t sof the Constitution, and/or Article I 5 13 and 14 of the Idaho State
Constitution, and/or the Idalio Doctrine of Quasi-Judicial Capacity, and amongst others and as
these statutes and constitutions are harmoniously construed, Plaintiffs coiltend when was before
the widening occurred.

If not then, and without waiver of this contention, the Plaintiffs contend that due process
was due on 4/12/06, or inlnlediately thereafter (aside, with the first Wagner driveway access
permit to be temporarily revoked until that hearing took place). Furthennore: on 4/12/06 due
process was now called for under I.C.

5 40-203a under the Coinmissioners own resolution as the

legal establishment was in question. Failure to provide a hearing under I.C. 9 40-203a under
Cornmissiollers own resolution now became in violation of Plaintiffs' equal protection rights, as
Plaintiffs have a right to private action under I.C. 5 40-203a as well as a right to due process (see
Owell, above ("since a ilxunicipality Ins no "discretion" to violate the Federal Constitution")).
Furtlzermore, Defendants denial of (i) Plaintiffs of predeprivational hearing, (ii) a post
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deprivation hearing, (iii) Plaintiffs' requests that Defendants initiate validation proceedings on
their own resolution on several occasions and (iv) Plaintiffs' Requests For Regulatory Takings
Analysis were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal and a
manifestation of Defendants deliberate indifference to the erroneous deprivations of Plaintiffs
property and property rights.
Plaintiffs also contend that post deprivational remedies under the ITCA are inadequate
when the actions were "not unauthorized" and a predeprivational hearing was feasible (see
Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124).

Defendants actions/failures to act are also arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal as Defendants' exertions of their governmental power, as
well as Defendants' findings and conclusions, bear no relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare; are in excess of Defendants' statutory authority (I. C. tj 40-23 12 does
not mandate a 50 foot-25

feet fi-om centerline and the holdings of Meservey require an

evidentiary hearing); are not supported by substantial evidence in the record (an unrecorded
prescriptive right of way has no public evidentiary hearing to establish the attributes-"public
interest", width, location, etc.); run counter to the evidence in this case and the agency record to
the findings and conclusions Defendants make (Defendants acknowledge nunlerous alterations in
Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, with no surveys and or accurate descriptions of the
land required for the alterations, and no records of the Defendants'/Commissioners' orders for
laying out of and/or for the alterations tl~emselves);are so implausible (Camps Canyoii Road
cannot rationally be occupying the identical strip of land it did at the end of the prescriptive
period as it is claimed to be acquired prior to 1996; as in 1996 Camps Canyon Road underwent
significant alteration with the permission of the then owner (see Ed S~uanso~zs
' First Af$davit, at
2, par. 7; see Plaint$%' Affidavit, at 2-3, par. 8);and even if Defendants began the 1996

alterations with a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way, they have no survey and/or

accurate record of the lands required for the alteration to support their claim that no private
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property was taken or that they did not exceed the limits of the original width of the usage of the
road or that they did not exceed the limits of the old fence line (see Ed Swansorzs ' First ,4fJ;davit,
at 2, par. I I ; see Joe Yockeys 's ' AfJidavit, at 2, par. 5 and 8; see PlaintFffs ' AfJidavit, at 2-3, par.
8); and the old trees (see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 2 (1989 FSA
aerial photo, showing large trees where fence line stood; large trees were cut down and
excavated in 1996 by Highway District (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 9, at
13 (Dan and Gary cut down trees on Camps Canyon Road))), and furthermore, if they do have a
mandated 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way as they do continue to claim, their

continued claim of 25 feet from centerline would exceed the original 25 feet from centerline
claim at the outer edges and thus negate their claim that no private property was taken) that they
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise; are in
contravention to the statutes and the constitutions of the State of Idaho and the U.S.; are relying
on factors the Idaho state legislature did not intend (a mandated width which gives them
authority under 1.C.S;40-23 12 "to improve" and to "maintain"); and fail to circumscribe their
broad authority to determine right of way boundaries and legal limitations with the statutory
safeguards of the requirements of due process and/or the equal treatment under the law (see the
5'" Amendment to the U.S. Constitution), legally conducted professionally done surveys (see I.C.

S; S; 40-1 3 10 and 605 and 1.C $5 3 1-2707 and 2709), accurate descriptions of the lands required
for the alterations(see I.C. $5 40-1310 and 605), the recording of the commissioners' orders for
laying out of and for the alteration itself (see I.C.

$5 40-608), and for recording of and conveying

of the agreements with abutting landowners(see I.C. $ $ 40-23021, remedies for erroneous
deprivations (see Zinermon v. Buvcdz 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124; see also Zitnmerrnan v. City of
Brush Co., 455 U.S.
Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, (9thCircuit, 200 1); see also Logan v. Zir?~~~errnan
422, 435-436 (1982) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is
foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized");
and/or are in real and ever present conflict with a litany of other statutes, many of which are of
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criminal and malicious intent (see Roeder Holdings v. Ada County, 41 P.3d 237, citing Idaho
County Nursing Home v. Dep't ofHealth, 120 Idaho 933,937, 821 P.2d 988, 992 (1991) ("When
a conflict exists between a statute and a regulation, the regulation must be set aside to the extent
of the conflict").
Whether I.C. $ 40-202 gives effective notice to abutting land owner (see Defendants '
Briefat 19-20) is not relevant as Camps Canyon Road had not even been established as being in
the public interest (see Homestead Farrns v. Board ofComnz 'rs Tefon County, state of Idaho, 141
Idaho 855, 119 P 3d 630 (2005) (establishing the public interest requires an evidentiary
hearing)). When Plaintiffs gave Defendants fair warning at the 4/12/06 meeting the next step
was up to Defendants-to

provide a hearing as the validity of the right of way was in doubt.

Defendants have a duty, not to take private property without due process (5&Amendment) or not
to take private property without trying to make an agreement with Plaintiffs, and without
surveying and without accurately describing the lands required for the alteration prior to the
alteration (see I.C. 5 $40- 13 10 and 605 and Title 40-Chapter 20). Defendants' failure to
establish the right of way (public hearing, they now have been given permission to cossect the
error, to do so under their own resolution (see 1.C $ 40-203a (l)(a), the "may" turns to "shall"
(see Oppenlzeirner Industries v. Johnson Cuttle Co., 112 ldaho 423, 732 P. 2d 661 (1986) (in this
case, the IDAPA had set forth required conduct of a brand inspector in two distinct contextual
settings. (e.g. When a brand i~lspectoris confronted with a "fresh brand", he shall not and when
he is confronted with two or more brands, he may). The shall not made the

mandatory

when the brand i~lspectorwas confronted with the conff uence of both circumstances) as they
have already acted), and thus those failures added to the failure to lay out (survey and describe),
and failure to keep records of orders for laying out and for alteration (I.C. $5 40-608) has left
Defendants without substantial evidence in the record to make a finding or draw a conclusion
that they in 1996 or in 2005 or in 2006 or even now as they continue widen as a matter of policy
"to improve and to maintain" Camps Canyon Road, or for that matter any and all unrecorded
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prescriptive rights of way (see Plaintiffs' petition for facial invalidity of Defendants' standard
operating procedure to widen prescriptive ways), have a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of

way or ever did or that they have not taken private propel-ty (whether gifted or not) or that they
are not now taking private property or that they will continue to do so with their diligent
maintenance policies (see Second Payne Affidavit, at pars. 3-5; see Defendarzts ' Briefat 9, par.

I I). The evidence to support Defendants' conclusory "ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS
RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAII\/ISmis distinctly absent, intentionally done, and blatantly
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, and or illegal. Plaintiffs have not
requested this Court to tell the Defendants that they must validate Camps Canyon Road (see
Court's Opinion denying Plaintiffs petition to reconsider Plaintiffs' requests for declaratory
judgments), they have said that the Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' rights to due process and
equal protections as the Defendants have no rational basis for the constitutional violatio~lsthey
effect on Plaintiffs. At a minimal requirement, Defendants need at least a rational basis for a
legitimate governmental interest. At the declaratory judgment hearings, Defendants did not
show any relation of their actions/failures to act to the public health, safety, morals, and/or
general welfare.
Indeed the litany of allegations grows and grows as Defendants defend and deny all
matters on a legal interpretation of Idaho Code 5 40-23 12. Plaintiffs agree with the Court's
findings that the right of way needs to be factually determined. E-Iowever,Plaintiffs allege that
the timeliness of that factual determination underlies the factual determinatio~litself. If it is then
eventually factually determined that the right of way of Camps Canyon Road is indeed 50 feet25 feet from centerline and that however irrational it may be to say that the present claim is
identical to the original claim or that indeed a new claim has g r o ~ and
a it is eventually
determined that the new claim is valid, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants could not do what they
did. For if these exertions of governmental authority are as Defendants claim ". ..the District
has, at all times relevant to this actiom, properly discharged its statutory responsibilities
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improve and maintain the public highway known as Camps Canyon" (Defendants ' BrieA at 2),
and "The District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on
Idaho Code 540-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey ... ",and "The District is well within its legal
rights to widen a road (have Defendants conveniently left out the words unrecorded
prescriptive?) without holding a public hearing (deeded rights of way may not require a public
hearing as they are not established by public testimony; however, are not then, the Defendants
discriminating against abutting land owners abutting to unrecorded prescriptive rights of way as
there is no record of attributes of the right of way in the case of the unrecorded prescriptive right
of way as there is in the case of the deeded right of way) when that activity occurs within the
area of the District's right of way" (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8);
then, either Defendants have invalid policies/customs, as they fail to identify their own
disclaimer-"under

usual circumstances"-that

as applied to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' situation,

Defendants' policies andlor customs are invalid; or Defendants' policies andlor customs are
invalid facially; andlor 1.C.g 40-23 12 is overly broad and/or vague.
Defendants have no valid legal theory under which they defend their actions/failures to
act as neither have the Wagners mandated the Defendants to do what they did, nor has the state
legislature mandated that the width of Camps Canyon Road or any unrecorded prescriptive right
of way be 50 feet-25

feet from centerline. Furthernlore, Defendants' counsel cannot mandate

what it is that Plaintiffs plead (see Defendants' Brief, at 4 ("Plaintiffs' claims in this action arise
almost exclusively from two (2) occurrences.. ."). See Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule ff8
(b) which reads' "Rule 8(b). Defenses - Forin of denials. A party shall state in short and plain
terms the defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the
adverse party relies. If a party is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of an averment, the party shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials
shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to
deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, the pleader shall specify so much of it as is
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true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to
controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, the pleader may make denials as specific
denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or n~ay,generallydeny all the averments except
such designated averments or paragraphs as the pleader expressly admits; but, when the pleader
does so intend to controvert all its averments, including averments of the grounds upon which the
court's jurisdiction depends, the pleader inay do so by general denial subject to the obligations
set forth in Rule 11." Nowhere does it say that Plaintiffs must change their pleadings to meet
Defendants chosen denials. Defendants have generally denied on the grounds of "good faith".
There is no such defense and Defendants' petition for summary judgment must be denied and
Plaintiffs petition for partial summary judgnlent should be granted. The Defendants request for
suininary judgment and their defense to Plaintiffs petition for partial summary judgment for
Defendants' liability under

1983, 1988, et seq. are frivolous andlor without merit. IVithout

waiver, Plaintiffs continue.
The Defendants have disrupted the status quo on both sides of the road and have invaded,
occupied Plaintiffs' land and permitted the intrusion of third parties onto Plaintiffs' land, and
have improperly interfered with Plaintiffs property rights (see Plair~tiffs' Fozlrth Record
Supplement, Item No. 3, at 1-1 1). On the south side of the road, the first Wagner driveway
access perinit was issued for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land (see Plaint@ ' Fourth Record
Supplement, Itznl No. 3, at 4 (Plaintiffs have the fee in the land whether or not it is eventually

kctually determined that the Defendants have a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way)

which has been shown to be so, B-hollyon Plaintiffs' land by a valid, professionally done sur.cey
by a licensed Idaho Land Surx-eyor and there has been no other sur\:ey, admissible as evidence,
to rebut this finding. Defendants intentionally issued, continued, failed to revoke the first
Wagner drive way access permit; trespass is illegal and an intentio~laltort (Defendants immuility
to liability. no malice or criminal behavior, is inisplaced (see Defendants' Brief at 12-16)). On
the north side of the road. the intrusions into Plaintiffs' buffer are admitted to as "not
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unauthorized" actsifailures to act and for which Plaintiffs have colorable claim to and for which
Plaintiffs have positive constitutional guaranties to equal protection and due process (procedural
and substantive). It is then this issue, the physical invasions of Plaintiffs' land, whether
colorable and/or factual, as no reasonable person would find otherwise, and that these invasions
were so arbitrary and capricious andlor not for public use that have denied Plaintiffs due process
and equal protection to which Plaintiffs ascribe the harm as effected by Defendants'
actionsifailures to act and for which the eventual factual determination of the width of the right
of way may mitigate some of the damages claimed by Plaintiffs (see Logun v. Zirnmerman
Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, at 432 (1982) ("Each of our due process cases has recognized, either
explicitly or implicitly, that because 'minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of
federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own
procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official
action.' Vitekv. Jones, (1980). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 166-167 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in part); id., at 21 1 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other conclusion would
allow the State to destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has
considered and rejected such an approach: 'While the legislature may elect not to confer a
property interest, . . . it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest,
once conferred, witl~outappropriate procedural safeguards. . . . [Tlhe adequacy of statutory
procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest illust be analyzed in
constitutional terms.' Vitek v. Joiiles, 445 U.S., at 490--491, n. 6, quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 41 6
U.S., at 167 (opinion concurring in part)")) that the Plaintiffs bring suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Plaintiffs' continue to dispute Defendants' claims of a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline
right of way as well as many other purposely obfuscated contentions of Defendants. Plaintiffs
will specifically answer these disputed facts and concur that which is not disputed as they arise
later. However, Plaintiffs petition Court to deny Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as it
is easily, obviously, concisely put that the Defendants' "ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS.. .''
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are not even material. However, without waiver of this objection Plaintiffs will observe what is
disputed.
First, Plaintiffs emphatically dispute Defendants' thesis of Defendants' Brief. The oilly

part of this thesis Plaintiffs agsee with Defendants is that they were (i)"acting under the color of
state law" and (ii) under and as a matter of agency policy at all times relevant. It is a matter of
Defendants not "properly discharg[ing their] statutory responsibilities" for which Plaintiffs have
filed this action and are presently in Court and for which Plaintiffs petition, as a matter of law,
for partial summary judgment for this Court to grant order that Defendants are liable with
damages to be determined under 42 U.S.C.

55 1983 1988 et seq.

have said that all inatters are matters of law, even the 50 foot-25

In Defendants' defenses, they
feet from centerline right of

way. They have seemingly dropped their contention to have validly issued, contii~uedand/or not
revoked the first Wagner driveway access permit on the basis it was within the reaches of
Defendailts' unrecorded prescriptive rigl~tof way (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szqple~nerzt,Item
No. 12, at 8 Interrogatory No. 18). They continue with their reasonable negligence ("good
faith") defense that it was within the road frontage of the Wagner deed (see PlaintiffsJ TThil.d

Record Supplement, Item No. 12, at 9 and 4-6 Interrogatory Nos. 19, 12, and 8-1 1 (Defendants
claim the good faith measurement of 699' of road frontage on the Wagner deed and say that it
was not their decision to revoke the permit, that the 2" permit impliedly revoked the first).
Without waiver of Plaintiffs' objection that this good faith defense is not of legal merit, Plaintiffs
simply say that the Defendants knew that the road frontage was not a dependable statistic as they
had changed the centerline of Camps Canyon Road. Furthermore, no reasonable persons would
disagree at this point in history or in any linear applications of Euclidean geometry that the
distance between two points is not a straight[ened] line. If one changes the centerline one can no
longer rely on it being accurate. If one straightens the centerline one can no longer rely on it
being accurate, the same length andlor longer. Shorter is the only answer unless you live in a
non Euclidean world, which may be true but Defenda~ltshave shown no evidence of this and we
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are confined to settle this case within well established law (property lines are confined to a two
dimensional system) which a reasonable person could understand.
To recapitulate, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all the preceding paragraphs in this
document, that in all of these matters and at all times relevant and at all times acting under the
color of state law, that Defendants, in their individual capacities and in their official capacities
were performing "not unauthorized" functions under the policies, customs, and/or standard
operating procedures of the NLCHD andlor all such action/failures to act were with the
expressed and implied approval of and/or were the actual actions/failures to act of the final
policy makers of the agency (see Monell v. Department ofSocia1 Services, 436 U.S. 658,694
(1978); see also Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (gth Cir. 1992) (per curim), cert.
denied, 114 S.Crt. 1345 (1993) (Municipal liability may be established in one of three ways) and
that both the issues for which Plaintiffs ascribe to and/or allege to having been harmed by (see
FVilliamson County Regional Plannivtg Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 193 (1985) (The
matter of the "issue that inflicts the actual, concrete injury" determines the necessary proofs); see
also Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497 (1990) are within the scope of responsibility of
and/or the actual actions/failures to act and/or were done with the approval of the final policy
makers of the NLCHD. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are the direct, proximate,
legal and substantial cause of these physical invasions of Plaintiffs' land and the denial of due
process (substantive and procedural) and equal protection to Plaintiffs as well as "taking, seizing
of, and or conversion of Plaintiffs' land for a not for public use. Without waiver of anything
Plaintiffs have said, Plaintiffs continue.
As to the second level issue, in the underlying issue of the factual determination of the
right of way of Camps Canyon Road, Plaintiffs allege that the mandated 50 foot-25

feet from

centerline prescriptive right of way as applied to their property abutting to and underlying the
easement across their land is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, bears no reasonable
relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare, an abuse of the Defendants' discretion,
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and/or is illegal. Furthermore, in the underlying issue of a factual determination of the right of
way of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Plaintiffs allege that the mandated 50 foot-25
feet from centerline prescriptive right of way is invalid facially. Further, Plaintiffs allege that
any policy, custom standard operating procedure which includes a mandated 50 foot-25
from centerline right of way and/or a presumed 50 foot-25

feet

feet from centerline right of way

without an evidentiasy hearing and an opportunity for a meaningful rebuttal at a meaningfbl time
and a rational response in matters relevant to Camps Canyon Road as it traverses the SENE
Section 15 T39N R3WBM is invalid whether it is formulated under I.C. 5 40-23 12 or any other
statute to the extent it authorizes "improving" and/or "maintaining" (in the sense that
maintenance (including the addition of cut slopes; that is if Plaintiffs give Defendants permission
to work on the slopes it does not imply that the Plaintiffs or any abutting landowner has waived
his constitutional rights) does not mean preservation of and means widening, straightening,
altering, changing, extending the fill slopes by pushing gravel over the edge of the traveled
surface and adding suppost, and/or relocating the centerline of (see Defendants ' BrieJ; at 7-8, pas.

6, pars. 4 and 5, and par. 8), straightening, altering, changing, widening and/or relocating the
centerline of Camps Canyon Road. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the denial of a hearing to
determine the limits of the Camps Canyon Road right of way though the SENE Section 15
T39N R3WBM under that statute and/or the holdings of h4eservey or any other form of
authorization when Plaintiffs' land, fence property rights and or liberty rights are adversely
affected by the findings, conclusions, actions and/or failures to act by the Defendants and/or the
defined right of way of Canlps Canyon Road are invalid, a taking without due process and/or
equal protection guaranteed by the jthand lilt" Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Any such policy so derived is invalid on its face andlor as applied to Plaintiffs.
There is no dispute amongst Defendants and Plaintiffs that Defendants have acted upon
their claim of a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way-they

have widened the road,
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issued and failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and determined that damage
to Plaintiffs' fence is a result of the fence being within the right of way. The dispute is ripe.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege, that in all matters as Plaintiffs allege harm (i.e., that due
process was due), Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the improper interference with and
the deprivation of Plaintiffs property rights whether as a matter of approval of a subordinate'
actionslfailures to act, as a matter of official acts, and/or as a matter of a failure to train
employees in light of obvious constitutional violations.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege, that in all matters as Plaintiffs allege harm (i.e., that due
process was due), Defendants were acting under well established law any reasonable person
could understand. ("The District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is
based on Idaho Code $40-2312 and the holdings of Meservey ... "). Idaho Code 440-23 12 is
unambiguous; that the matter of the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way is expressly
not mandated, that clearly a choice of 50 feet, greater than 50 feet or less than 50 feet are
possible and as harmoniously construed with the U.S. and Idaho State Constitutions and Idaho
State statutes and with the holdings of Meservey; that 50 feet is a place to start, unless there is a
fence or some other way the landowner limited the width, then that is the starting width; and the
width is to be factually determined wirh a "consideration of the facts peculiar to the case".
Plaintiffs' petition for partial summary judgment can stop right here (see Roberts v.

Transportation Department, 121 Idaho 727(1991) the agency cannot subvert the legislation by
promulgating its own rules); see Chevron US.A., I~zc.v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (if the court finds that Congress had a specific intent then that
is the end of the inquiry, the statute is enforced regardless of the agency's interpretation)).
Defendants can contemplate the 'width of the road" all they ant and insure that the road to their
house is paved while other members of the public struggle to get out of the canyon from their
newly built homes; however, if they act on their decision, a mandated 50 foot-25

feet from

centerline right of way, they have made a "flnal decision" and must follow the law (see Czaplicki
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v. Gooding Joint School District iVo. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 610 ("[D]iscretionary
function does not shield negligent implementation of statutes.. ."); see also Gooding Highway

District v.Idaho IrlaigationC., 30 Idaho 232, 165 P 99 (1917) ("In order that act of county
comrnissioners in laying out of highways be valid, whether upon public domain or private
property, board must conform to law giving such authority, as power to establish highways rests
in legislature and right may be exercised only in such manner as legislature provides"); see also
Owen, above)). Without waver that we could also stop right here also, Plaintiffs continue.

Defendants have exceeded their authority under Idaho Code 540-23 12; (i) this statute
does not give Defendants the authority "to improve" and/or "to maintain", to alter, to straighten,
to widen, to change andlor to "improve7' and/or to "n~aintain"an unrecorded prescriptive right of
way; (ii) furthermore, Idaho Code 540-23 12 speaks to Defendants' discretion to determine "tile
width" (a noun) of a highway; (iii) the statute does not mandate a 50 foot width; (iv) the statute
does not mandate or mention a 25 feet from centerline width; (v) the statute does not deny an
abutting landowner due process and/or equal protection or an evidentiary hearing when the
Defendants choose to alter, to straighten, to widen, to change and/or to "improve" and/or to
"maintain" andlor to determine a fence is encroaching on an unrecorded prescriptive right of
way; (vi) the statute does Plaintiffs contend that the only path from the statute determining "the
width" (Idaho Code 540-23 12) to the statutes authorizing the actions of such notions of "to
in~prove",such as to widen, to straighten, to alter, and/or to change a highway (as to be found in
Idaho Code 540-13 10 and/or Idaho Code 540-605) is through the hallowed halls of a public
evidentiary hearing and Plaintiffs dispute that the Defendants are in any way, shape or form
"properly dischargling their] statutory responsibilities".
Defendants have no rational basis for which to denv PIaintiffs rights to due process
(substantive and procedura1) and lor equal protection of the law. Furthermore, as
Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' substantive 5'l' Amendment rights they are compelled to
show reason for the ends which would necessitate such means.
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Plaintiffs begin first with answering Defendants' claim that these matters may be settled
under the ITCA without waiver of Plaintiffs' objections that the ITCA is an adequate remedy.

11. Defendants affirmative defense of the time bar of the 180 day notice requirement of the
ITCA and /or ITCA as an adequate remedy-Plaintiffs

dispute that the ITCA is adequate

and therefore the only course of action is under 42 U.S.C. (5 1983.
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of this document and
continue. First Plaintiffs seek action under 42 U.S.C.

5 1983, 1988, et seq. and such tort claim

notice is not required (see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (state laws requiring pre-suit
notification prior to initiating an action against the state or its subdivisions do not apply); see also

Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S 496 (Plaintiffs need not exhaust agency remedies
before bringing $ 1983 suit)).
Secondly, the intentional tort of trespass and the tort of nuisance are not covered under
the ITCA (see Cobbley v. City of Challis, 138 Idaho, at 159).
Third, Plaintiffs reasonably approached the Defendants on 4/12/06 at the regular meeting
of the NLCHD Commissioners and gave them fair warning that Plaintiffs did not agree with their
action to issue the first Wagner driveway access permit and/or with Defendants' refusal to get a
professional survey done to resolve the matter and/or with Defendants' failure to require the
Wagners to get a profcssio~iallydone survey, and/or with Defendants' failure to revoke the
permit when Plaintiffs said that they would call for a survey n-lien Defendants refused to.
Plaintiffs also gave the Defendants fair warning that Defendants' entrance into Plaintiffs' buffer
was an improper interference with Plaintiffs' property rights as was the action oflfailure to act of
the issuancelrevocation of the first UJagner driveway access permit. Plaintiffs have kept
Defendants abreast of Plaintiffs complaints and sincerely sought resolution of the issues with
Defendants, although Defendants rebuffed any attempt Plaintiffs made at agency remedy,
claiming in effect that Defendants' "prescriptive right" of a 50 foot-25

feet from centsrline
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right of way gave Defendants authority to deny Plaintiffs due process. Neither actiodfailure to
act has been abated. Defendants continue to occupy Plaintiffs buffer and continue to further
encroach and impinge on Plaintiffs' fence; as well as the Defendants have not acknowledged the
revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit, nor have they denied their claimed
statutory right to issue a permit across the east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel (see

Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 17, at 5-6, 10-11 Interrogatory Nos 10-14 and 2324). Accrual does not begin until abatement has occurred and/or the injurious actsifailures to act
have ceased (see McCabe v. Craven, -Idaho -(2007), Docket No. 32219) (a continuous
tort). Defendants claim of "prescriptive right "to inlproperly interfere with Plaintiffs' property
rights and the wrongful taking of and damage to Plaintiffs7 property continues unabated and
threatening of further irreparable harm.
Fourth, a post deprivation action under the ITCA is not "adequate" when the
actionsifailures to act are "not unauthorized" and a predeprivation hearing is feasible (see Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); and see Zinerrnon v. Burch 494 U . S. 113 starting at 124; see also

Zirnmerman v. City ofoakland, 255 F.3d 734, (gt" Circuit, 2001); see also Logan v. Zimmrrman
Bruslz Co., 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate
when deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was
slot "unauthorized").
Fifih, Defendants are now estopped from the defense that these matters are now time
barred af3er receiving the benefit of the defcilse of "no final decision" on Plaintiffs' Motion for
declaratory judgnlent on I.C.

5 67-8003(3).

Defendants have sought and received the benefit of

the defense that these allegations that Plaintiffs make are matters of Defendants discretion (that
they were legislative in nature) and they now are claiming they are not discretionary and
therefore time barred (see also h e n , above).
Sixth, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs property and liberty
rights from the execution of Defendants governmental policies, customs and/or standard
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operating procedures (see Monell v. Department of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Not
only are Defendants the NLCHD final policy makers they have endorsed all incidents of action
and/or failures to act and/or all acts/failures to act are a result of Defendants policies, customs,
and/or standard operating procedures (see Defendants ' Briefi, at 2, above) (Defendants' thesis is
that at all relevant times Defendants were acting within their statutory duties)issuance/revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit and invasion of Plaintiffs' buffer
and encroachment on Plaintiffs' fence. The potential liability under 42 U.S.C.

1983 is not

disputed (see Wade xCity oflnglewood, 108 F.3d 1387 (9thCir. 1997)) as the Defendants say, it
is a matter of law, that Defendants have done and may continue their arbitrary and capricious,
irrational, unreasonable and vindictive actions and/or failures to act. Plaintiffs are not
complaining of matters which even Defendants believe to be random acts.
Seventh, Plaintiffs' allegations of due process violations (substantive and procedural) as
well as alleged equal protection violations are based on the situation Plaintiffs find themselves in
as a result of Defendants' irrational and vindictive actions andlor failures to act. Plaintiffs were
singled out for differential treatment causing mental and physical anguish, as Defendants sole
purpose in allotting time on the agenda for Plaintiff, Don Halvorson, to speak was to ram the first
Wagner driveway access permit through at a public meeting, to give the permit an air of legality
and to paint the Haivorsons as the sole cause for the Wagners not getting a driveway access to
their property rather than the Defendants accepting responsibility for having destroyed the
historical driveway access iiz the 1996 alteration, calling for a survey and properly carrying out
any necessary deed changes to resolve the problem(see PlaintiffsJ Third Record Supplement,
Item No. 10, at 1). After having to go to the expense of obtaining a survey and once again trying
to work things out with the bTagners,the Defendants, on Plaintiffs' information and belief, as
told to Plaintiffs by Bob Wagner; the Defendants refused to accept deeded easement to resolve
the driveway issue (see Plaintiffs Af$davif at 9, par. 15). Plaintiffs have alleged and Defendants
do not dispute that Defendant and Chairman of the NLCHD Co~nmissioners,Orland Arneberg is
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the fiiend, neighbor and business partner of Ridgeview Farms, whose owners are the brother-inlaw of Bob Wagner and the relative of Defendant Dan Payne. Plaintiffs claim that they have
been victimized by the Defendants, who have acted under the color of state law, and do not have
the ability of an adequate resolution under traditional recognized categories of causes of action,
such as negligence, malicious trespass, inverse condemnation, amongst others as the Defendants
flagrantly abused the procedural processes of statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous
deprivations (see PlaintiffsAffidavit,at 12, par. 28), (see Lingle v.Cllzevron US.A. Inc., (04-163)
544 U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F.3d 846, ("'Conversely, if a government action is found to be
impermissible--for instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary
as to violate due process--that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of co~npensationcar1
authorize such action.")
Plaintiffs filed their tort claim notice within 30 days of the time that Defendants had
issued Plaintiffs the ultimatum, that Plaintiffs had only two choices: (i) pay a $750 fee and file a
petition for validation of Camps Canyon Road, or (ii) get a lawyer. Plaintiffs filed their tort
claim notice in a timely manner as Defendants had indicated that the Plaintiffs had exhausted
agency remedies. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have only sougl~tcause of action solely under the
theory of negligence in the alternative.
Plaintiffs allege that the policies, customs, standard operating procedures and/or
Defendants' exertion of their governmental powers are facially invalid as well as invalid as
applied to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs' situation. Not only have Defendants discriminated to.cvard
abutting land owners abutting to unrecorded prescriptive rights of way as opposed to similarly
situated abutting land owner of recorded rights of way (as in deeded), Defendants have also
discriminated against Plaintiffs in the determination of the legality of the first Wagner driveway
access permit. Furthermore, when the survey showed they lost the argument they simply ignored
the resolution and in retaliation pushed dirt, gravel, and snow upon Plaintiffs' fence. There are
proper civil procedures for determining whether Plaintiffs' fence is u.~ongfullypositioned, but
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ignoring those procedures in lieu of retaliation is actionable criminally as well as under $ 1983
(see Villiage of Willowbrook v. Olech 528 U.S. 562 (2000)).
Plaintiffs have responded to Defendants claims of a mandated 50 foot-25

feet from

centerline width for an unrecorded prescriptive right of way and continue their allegations that
not only do Defendants not have a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way; that even if it is

found that they do, the Defendants could not do what they did-widened

the road, issued,

continued, and failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and determined that
damage to Plaintiffs' fence is a result of the fence being within the right of way without the due
process of an evidentiary hearing and an opportunity for Plaintiffs to meaningfully respond at a
meaningful time (see Bivens V. Six Unkno~)nNamedAgents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (United States
Supreme Court ruled that an implied cause of action existed for an individual whose Fourth
Amendment freedom from uilreasonable search and seizures had been violated by federal
agents); see McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F. 2d 47 (5th Circuit 1980), (plaintiff was entitled to
Due Process before road was built over land of disputed ownership); see F u e ~ t e v.
s Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 92S.Ct. 1983,32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), (14th Amendment property right even though
dispute exists); see Carey v. Piphzns, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)
("...right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not depend upon the merits
of a claimants' assertion. . ."); see Cooper v. Board of County Conzmissioners of Ada Cou~ty,101
Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), (the test for functioning in a quasi-judicial capacity and due
process requirements); see also Lingle v. Chevron, US. A. fnc. (04-163), 544 U.S. 528, 363 F.3d
846, (2005) ("Conversely, if a government action is found to be impermissible for instance
because it fails to meet the public use requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process that
is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can autlzorize such action"); see also
Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiffs
allege that these "not unauthorized" actions/failures to act required a predeprivational hearing; as
such was feasible, practicable, and predictable (see Parratt v. Twlor, as compared to
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"unauthorized" actions not found in Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124) 451 U. S.
527 (198 1). Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege once again that the denial of a hearing to determine the
limits of the Camps Canyon Road right of way though the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM
violates their 5thAmendment rights to procedural due process, equal protection, and substantive
due process as guaranteed by the 1 4 Amendment
~ ~
to the United States Constitution. In this
form, Defendants' exertion of their governnlental powers, their customs, policies, and/or
standard operating procedures are invalid facially in the first instance, andlor as applied to
Plaintiffs, their situation and/or to their property as Defendants do not circumscribe their broad
authorities with statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations and/or Defendants
have admitted to the actionslfailures to act for which Plaintiffs claim harm and damages and for
which Defendants claim they were within their legal right to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or
equal protection. Furthermore, Defendants have shown no rational basis to regulate Plaintiffs'
property or to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights to peacefully enjoy their land, their right to restrict
others from their land and their right to a clear and marketable title to their land. Defendants
have violated Plaintiffs sthAmendment rights and as such are compelled to bring forth such ends
which 1%-ould
justify such means to deprive Plaintiffs of due process in the invasion of Plaintiffs'
land by the Defendants and third parties and to wrongfully take Plaintiffs land for not a public
use and to destroy Plaintiffs' property. These actionslfailures to act of Defendants are far from
"properly discharg[ing their] statutory responsibilities"; rather they are arbitrary and capricious,
an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal. Defendants bring forth an argumentative
justification for their admitted to actions and/or failures to act, based on unreasonable legal
conclusions and findings which are not supported by substantial evidence of their agency record
and which run contrary to the evidence of their agency record and/or of the record of this case.
Defendants' affidavits are conclusory and brought forth in bad faith.
Defendants are liable under

5 1983, on an individual basis as well as on an official basis

and have shown no objective standard of a law u7hicl1 has not been well established or that a
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reasonable person could not understand the adherence to which would legally justify their
actions/failures to act. The correct cause of action in the present case is 42 U.S.C.

5 1983.

111. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Admissible Material Facts Relevant To Plaintiffs'
Claifizs rFacts'9
To begin with Defendants opening remarks again misstates the situation, as Plaintiffs have
already said. "Plaintiffs' complaints in this action arise from almost exclusively from two (2)
occurrences, the first being improvements made by Defendant North Latah County Highway
District ("the District") in 2005 and 2006 to an area of Camps Canyon Road, located primarily
between property owned by Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs' real property") and Robert Wagner and Kate
Wagner, husband and wife ("Wagners' real property"), approximately 700 feet in length, and the
second being the District foreman Dan Payne's (i) issuance and revocation and (ii) reissuance of
a driveway approach permit to Robert Wagner in 2006 to access Wagner's real property" (see
Defendants' Brie5 at 4).
Defendants again want to redefine Plaintiffs' pleadings to fit their denials and as such
Plaintiffs incorporate all previous parts of this document by reference (see Owen, above).
Plaintiffs allege and bring forth specific evidence that Defendants' claim of a 50 foot-25
feet from centerline right of way is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion,
and/or illegal; as I.C.

5 40-23 12 does not mandate a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of

way, does not deny an abutting land owner a right to due process in alterations to an unrecorded
prescriptive right of \yay; does not deny an abutting land owner a right to due process in
determining if a fence is located within an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, does not deny an
abutting land owner a right to due process if the Defendants issue/fail to revoke a driveway
access permit wholly on another abutting land ow~ler'spropei-ty; as I.C.

5 40-23 12

and the

holdings of Meservey intends that an unrecorded prescriptive right of way may be presumed to
be 50 feet or any other width and may not be presumed to be fifty feet if an abutting land owner
had limited the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, or uvlless the highway was of a
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lesser width; as Defendants admit that there have been no evidentiary hearings on the matter of
Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part; there is no substantial evidence in the record to
support Defendants' claims and all evidence in the record runs contrary to their continuation of
the original prescriptive claim as they have admitted to moving and then widening the section of
road in dispute. Furthermore, Defendants admit that they have done no surveys and have made
no accurate descriptions of the required lands in any of the alterations admitted to (see Idaho
Code $5 40-605 and 40- 1310) nor have they any agency record of Commissioners orders to lay
out andlor make the alterations they admit to (see Idaho Code $$40-608). Furtl~errnore,
Defendants have not shown that Camps Canyon Road has been worked and used as it is now for
a period of 5 years.

1) Defendants' first material fact: Establishment of Camps Canyon Road as a public
highway under the jurisdiction of the District. This is conclusory. The District does not have
substantial evidence in the agency record to support this conclusion and finding as there has been
no public evidentiary hearing to show that a finding or conclusion that Cainps Canyon Road in
the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM is a public highway.
(a) Plaintiffs do not dispute nor aver that Camps Canyon Road is a public
highway, and that its status as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way may predate the formation
of the 3+/- acre parcel and may extend as far back as to the pre-homesteading period into the
1870s as the road itself was the only access to the Einmett Geinmill homestead entry of 1890
(see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 2 (BLM Homestead Entry Records of
Emmett J. Cemniill) However, there is no substantial evidence in the agency record to establish
Camps Canyon Road as a public highway or to conclude that the present road occupies the
identical strip of land that the original prescriptive claim did; or that the original prescriptive way
was 50 feet-25

feet from centerline wide (see Homestead Farms v. Board ofCovtznz 'rs Teton

County, sstate ofIdaho, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P 3d 630 (2005) (Justice Eismann SPECIALLY

CONCURRING) (Highways in this unrecorded category require evidence showing that the road
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was used for a period of five years and worked and kept up at the expense of the public, with the
exception of those unrecorded ways which may have been established before 1893 when no
public upkeep was required. Such evidence must be taken at an open public meeting and
therefore should be part of the public record).
(b) Furthermore the evidence in the agency record and this present case runs
contrary to such a claim as the present claim does not occupy the identical strip of land that the
original claim did as the Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road on several occasions (see
Plaintiffs Afidavit at 8; see Swanson ilfidavit). This is undisputed as Defendants admit to no
evidentiary hearings and to altering the physical location (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record
Supplement, Item No. 2, at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 3) of the pertinent part of Camps Canyon Road
as well as having widened it numerous times (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No.
1, at 3, Request For Admission No. 3, subpart c.; see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item
No. 3, at 16-17, Interrogatory Nos. 40 - 44; (Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road
several times and altered the centerline; see Second Payne Affidavit at 2 and 3).
(c) It is also undisputed that there are no known alterations to Camps Canyon
Road prior to 1996.
(d) Whether Orland Arneberg can aver, at the age of 4 years and based on his
own knowledge, that Camps Canyon Road was worked at the expense of the public and used by
the public for a minimum of five years which includes a year before Mr. Arneberg was born is
irrational and this affidavit is made in bad faith. Furthermore it is h4r. Arneberg's elected duty,
and he has taken oath to obey and enforce the laws of the land to do so, to impartially consider
the establishment of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, and it is not his duty, on his own
testimony, to self proclaim the establishment of unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps
Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, to be Public (Idaho Code 8 40-203a prohibits this). Mr.
Landeck has been to law school, we assume and it appears to be an admission of a weak case and
an attempt to abuse the process of discovery that he brings forth such affidavits.
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(e) The material fact here is there that is no agency record, no public evidentiary
hearing, on which Defendants can base their conclusions andlor findings whether Plaintiffs do
not dispute it or not. This is conclusory and Defendants bring forth no evidence to support this
statement. Such attempts to deceive this Court (see Opinion at 9 (The Defendants have
submitted affidavits from the commissioners of the Highway District which have stated that the
Commissioners actions regarding Camps Canyon Road have been within the lawful authority of
the Highway District")) are subject to sanction.

2) Although improved over the years, Camps Canyon Road follows the same
approximate centerline now that it has since the early 1930's.
(a) Defendants do not define what approximate might mean, or how one might
measure approximate, or estimate the significance of approximate. This is conclusory and is not
probative and is meant only to add confusion. A taking is not limited by its size (see Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 41 9 (1982) (the space occupied by a cable t.v.
box is considered a taking). It is the physical invasion and/or occupation of the land which
defines taking and not whether it was approxinlately done or not done. Therefore Defendants'
statement is meaningless and of no probative value. One could say that Mathews (see Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 19, 335 (1976)) speaks to this and suggests that fairness is a matter of

weighing the deprivation with the reliability of the process and probable value of new procedures
and even the public interest of the social costs. However, Plaintiffs are not suggesting new
procedures. Plaintiffs suggest that there are ample statutory safeguards and remedies for
erroneous deprivations for which Defendants simply circumvent (establish the right of way
before altering, including talking to the abutting owner, survey and describe, come to an
agreement record and convey, keep records of Commissioners orders, etc.). One ca~mot
conclude the process does not work until one tries it. Defendants' actions imply malicious
compliance and arrogance. Defendants ha.ire not brought forth a costlbenefit analysis of the
comparison of obtaining private property at fair market value (on the cheap) with paying the full
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extent of common law damages (at the expense of the public purse-not

at the expense of the

Defendants to achieve their political and private goals and the additions to Mr. Landeck7s
pocketbook). They have not chosen to avail themselves of this defense with any evidence that
the old procedures do not work and/or the new ones might be costly
(b) Defendants statement is conclusory. Defendants bring forth no admissible
survey to support Defendants conclusion. The Rimrock survey is in contradiction to the
conclusion that the centerline of Camps Canyon Road is identical to what it was in 19 11. It is
irrational for Defendants to suggest that they can "accurately determine" the location of the
public right of way (see Idaho Code 5 40-302a(l)(b) "If the location of the public highway or
right-of-way cannot be accurately determined due to numerous alterations.. .") through this aerial
photo. "Approximate centerline" is not the intention of the statute and state legislature or of a
per se taking.
(c) Plaintiffs object to the admission of the aerial photos as material evidence.
The aerial photos of 1940 and 2004 are of questionable origin and validity. Mr. Hodge avers that
the 1940 photo is from the Latah County Assessors office (Hodge Afldavit, at par. 8) and the
Defendants only represent all the items in their Second Record Suppleinent as "Latah County,
Idaho Records", and as such, have identified the source of the documents and/or photos for
verification. However this aerial photo indicates that Doug Kelly owils the old niining claim in
1940 (if this is indeed a 1940 photo and Doug Kelly did not pick up the old mining claim to the
north of the Harris place until 1944 (Plaintiffs ' FoFou Record Supplement, Iten1 No. 1, at 1-3).
Further, the attempts by Defendants at the 312 1/07 meeting of the NLCWD Conzmissioners to
bring forth this aerial photo as evidence (identified there as circa 1949 (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth
Record Supplenzent, Item No. 5, at 2-3) without first allowing Plaintiffs any attempt to analyze
the data and to deny Plairztiffs any procedural due process by transcribable verbatim record of the
meeting is exemplary of their contempt for ally fair and democratic procedures. Plaintiffs object
to the admission of this plioto on the basis of its obvious inacc~~racy
to its date of origin.
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(d) Without waiver of Plaintiffs objection to the admission as evidence of the
aerial photos, Plaintiffs continue to state that an analysis of the photos, whether they are valid
and/or of sufficient accuracy to determine movement of Camps Canyon Road, shows movement
of the portion of the road in question and that the movement occurred between 1989 and 2004
(see Plaintiffs AAfJidavit,at par. 19,20, and 23).
(e) Without waiver of Plaintiffs objection to the admission as evidence of the
aerial photos and without waiver that a proper analysis of the photos shows movemel~t,Plaintiffs
object to the admission of the aerial photos as evidence as they are argurneiltative and without
any probative value to "accurately determine" the location of the centerline of the Camps
Canyon Road right of way. Neither of the photos is shown to be orthogonally rectified and many
of these aerial photos are mosaics. The weight given to these photos must be greatly reduced to
afford any fairness of determining the accurate location of the centerline of Camps Canyon Road
right of way. The east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel was well lcnown (see Ole Hanson
Affidavit at 2, par. 7), and Mr. Hodge has no foundation for his claim and/or personal knowledge
of the east property line to express that its locatioll is debatable via a 1940 aerial photo showing
someone arbitrarily drawing lines of farm lines on it.
(f) The Rinlrock survey shows (as compared to the 19 11 Deed description) that

the centerline of Camps Canyon Road has moved 84+ feet to the north at its intersection with the
east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel and 50 feet to the north at its intersection with the west
property line of the 3+/- acre parcel (see Plaintiffs ' TThivd Recorpd Supplement, Item No. 4. at 2
(at 312 1/07 meeting of the NLCHD Conimissioners Plaintiffs movement to Defendants).

(g) At 7, Mr. Hodge states that the County Road is a de facto monument for
surveying purposes and the distances between the points on that road should take precedence
over other calls in the 1911 deed. However the law determines the centerline of the road to be a
monument, Plaintiffs see the logic in making such a claim and have requested this Court for an
adverse evidentiary ruling against the Defendants for spoliation of evidence and Mr. Hodge's
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testimony is in line with Plaintiffs' petition. This is supportive of Plaintiffs' clainl that the
Defendants' random alterations of Camps Canyon Road centerline without survey and/or
accurate descriptions of the required lands for the alteration puts the road as a moilument at risk
and as well as ail Idaho Statute as being overly broad and/or vague to allow for per se takings in
the event that I.C.6 40-23 12, I.C.6 40-13 10, I.C.6 40-605 or any other statute do not prohibit this
action. Such statutory interpretations which would allow for the deliberate indifference to
private property lines would require a rational basis to a legitimate governmental interest.
Defendants have sl~ownno relation to the public safety, n~orals,health, or general welfare that
would justify such means. The civil process of eminent domain, surveying and recording are
legitimate governmental interests and are the intended governmental interest and do not prohibit
the legal acquisition of land for alterations. The alteration in an unrecorded prescriptive right of
way, in the present case Camps Canyon Road, without a prior survey destroys a survey
monument as per Mr. Hodge. This is illegal and furthermore the recovery of a lost monument
requires a hearing, (see Elenrickson v. Nampa Highway District,

Idaho

, (2004).

This is in support of Plaintiffs overall objection to the wrongful procedures of the Defendants.
(h) At 8, Mr. Hodge suggests that the excess road frontage not to be measured
along the road but somewhat randomly out into the Wagners or Plaintiffs fields according to a
1940 aerial photo. This can no longer be done as the road no longer extends into that area as the
curves at the east end of the 3+/- acre parcel were straightened and the road bed was moved to
the northeast. Mr. Swanson avers that the Defendants asked to straighten curves (see Swanson
Affidavit) and the Defendants have admitted to straightening the curves and the straightening
was done under the watch of Defendants Payne and Arneberg (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record
Szipplernent, Item No. 13, at 10-11, Interrogatory No. 16). There is no probative value in asking a
witness to suggest that an unreliable statistic, the road frontage of the 3+/- acre parcel, a fact to
which no one disputes has been altered, is now reliable. To what purpose does Mr. Landeck
subject Mr. Hodge to, to aver to a fact that Mr. Landeck knows to be inaccurate?
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(i) At 6, Mr. Hodge faults Mr. Dunn for not including the road frontage in his
survey. Mr. Hodge states that all the distances described in these distances need to be recognized
and notes the east property line and the road frontage as not identical to the deed. Mr. Hodge
conveniently leaves out the first call in the deed. The intersection of the west property line with
Camps Canyon Road has moved 50 feet to the north. This is a fact that is in line with the
undisputed facts that in 1996 the curves of Camps Canyon Road were altered and thus shift all
lines to the north 50 feet (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 16-17,
Interrogatory Nos. 40 - 44; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 1, at 3, Request
For Admission No. 3, subpart c.). Plaintiffs made no attempts to influence Mr. Dunn in any way
to make the survey come out a certain way. An Idaho Land Surveyor works for the public to
make legal determinations of property lines, even though they may be paid by an individual.
Furthermore, Mr. Dunn was chosen for his fairness and lmowledge of the subject.

Cj) Further Mr. Hodge also leaves out that the acreage on the photo reads 3.4
acres which is not in congruence with the deed description of 3 acres (see Plaintiffs' Third
Record Szipplernent, Item No. 4, at 6) (Latah County Assessors map with deed which indicates
the acreage to be 3 acres). Where do the extra 0.4 acres come from? Who is it that is making
these acreage determinations? The southeasterly course of the outline of the south boundary of
the 3.4 acre fann parcel is not the south property line of the 3+/- acre parcel (see Hodge Affidavit
at 3, par. 8). The Swansons farmed the adjoining land by extending the farmable ground from
the mutual southwest corner of the 3+/- acre parcel and the heading east and swinging south to
avoid the grassy water draw at the bottom of the hill (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplement,
Item No. 3, at 2 (the same farm line continues through 1989). Mr. Hodge has no personal
knowledge of those who have created this farm line or why they farmed as they did; there is no
reason to conclude this southerly direction is a property line. This southeasterly course made a
farm line which was inaccurately and/or made not indicative of a property line and hence the
recording of the additional 0.4 acres. The actual property line heads due east from the southwest
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corner of the 3+/- acre parcel (see Plaintiffs' FourtJz Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 15 (the
FSA aerial photo in 2007, shows the addition with computerized technology the addition of more
accurately placed property lines which enables the FSA to better estimate the acreage and who
owns what). The deed calls for a due east direction of the south property line and Mr. Hodge
now denies his own recom~nendationthat all calls be recognized (see Hodge Affidavit at 3, par.

6).

(k) At 8, Mr. Hodge does not indicate where on the photo that he sees Charley
Harris' driveway through the 3+/- acre parcel. If he is referring to the light colored area at the
east end of the parcel that is where the seasonal runoff creek dumps illto the road ditch. It is not
the old driveway access as it is the drainage of the grassy draw (see Plaintiffs' Fourlh Record
Supplement, Item No. 3, at 4, 12, 13, and 14 (photos showing the hardened area where the
original road ran and where the runoff drainage met the road)).
(1) Aerial photos are informative but they are limited by a lot of variables. Mr.
Dunn went out of his way to accommodate Mr. Wagner and investigated whatever evidence Mr.
Wagner u~ouldbring in. Idaho Code S; 3 1-2709 reads, "SURVEYS MUST CONFORh4 TO
UNITED STATES h4ANUAL. No surveys or resurveys hereafter made shall be considered legal
evidence in any court within the state, except such surveys as are made in accordance with the
United States manual of surveying instructions, the circular on restoration of lost or obliterated
corners and subdivisions of sections, issued by the general land office, or by the authority of the
United States, the state of Idaho, or by mutual consent of the parties." The only survey here is
the Rimrock survey; Mr. Dunn's credentials are impeccable. If h4r. Hodge truly wishes to
confront Mr. Dulm's CONFORM[ANCE] TO UNITED STATES MANUAL, let him bring in a
survey of his own. There is no probative value in Mr. Landeck's attempt to subvert the issue of
whether the Defendants arbitrarily and capriciously issued and/or continued andlor failed to
revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and/or whether they abused their discretion in
doing so, andlor did so illegally into an issue of whether t ~ \ ~surveyors
o
may have reasonably
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considered the road frontage of the 3+/- acre parcel differently when the issue is not even
disputed. The material facts are; (i) The curves were straightened and the road bed was relocated
in 1996; (ii) how much is not recorded; (iii) The Rimrock survey is admissible evidence; (iv) The
Wagner and/or Payne "surveys" are not admissible evidence; (v) The shortest distance between
two points as in the intersection of the east and west property lines with Camps Canyon Road is a
straightcened] line; (vi) What Mr. Hodge opines is put in doubt as to him being accurately
informed (what does Mr. Hodge opine if he is informed that the centerline of Camps Canyon
Road has been altered-does

he then contend the road frontage call prevails; or does it fall out of

the equation?). As Mr. Hodge opines that &
distances
l
Jbe recognized described in the
instruments and this may reasonably be accomplished by the recognition of the undisputed fact
that Camps Canyon Road has had its physical location and centerline altered in 1996.
Furthermore, Defendants suggestion here that maybe two surveyors might disagree on how to do
the survey is admissible without a survey by Mr. Hodge and the subject is immaterial (see Owen
above, (a good faith defense is not relevant)).
(m) Plaintiffs on 4/12/06 requested that the Defendants and the Wagners obtain a
professional survey (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 10, at 1) (Plaintiffs
request Defendants get a professionally done survey and Defendants relied on the surveys that
Mr. Wagner and Dan Payne and others performed ((see Plairftiffs ' Third Record Supplement,
Item No. 1, at 12, Request for Admission No. 27 (Defendants knew Wagner had done his own
survey). Neither hlr. Hodge and/or the Defendants have a survey on which may be considered
legal evidence and no one says they cannot conduct their own survey. Mr. Dunn's survey stands
as the only legally admissible evidence. The Dunn survey showed the Wagner driveway access
to be wholly on Plaintiffs' land and the Defendants (as final policy makers) decision to issue
and/or to continue andor not to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit was arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, and/or illegal. They issued, continued, and/or
failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit which was trespassing based on
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insufficient evidence in the record and/or on not legally admissible evidence. Furthermore, they
knew the centerline was no longer accurate as they had altered it and their attempt now to say
that the centerline issue is now debatable is an admission to the arbitrary and capricious
acts/failures to act. Defendants are estopped from claiming both (i) the evidence in the record is
substantial enough to support the Defendants, as final policy makers, issuance, continuance,
and/or failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and (ii) now to claim that it is
debatable.
(n) Rather than making the deed description meet the wants of the Defendants,
there is a plausible explanation for which all variables fit and/or are allowable, &
survey
l
lines;
as well as the aerial photos. Furthermore, it not only fits with what the Plaintiffs allege and with
what the Defendants admit to-Camps

Canyon Road has been altered, straightened, and

widened. Its centerline in the pertinent part is not where its centerline originally was. Indeed
this still leaves room for discussion of how much movement has occurred. That is where the
argument lies; not in whether the right of way was changed and continues to be altered; but how
much it has been changed; however unimportant that might be (see Loretto (small is not relevant,
in per se invasions and/or occupations)..
(0) Plaintiffs have done an analysis on these and other photos under the
assumption that what the Defendants averred to on 3/21/07 should be accurate (see Plaintiffs '
Third Record Szdpplenzent, Item No.5, at 2-3 (Defendants and Defendants' counsel state that the
aerial photos should show the alterations Plaintiffs allege and without any rational basis for their
claim, as to how they made the determination that there %-asno evidence of movement of Camps
Canyon Road in the aerial photos). In doing so Plaintiffs have found the results to show that the
road location has changed as Mr. Durn's survey would suggest and Defendants admit to having
altered (see Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement, Item No. 4, at 1 through 9 (Plaintiffs' letter
explains the changes in location of the east and u7estproperty lines of the 341- acre parcel with
Camps Canyon Road); see also Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement, Item No. 5, at 2-3
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(Defendants attest to accuracy of photos without rational basis to substantiate a claim that the
photos show no movement in the road); Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 5-6
(Plaintiffs were allowed time on the agenda to show their analysis of the aerial photos which
showed movement of the road and Plaintiffs are then denied the right to show the evidence).
(p) There is a more reasonable answer to the problem posed by Mr. Hodge-that
the road frontage distance be recognized and this recognition can be granted without the sacrifice
of the other measurements and angles. This present case is not premised on the fact that two
reasonable minds can differ, it is premised on the claim of the Defendants that they can decide a
debatable question on an invalid policy and make co~lclusionsand findings arbitrarily and
capriciously not supported by the evidence in the record and can after the fact create a record to
support their claims. One only needs to consider that Defendants have admitted to making
changes in the road and that the alterations are significant enough to show both the loss of a
quarter acre of land area and a loss of 200 feet of road frontage and that these alterations may
only show as slight variations in the path of a line across the aerial photos (the area on a map
scaled to be 40 acres = 4 square inches would require a total of 0.25 square inches to show the
loss of acreage from the original deed to the Rimrock survey). Furthermore, Defendants' denials
of significant change are irrelevant as the U.S. Supreme Court in states that the physical space a
small cable T.V box occupies is a taking (see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,

458 U.S. 419 (1982).
(q) John Durn, the Latah County Surveyor, ~ ~ performed
h o
the Rinlrock survey
of July 2006, and whom Mr. Hodge reprimands for not including a destroyed measurement in his
survey, was in the same situation that Plaintiffs are in now and that Bob Wagner also shared in.
All three of us are at the mercy of an agency which is deliberately indifferent to what is valid
private property and Defendants arbitrarily alter lines within easements they have arbitrarily
determined and all three are then required to prove what is no longer there or adequately
recorded u-hether it is a straightened road, a driveway access, or a fence. If Mr. Durne writes on
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his survey "Camps Canyon Road (County road) is shown with a 50 foot wide prescriptive R/W.
The physical location of the road is on a side hill and appears to be stable with little, if any,
change occurring over time", he must make some basic assumptions whether Mr. Arneberg
chooses to be truthful or not about previous alterations (see P l a i n t ~ 'sThird Record Supplement,
Item No. 5 , at 3 ("Orland Arneberg said he's lived out there his whole life and can testify that the
road hasn't moved.") or if Dan Payne call successfully conceal andlor adequately destroy the
necessary evidence (Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 7 "Dan Payne said that
unless Mr. Halvorson could prove the highway district pushed the tree through the fence he
should drop the issue"). Any investigation has a beginning and as so assumptions are made,
whether such assumptions are out of the prevue of Mr. Dunn (he is not the one who determines
the width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road, nor is he an archeologist) or simply a matter
at where a rational investigation begins. Mr. Dun11 notes his beginning assumptions and that he
will "show[nJ" his findings as a 50 foot prescriptive right of way in a stable enviroilrnent.

In regards to Defendants' " ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS RELEVANT TO
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ('Facts')" # 1 &2, it is not clear as to what Mr. Landeck intends bv
questioning the validitv of Mr. Dunn's survey or the implications that there might be
reason for dispute whether the Defendants had reason to believe that the bare area on a
aerial photo a t the east end of a arbitraritv drawn farm field line which was the seasonal
creek (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Szpplenzent, Item No. 3, at 4, 12, 13, and 14 (photos
showing the hardened area where the original road ran and where the runoff drainage met the
road)), to be Charlie Harris' historic driveway when his summary judgment is to be denied
on such disputed facts and Plaintiffs petition for summary iudgment is to be granted bv
those disputes he proposes. However it is that Mr. Landeck seeks to prove his Defendants
might be reasonablv negligent, he is again proving Plaintiffs case that that reasonable
negligence as viewed as a "not unauthorized'' action is not relevant to a constitutional tort.
Once again Mr. Landeck must come forth with a rational basis to a legitimate
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governmental interest to burden Plaintiffs with carrying the load of the Wagners' driveway
access and/or the additional width of the road. There is no legitimate governmental
interest to deny Plaintiffs their 5thAmendment rights and/or to be reasonably negligent.

3) Mr. Payne's conclusions and findings are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of the
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. Idaho Code does not mandate an unrecorded prescriptive
right of way be fifty feet wide nor does it mention a 25 feet from centerline right of way and if it
did it would be uncol~stitutional(see Keidel V. Rask, 304 N.W. 2d 402 (N.D 1981); see also
Barfnecht v. Town Board of N o l l p ~ o o dTp., 232 N. W.2d 420 (Minn. 1975)). Defendants must
seek a constitutionally valid interpretation of the Idaho statutes ("An appellate court is obligated
to seek an interpretation of a statute that will uphold its constitutionality. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197,
969 P.2d at 246. In addition, 'a statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical
interpretation can be given it.' Id. at 197, 969 P.2d at 246", State of Idaho v. John Doe,
-Idaho,

(2004) (Opinion No. 69)). Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants policies,

customs, standard operating procedures andlor exertion of their governmental powers are invalid,
facially and/or as applied to Plaintiffs (see Parratt v. Taylor, 45 1 U.S. 527 (198 1); and see
Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124; see also Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255
F.3d 734, (gth circuit, 2001); see also Logan v. Zirnmermun Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-436
(1982) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable,
predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"). Mr. Payne's
opinion is conclusory. Mr. Payne shows no criteria on which he relies on to make a judgment
that 50 feet implies public safety and or convenience, nor is any such judgment rationally related
to the burden placed upon the servient estate (see Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255,260 (1980),
("The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination
that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state
power in the public interest"). There is no de minimis applicability in this situation of where
such gains from the application of the statute are being weighed against the administrative
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burdens to the Plaintiffs, as implied authority to make cost-benefit decisions must be derived
from statute and not from a general de minimis doctrine. Mr. Payne's affiances here are
conclusory and not meant to lead to admissible evidence.
4) Same as 3) above; This is conclusory and not meant to lead to admissible evidence
Mr. Payne simply states that he is following the policies, customs of the Defendants. This is
repetitious rebutted testimony . Mr. Payne's Affidavit confirnzs there is a dispute over the
permission of Mr. Swanson (see Ed Swanson Affidavit at par. 7). Defendants' conclusions and
findings in Mr. Payne's inference is that Mr. Swanson conferred with him at Mr. Payne's
initiation so that Mr. Payne could make Mr. Swanson aware of the abusive action of which Mr.
Payne was about to undertake is somewhat obscure (see Pr~yneAfJidavit, par. 4 and Ameberg
AfJidavit, at par. 10); Defendants ' Second Record Supplement, Iteins 2 and 3, (Swansons had fee
in the land in 1996 and Plaintiffs acquired fee in the land; colorable evidence that the Swansons
then and the Plaintiffs now have a right to a nleaningful response at a meaningf~lltime; however

it is that Defendants arrogantly believe they absolutely rule the road. The question here is do the
Defendants have the right to alter the road not only at their decree, but also can they do it without
engaging the abutting land o~vnersin affording them due process and equal protection or to even
ignore the intentions of the abutting landowners \+;henthey seek them out. Whatever it is that
Mr. Payne and/or h4r. Arneberg believe about the issue of whether due process and equal
protection are required or not is not relevant to the question; it is strictly an objective question of
well established law and how a reasonable person would view it-not

Mr. Arneberg or Mr.

Payne. These affidavits are simply their coilclusions of law and not evidence of lack of dispute.
For the Defendants to prevail they must show no requirement of due process not sinlply admit
they didn't provide it. As arrogant as this stance is it is also frivolous. Defendants have brought
forth no substantial evidence here to support any theory that they did not need to p r o ~ i d eMr.
Swanson then or the Plaintiffs now due process and the record runs contrary in this case as in all
instances the Defendants are intending to adversely effect a land owners' propesty and liberty
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rights with per se violations (at this point the only defense Defendants have is to claiin they are
quelling a nuisance (see Idaho Code 5 22-4504 (proscribes such declaration). Defendants are
liable, in their official capacities for their invalid policies (see Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d
1342, 1346 (9'" Cis. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S.Crt. 1345 (1993) (Municipal liability
may be established in one of three ways). Defendants are liable in their individual capacities
weighed on an objective standard of reasonableness (see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987) (held, "...may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally
turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in the light of the legal rules
that were clearly established at the time the action m7astaken", citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800)). Defendants have only confirmed their official and individual liabilities and hang
both heavily on I.C. 5 40-23 12 for the ongoing harmful issue on the north side of the road, as
they rely heavily on an mandated 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way to preclude due

process and/or equal protection for the widening andlor property damage in widening andlor
encroacl~mentof a fence. On the south side of the road the Defendants rely on I.C. 5 40-23 12 to
authorize the issuance of, continuation of, and/or the failure to revoke of a driveway access
permit for a permit wholly on Plaintiffs' land and that denial of Plaintiffs' objections to the
actions/failures .to act adverse to Plaintiffs' property and liberty rights and to the positive
guaranties of the U.S. Constitution are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Defendants' affiances provide no rational basis for their findings and conclusions; they are
co~~clusory,
and are unreasonable and not rationally related to a legitimate gover~mentalinterest
andior bear no relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare and are arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. iMore specifically:
(a) Second Affidavit of Dan Payne, at 4; is an admission ofthe issue for which
Plaintiffs allege as to be harmful, the only step necessary to grant summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs is, as a matter of law, to determine if such actions/failures to act require the due process
of law, an evidentiary public hearing in this case (see Williar;l?sonCounty Regional Plarz~ing
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Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 193 (1 985) (The matter of the "issue that inflicts the

actual, concrete injury" determines the necessary proofs); see also Harris v. County of Riverside.
904 F.2d 497 (1990);
(b) Arneberg Affidavit, at 10; Defendants' policies, customs, standard operating
procedures are invalid as Defendants fail to circumscribe their broad authority to determine right
of way boundaries and legal limitations with the statutory safeguards of the requirements of due
process and/or the equal treatment under the law (see the 5thAmendment to the U.S.
Constitution), legally conducted professionally done surveys (see I.C. $9 40- 13 10 and 605 and
1.C $9 31-2707 and 2709), accurate descriptions of the lands required for the alterations(see I.C.

$5 40- 1310 and 605), the recording of the commissioners' orders for laying out of and for the
alteration itself(see I.C. $5 40-6081, and for recording of and conveying of the agreements with
abutting landowners(see I.C. $5 40-2302), remedies for erroneous deprivations (see Zinermon);
(c) Defendants Second Record Supplement, Items 2 and 3; Defendants have
provided evasive answers and have failed to ansurer Plaintiffs' discovery requests for the
information, documents, agency records, facts and opinions of fact on which Defendants base
their findings and conclusion of law. There is nothing in either the Wagner or the Plaintiffs deed
which says more than a public, county road passes over the SE % NE 54 and the centerline forms
the northeast boundary between the two. This boundary has a determined length R-hich starts
and ends at two determinable points that is where two imaginary geographic lines cross said
road. If said road is altered and these monument points are destroyed by moving the centerline
of the road are these points then not retrievable, simply because they are now 50 and 84 feet,
more or less south of the now centerline of Camps Canyon Road. One could by meets and
bounds discover these points; yet no rational person would say the road is still there, nor would
he say that a straightened line is as long as a convoluted one. How does the road gets from point
a to point b without certain statutory safeguards including positive constitutional guaranties, and
remedies for erroneous takings? It is unreasonable to conclude that this type of clandestine
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alteration was the unainbiguous intent of the legislature when it enacted I.C. 5 40-23 12. Nor was
this activity, which would clearly be banned in the broad daylight of the open court rooin (a
waiver of constitutional right requires both knowledge and intent to do so), be the unambiguous
intent of the Idaho State legislature when it enacted I.C.

$6 40-13 10 and 605 and prohibited the

taking of private land without prior survey, accurate description of the lands required, and
admonishing the commissioilers to endeavor to come to an agreement with the abutting
landowners. None of those statutes carries the inference that the government official may tell the
abutting landowner of his intended adverse actions, if it be convenient to do so, and either way
the official is authorized to do as he so decides, however capriciously, irrationally and/or
arbitrarily he decides; with the mandate that if she should complain the official shall have the
authority to ignore her with the unabashed deference and comity of the court.
5) Same as 3) above; Defendants conclusions and findings are no supported by
substantial evidence in the record and/or run contrary to the record of this case and the agency
record and/or are unreasonable and not rationally related to a legitilllate governmental interest
and/or bear no relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare and are arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal. Defendant Payne's affiances
are to be stricken for improperly augmenting the agency record. More specifically:
(a) Payne Affidavit, at 5; Defendants' affidavit is made in bad faith; Dan Payne
supplements his required record keeping to fit his claims. There is no evidence in Defendant
Payne's log to substantiate the specific claims he makes. There is no evidence in the records of
the agency to support any conclusion that Defendants were in compliance wit11 the laws (see I.C.

5 s 40-13 10 and 605; see I.C. $5 40-608; see 1.C 5s 3 1-2707 and 2709, and see I.C. $5 40-2302).
(b) Defendants records and logs are admissible evidence, however empty they
may be.
6) Same as 3) above; Defendants conclusions and findings are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record and/or run contrary to the record of this case and the agency
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' ,VOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGh4ENT AND REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER
h'iOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009
46

1305

record and/or are unreasonable and not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest
and/or bear no relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare and are arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. More specifically:
(a) Payne Second Affidavit, at 4; Defendants' affidavit is made in bad faith; Dan
Payne supplements his required record keeping to fit his claims. There is no evidence in
Defendant Payne's log to substantiate the specific claims he makes. There is no evidence in the
records of the agency to support any conclusion that Defendants were in compliance with the
laws (see I.C. $5 40-1310 and 605; see I.C. 55 40-608; see 1.C $5 31-2707 and 2709, and see I.C.

$5 40-2302).
(b) Defendants records and logs are admissible evidence.
7) Payne Affidavit at 7; If you take Mr. Payne's two previous affiances in 5) (see Payne
Affidavit, par. 5) and 6) (see Payne Affidavit, par. 6), specifically that he added 4' to the north
side of Camps Canyon Road in 1996 and again added 4' to the road in 2005 and 2006 and then
subtract those additions from what Mr. Payne now ascribes to be the width of the road; that 21
feet - 4 feet -4 feet = 13 feet; and then subtract from that the additional 2 feet of width (see
Payne Second Affidavit, par. 4); that is 13 feet -2 feet =11 feet. One now arrives at what
Plaintiffs state the original right of way was in width (see Plaintiffs Affidavit submitted in
support of partial summary judgments and other motions submitted January 26,2009 (Plaintiffs'
Afidavit), at 8; The width of the road was less than 12 feet including supporting structures,
Defendants have no evidentiary hearing and/or substantial evidence in their record to support a
finding and conclusion of a fifty foot-25

feet from centerline right of way. Prior to all these

alterations Camps Canyon Road was a narrow, little used, canyon road; it was steep and winding
at the west end of the SE114 NE114. These facts are undisputed. The question is, as a matter of
law, can this original unrecorded prescriptive right of way be mandate to have a width of 50
feet-25feet

from centerline?
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8) and 9) Payne Affidavit at 9 and at 10; I.C. $40-1 14 (3) "'Maintenance' means to
preserve from failure or decline, or repair, rehrbish, repaint or otherwise keep an existing
highway or structure in a suitable state for use." There is no reference at all to widening,
straightening, altering, or changing in anyway, in fact the implication of maintenance is to
preserve the present conditioli and not allow it to change. The intention of keeping the physical
extensions of a right of way distinguishable from the required activities of repair and
refurbishment is apparent and consistent (compare to I.C.9 40-605). Mr. Payne brings forth no
evidence of or a rational basis for the need for enveloping additional land without the proper
interference with Plaintiffs property rights-eminent

domain. There is no apparent need to

increase the burden on the servient estate by enveloping more land than is necessary. The
dominant estate can effect repairs to the road without any increase in the burden to the servient
estate but simply asking and communicating what repairs are necessary. If there is reason to,
that is a rational basis for increasing the burden of the servient estate, the legitimate
governmental interest is to spread that burden amongst the public (see Pennell v. City ofSan
Jose, 485 U.S.l, 9 (1988) ('"[ilt is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment's just compensation
provision is 'designed to bar Government fiom forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Gleizdale v. Coun f y of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304,482 U. S.
318-319 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States. 364 U. S. 40, 364 U. S. 49 (1960))"; See
also ~MonongahelaNav. Co. 11. Ukited States, 148 U.S. 3 12, 325 (1 893); See County of
Sacranzento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (stating that the Due Process Clause is intended,
in part, to protect the individual against "the exercise of power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate government objective"). Plaintiffs land andlor fence is
neither immoral, unsafe, unhealthful, nor do they cause a diminution in the general welfare of the
public or the Wagners; Defendants have no rational basis for regulating any harmful effects of
the land use provided Plaintiffs by the County of Latah. Defendant Payne brings forth no
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rational basis for the increase burden to the servient estate, simply a conclusion that the District
"nzust maintain".
I n regards to Defendants' "ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS =LEVANT

TO

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ('Facts') #s 3 through 12, it is not clear what Mr. Landeck' s
intentions are, as he seems to argue iust for the sake of arguing.. Mr. Landeck's argument
simplv begs the question, "Is the envelopment of more land permissible without due
process and equal protection?" Whether it is called width, widen in^, straightening,
altering, "to maintain" andlor "to improve", the name does not mandate an action
prohibited by law and constitution. The "as is, where as" precedent conditions must first
be determined and established before the action is permitted as it is a per se taking.
Furthermore all Mr. Pavne's affiances are conclusory. Mr. Payne brings forth no points of
discussion of whv maintenance requires extension of the easement and hence the increase
burden on the servient estate. He simply savs in effect maintenance mandates a 50 foot25 feet from centerline right of way. The Defendants bring forth no public opinion that for
their convenience o r easement of travel maintenance o r statute mandates a 50 foot-25 feet
from centerline right of way, that maintenance can not adequately be performed by
reasonable persons and permission of lando~vners.What is a t stake is the clandestine
extension of width and burden upon the senrient estate without due process of law.
Furthermore, Mr. Pavne and Defendants ' counsel

PO

out of their wav to state that none of

these matters have anything to do with the public (see Defendants' Brief at 8, par. 11
f"While the fence does not interfere with the public traffic on the traveled surface of
Camps Canvon Road, the District's maintenance activities, primarily grading and snow
removal, a r e affected by the fence's placement)). There are no complaints from the public
listed.

10) "The entire stretch of Camps Canyon Road used by the District for public
highway purposes in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property, including cut slope to fill slope
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lies within a 50 foot right of way." This is as Mr. Landeck, as an educated lawyer, is so fond

of saying, "intermittently conclusory, speculative, argumentative, generalized, repetitive and
disorganized" (see Defendants ' Brief at 2) statement, which "relies on factual assertions that are
not admissible in evidence, primarily for lack of foundation and hearsay" (see Defendants' brief
at 2 ) and are not supported by substantial evidence in the agency record and for which
Defendants Iiave provided no rational basis or relation to a legitimate governmental interest
(Plaintiffs, having no legal education, do not require anything is excess of what a reasonable
person might expect of governmental officials-a

rational basis). To the extent that Camps

Canyon Road lies on a naturally occurring slope as it traverses Plaintiff real property, the road
surface would logically require support as it is not in any way suspended and detached from the
physical structure of the earth beneath it. Furthermore, that supporting slope itself is not in any
way suspended from or detached from the rest of the naturally occurring slope at approximately
50 feet or the draw beneath the slope itself. It is then no further stretch of the imagination to see
that indeed the County of Latah as well as the State of Idaho is supportive of that draw and
naturally occurring slope also. These matters, such as the County of Latah and the State of Idaho
are defined on the basis of their limitations, that is, they have a rationally and/or legally defined
border, soniewhat permanently established. If the Defendants are saying that the border or
limitation of Camps Canyon Road is legally established at 50 feet, this has no relevance to the
slopes above or below the road surface as, it is a matter of law and this question has previously
been discussed as being not bound in any statute and is arbitrary and capricious an abuse of
defendants discretion and/or illegal. On the other hand if Defendants are saying that the support
of the road ends at 25 feet from centerline on the downhill side or that the slope which extends
above the road surface is supportive, then these inferences or statements are irrational
conclusions and findings without substantial evidence in the record and run contrary to any sense
of rationality and are therefore arbitrary and capricious an abuse of defendants discretion and/or
illegal. Plaintiffs have in no way sought to interfere with the status quo of the support of Camps
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Canyon Road as it traverses their land. The complaint Plaintiffs have is that the Defendants have
admitted to increasing the burden on Plaintiffs land (both in the road surface itself as well as the
support that is required for an ever increasing size of road); and as the Defendants admit (see
Payne ,S'econdAffidavit at 4). Plaintiffs' complaint is that this is, as are other matters, an
improper interference with Plaintiffs' property rights as it is done without the due process and/or
equal protection of the law. Defendants' statements and affiances are conclusory and not meant
to lead to adnlissible evidence.
11) and 12) Snow plowing and gravefing and road grading as enveloping more land
and damage to Plaintiffs' fence; Once again Defendants admit to (Payne Affidavit, at 12) the

issue to which Plaintiffs ascribe to as being harmful and egregious. Tlie only step necessary to
grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs is, as a matter of law, to determine if such
actions/failures to act require the due process of law (see Williamson County Regional Planning
Comrn 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 193 (1985) (The matter of the "issue that inflicts the
actual, coilcrete injury" determines the necessary proofs); see also Harris v. C o u ~ t yofRiverside,
904 F.2d 497 (1990). Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants have physically invaded their land
and damaged their fence. These actions are not disputed. Furthermore, Defendants
argumentatively state, as here that Plaintiffs' fence lies within their right of way. There is no
dispute that Plaii~tiffshave fee in the land in question. The issues then Lie in whether the land in
question lies within the right of way and if such right of way exists do the Defendants have the
right to encroach and injure Plaintiffs fence. Defendants do not have substantial evidence in
their record to support such a claim that they have a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of

way; and, all evidence ill the record of this case and as well as the agency record consist on
repetitious, rebutted testimony of Defendants claims, and all evidence in this case as well as the
agency record runs contrary to the claims of the Defendants and most importantly so Defendants
have stated emphatically so that no due process and/or equal protection is required. They bring
forth no rational basis for the burden they place on Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' land nor do they show
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any ends which would justify the means they take-to

physically invade and occupy Plaintiffs

land without any recourse available to Plaintiffs. When their encroachments now have surpassed
the intended protection of Plaintiffs' buffer there may be reason for the defendants to halt their
intrusive, vindictive behavior.
(a) In the first instance Plaintiffs fence is protected from malicious injury by
statute. Defendants policies, customs, standard operating procedures are invalid as to the extent
that they are proscribed by law (see Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sclzool District No. 231, 116
Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640) ("[D]iscretionary fu~lctiondoes not shield negligent implementation of
statutes.. ."); see also Owen, above).
(b) Furthermore, this action requires notice and hearing before action is takendue process is required by I.C. $$ 40-23 17, and 23 19, many legal doctrines, including but not
limited to the 5thAmendment of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants claims of reasonable and
diligent behavior is denied by their own admissions as Camps Canyon Road as an ulirecorded
prescriptive right of way has a history of probably in excess of 100 years. During that time until
1996 maintenance and use resulted in a 11-12 foot road surface including supporting structures
(calculated by Defendants' own figures; average width of the road now=2 1 feet (see Defendants'
Brief, at 7, par. 7) minus 2005 and 2006 and 1996 additions of 10 feet (see Defendants' Brief, at
7, par. 5 and 6). During the years (2005-2006) of Mr. Payne's diligent maintenance and under
the policies of the NLCHD, the width has grown by six feet (see Payne Second Affidavit, at 4,5;
see also Defendants ' BrieJ; at 7, par. 5 and 6); at that rate the road surface would be well over
three hundred feet now (1 00/2x6=300). Defendants deny their disclaimer-absent
circumstances-it

special

is apparent circumstances are other than they were. There are no exigent

circumstances. Defendants' authority "to improve" and "to maintain" is unstoppable.
Defendants claims are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, andlor illegal.
Plaintiffs' fence as well as Plaintiffs' buffer is wholly northeast and beyond the original road
surface and supporting structures and is wholly northeast and beyond the original line fence and
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is northeast and beyond the original 25 feet from centerline right of way if such right of way
existed is most if not all save for a small section northeast of the old logging road and the
Plaintiffs left the buffer to protect their fence and allow for snow removal, adequately "sized" for
the road accomplished by the Highway District in 1996 (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record
Supplement, Item No. 3, at 16 (photos showing the area left by Plaintiffs and as already reduced
by the extensions to the road by Defendants and as photographed in 2007)) and not at all
required by Plaintiffs to leave. Plaintiffs could have built their fence at the edge of the road (see

Ed Swnnson Afldavit, at par. 12).
(c) "That is, given the steepness of the slope on Plaintiffs' property, it is virtually
impossible to properly maintain Camps Canyon Road without some gravel or snow reaching
Plaintiffs' fence" (see Defendants ' Brief at 8, par. 11). First of all, Plaintiffs are not talking
about a sinall amount of incidental snow (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3,
at 8, and 9 (photos showing the pushing of snow with deliberate indifference into the fence,
winter of 2007-8). Secondly, Plaintiffs and the neighbors plowed the snow on Camps Canyon
Road for years without difficulties (see PlaintiSfsJ.4fldavit par. 2). Third, most of the several
miles of fences that Plaintiffs maintain are in the South Latall County Highway District. Of the
mile and half of fence on this farin, all is out of the reach of the NLCHD save for this 700 feet
(see Plairztiff 1s Af$davit par. 27). This stretch of fence requires more time and expense to repair
then at least a mile of fence unexposed to the Defendants. If Defendants have reached an
operational conclusion that it is indeed "virtually impossible", excluding any malicious
compliance, "to properly maintain", then their approach to widen the road and use up Plaintiffs'
buffer rather than to maintain it as intended for snow storage is irrational. If one does not have
space enough for storage for snow now why would you both increase the need for more storage
by widening the road (more roadzmore snow) and decrease the availability for the storage
already needed by widening the road (more road =less buffer)? "While the fence does not
interfere with the public traffic on the travelled surface of Camps Canyon Road, the District's
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maintenance activities, primarily grading and silow removal, are affected by the fence's
placement" (see Defendants' Brief at 8, par. 1I). Plaintiffs' land and fence is not unsafe,
unhealthful, immoral, nor does it cause a diminution in the general welfare of the public.
Defendants have many options. The choice they take is illegal to damage the fence rather than
follow the statute, give notice and/or hold evidentiary hearing on the width of the easement. This
is deliberate indifference esroneous deprivation.
13) through 18) The first Wagner driveway access permit, the south and the east
property lines of the 3+/- acre parcel (Plaintiffs address Defendants statements of material
facts without waiver that Defendants measurements and claims of real property lines are
not base on relevant evidence which would lead to admissible evidence; Defendants have
not submitted any surveys (see I.C. 5 31- 2709):

(a) Defendants' couilsel and Defendant Payile seem to relate difficulties related to
the south property line of the 3+/- acre parcel. Altl~oughthe south property line is less involved
in the Conzplaint Plaintiffs have with the Defendants u~ongfullytaking of Plaintiffs' land, it is a
matter which should also be addressed (see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record S'upplement, Itein No. 3, at
4, 12, 13, and 14 (photos showing the south property line as established by the Riinrock
Survey-marked

by the posts-and

the original line-as

marked by the field line). Mr. Wagner

had difficulty in establishing the position of the south property line due to a lot of possible
reasons; he started from a point not in section 15, he had to use his inagnetic compass under a
15000 volt power line, and had to confront an 8 foot embankment (see Plaintiffs Fourth Record
Suppleunent, Item No. 3, at 17 (photo looking south along the east property line; with Mr.
Wagner's "post" in the distance at the edge of the road, sl~owinghow far he was off in his
survey).
(b) Furthermore, the 3+/- acre parcel is tied to the centerline of Camps Canyon
Road as a flea to a dog's tail. Whenever the centerline of the unrecorded prescriptive right of
way waged so went the 31.1- acre parcel as no recorded survey of the 3+/- acre parcel was found
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either. The shift in the south property line was significant. However it is that the iiltersection of
the west line of the SE114 NE114 of section with Camps Canyon Road has changed over the
years (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 1, at 3, Request For Admission No. 3,
subpart c.; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 16-17, Interrogatory Nos. 40 -

44; (Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road several times and altered the centerline; see
Second Payne Affidavit at 2 and 3); and, with the undisputed fact that the road in the pertinent
part was esseiltially a narrow, little used and stable steep canyon road until 1996 (see Plaintiffs'
Affidavit at 2-3, par. 8; see Joe Yockey's Affidavit, at 2, par. 8) and, that most other parts of
Camps Canyo11 Road in section 15 remained so until 2005. For all intents and purposes the
major shift in that intersection, as is supported by the evidence, occurred in 1996 and absent any
other known alterations; and, without any survey or accurate description of the lands required for
said alteration in 1996, and thus no recording of survey and/or agreeilleilts or conveyance
occurred, resulted in the shift of the southern property line of the 3+/- acre parcel to the north by
approximately 50 feet. Had the Defendants done a survey and recorded the results in 1996, the
majority of this shift could have been avoided (see Hodge Affidavit, the road is a monument).
This emphasizes Mr. Hodge's point that the road lies as a lllonulnent and requires the respect of
the Highway District. This also emphasizes that the Wagners were also victims of the
Defendants. This also emphasizes the difficulty Mr. Dunn ei~coui~tered
with conductiilg the
survey. Whether the Wagners need to be joined to this action is for the Coui-t to decide. At this
point Plaintiffs rely only on the fact that the deterlnination of the post h4r. Payne refers to was
not based on a professioilally done survey and does not appear to lead to admissible evidence for
whatever reason Defendai~tsrely on it. Defendants' description of the south property line and
the land north of Mr. Wagner's post, "North of that post was an old driveway that used to lead to
a home and outbuildings on Mr. Wagner's property" (Dan Payne, see Defendants ' Briefat 9, par
13) may be disoriented in direction. North of Mr. Wagners' post lies the present County Road;
fifty feet across the County Road lies yellow pine (ponderosa) trees in excess of 100 years old
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(see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Sz~pplement,Item No. 3, at 14 and 2 (photo looking northeast from
Camps Canyon Road showing 100 year old pine trees north of where Mr. Payne says Charlie's
old driveway was north andlor in the middle of those trees)). Mr. Payne may mean west instead
of north as the east property line lays approximately 50 feet west of Mr. Wagner's post and 104
feet north along that line is where the east property met the centerline of the road (see Plaintiffs '
Fourtl~Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 4 (photo loolcing ilortheast from Camps Canyon Road
showing east property line in the middle of the photo about 40-50 feet due west of Mr. Wagner's
post). West of the property line and in close proximity to it Charlie's driveway entered the road
heading almost due north [see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 4 (photo
looking northeast from Camps Canyon Road showing approximate position of the intersection of
Camps Canyon Road with the east property line of the 3+/- acre Parcel as it %-aswhen the road

was higher on the slope)).
(b) The east property line of the 31/- acre parcel is a different matter, as it
remains geographically unchanged in position from east to west and its presence is a well known
fact. Any change here is based

011 the

accuracy of technological advances and Mr. Dunn's

thoughtful consideration to the variables involved. It may have been extended and started in a
different place as the southern property line was shifted north and the curves at the east end of
the 3+/- acre parcel were straightened in 1996 (see Plainti$s ' Third Record Suypler?zent,Item
No. 13, at 10-1 1, Interrogatory No. 16). These two facts alone account for more tllail 100 feet of
the loss of road frontage as the change in the curves resulted in the road and the east property
line paralleling each other for a short distance and the property line had to chase the road for an
additional 30 feet (more than the shift of 50 feet to the north in the southern property line) (see
Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Suppleunent, Item No. 3, at 20 (photo looking due south along east
property line (this photo was taken in 2006 after the Highway District cleared the last remaining
evidence of the 8 foot einbankrneilt left by the 1996 alteration in the late summer of 2006)), as
sited by the two posts showing how the post 1996 road parallels the property line and thus a loss
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of road frontage; as the calculation of road frontage does not start until the east property line
crosses the centerline of the road; there may be parts of the old road which are geographically 50
and 84 feet from the post 1996 road but the distance varies throughout the 700 or so feet of the
road)) and ,another 20 plus feet as the west intersection moved north 50 feet and the east
intersection moved north 80 plus feet. This shift to the north resulted in another untoward effect
in regards to the old historic driveway as north is down hill and the road bed necessarily dropped
down hill fiom where the height of the historic driveway met the road and left an 8 foot
embankment (see Plaintiffs ' Fourlh Record Supplement, Item No. 3 , at 17(photo looking due
south along east property line (this photo was taken in 2006 after Wagners built their 2fld
driveway in June of 2006 and about three months before Plaintiffs ' Fou~thRecord Sz~yleizenf,
Item No. 3 , at 20)). Without the accurate information of the 1996 alterations, the Wagners were
leA with the impression that the historic driveway headed due east and thus straight into the east
property line (see Plaint85 ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 1, at 12, Request for Ad~nission
No. 27).
(c) The survey that Bob Wagner had done had passed the east property line some
forty feet before he reached the road and placed the post alol~gsidethe road (Mr. U7agner's
survey is inad~~lissible
as evidence), whether or not Mr. Wagner had begrul his survey from a
point located in Section 16 and a fact that Mr. Wagner had spolcen with Ron Munson about
so~netimearound the time Mr. Wagner conducted his survey and that Mr. R/l~msonhad told him
that may not tvork (see PlaintiffS Asdavit par. 12). Neither Defendants nor the Wagners have a
professionally done survey on which to base any rational decision as to why they positioned a
post where they did and as such the references Defendant Payne makes in reference to a non
existent southern property line extending to the road are nonsensical. Bob Wagner had been told
in the fall of 2005 that his post was not acc~~rately
placed and Defendant Payne and Defendant
Arneberg were well aware of these facts as a result of their close relationship with the Wagners
and the Ridgeview Farms owners (see PlairztifSs ' Third Record Suppler?zent,Item No. 1, at 10-11,
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Request for Admission Nos. 23-26; see also Plaintiffs' Third Record Szpplement, Item No. 3, at
10-11, Request for Admission No. 25-26; see also Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No.
12, at 4-1 1, Interrogatory Nos. 6-21). Defendants Payne and Arneberg were well acquainted
with the Wagners situation, even before the permit was issued and lulew Plaintiffs did not agree
with the Wagners' survey; Defendants Arneberg, Clyde and Payne were in the same official
positions now as they were in 1996 when the NLCHD made the alterations to Camps Canyon
Road and the changes to the centerline of the road, the straightening of the curves and the
movement of the road bed to the northeast and knew the measurement of the road frontage
referred to in the deed was not accurate; Defendants conclusions and findings that the first
Wagner driveway access permit was valid were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, and/or illegal. Furthermore, Defendants are the final policy makers of the agency and
they gave their approval of the permit by failing to revoke the permit when they were told the
Wagner driveway access was wholly on the plaintiffs' land, by refusing to call for a survey to
resolve the issue, by refusing to require the Wagners to call for a survey to resolve the problem
and by refusing to revoke the permit when the Plaintiffs said that they would call for a survey.
Furtlierrnore Defendants failed to afford Plaintiffs due process to resolve the problem when all
parties were present and time was allotted of the agenda.
19) There is no dispute that Plaintiffs have considered that matter of paying a $750 fee
and petitioning Commissioners to validate Camps Canyon Road to be futile and an idle waste of
Plaintiffs' time money and effort. There is also no dispute that Plaintiffs have supplied
Defendants with sufficient data for the Conlmissioners to validate Camps Canyon Road on their
own resolution. Idaho offers two exceptions to tlie requirement to exhaust agency remedies (see
Fairway Development are applicable to their appeal. This Court in Fairway Development
acknowledged that the general rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted before a
district court will acquire subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case, has been deviated from in
certain cases. The Court stated: In relaxing the doctrine of exhaustion, this Court held that the
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rule will be departed from under certain circumstances, first, where the interests of justice so
require and secondly, where the agency acts outside its authority. Fairway Dev., 119 Idaho at
125,804 P.2d at 298 (citing Grever v. Idaho Tel. Co., 94 Idaho 900,903,499 P.2d 1256, 1259
(1 972). Exhaustion of agency remedies is not required under

5 1983 (see Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (exhaustion of judicial remedies is not a prerequisite); see also Patsy v.
Florida Board ofRegents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not a prerequisite)). Plaintiffs are not required to engage in idle and/or futile collduct to resolve
these matters. I.C. fj40-203a allows Commissioners to initiate validation proceedings under
their own resolution only if one of three col~ditionsexist: (i) On 4/12/06 Plaintiffs questioned the
legal establishmellt of the Camps Canyon Road right of way (alterations had been made to the
right of way in 1996 with the permission of the previous owner (see Ed Swanson Affidavit) and
the Defendants were now claiming prescription (see Plaintiffs ' AAfJidavit,at 8 and 13) and availed
Defendants of the facts that alterations had been made to Canlps Canyon Road (see Plaintiffs'
Afldavit, at 8 and 13) and that Defendants were not knowledgeable of the accurate location of
the right of way if they believed that the first Wagner driveway access permit was not on
Plaintiffs land (see Plaint$ss' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 12, at 9, (however Dan Payne
is also know1edg;eable of the 1996 alterations to Camps Canyon Road, as he conducted the
alterations (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szlpplement, Item No. 3, at 16-17, Request For
Admission Nos. 40-44). Dan Payne altered the centerline of Camps Canyon Road on several
occasions; yet he used the measurement of the centerline to determine the validity of the first
Wagner driveway access permit; (ii) On 3/21/07, Plaintiffs represented the facts of (i) and
supplemented those facts with the results of the Rimrock survey which showed lliovenient of the
intersection points of the east and west property lines of the 3+/- acre parcel of greater than 50
feet. The present location of Camps Canyon Road no longer agreed with the Latah County
records (our deed) (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 4, at 2-3). The Idaho
Doctrine of Quasi-Estoppel estops Defendants from asserting reliability of the deed description
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for issuance/failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and then denying the
reliability of the deed in negating the movement of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the
3+/- acre parcel. All three "permission given" factors of I.C. 5 40-203a for Commissiollers to
initiate validation proceedings under their own resolutioll had been shown to Commissioners and
they reksed to respond. It would be futile to believe the $750 fee and the same data would result
in a meaningful response. Further Defendants demands of the $750 fee and that Plaintiffs apply
for validation proceedings would only result in the declaration of Camps Canyon Road in the
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel as being "in the public interest" or not (a fact not in dispute-the
only dispute is with the doubts of location, public records, numerous alterations, claim of legal
establishment as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way). The questions (as a right to private
action) of doubt are better addressed by the Commissioners initiating validation proceedings
under their own resolution. See Ware v. Idaho State Tax Conm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, 567 P.2d 423
(1977). Defendants and Court incorrectly identifies I.C. 5 40-203a as a predeprivation remedy
and as a post deprivation remedy I.C. 40-203a is inadequate on the grounds: (a) a
predeprivation remedy is feasible, predictable, and practicable; (b) exl~austionof agency
remedies is not necessary under $1983; and even if exhaustion of agency remedies was required,
this case meets both exceptions to exhaustion in Idaho as the Defendants are alleged to be biased
both in their culpability to improperly altering Camps Canyon Road and their ties to the
aspirations of and the ex parte communications with the Wagners and it would be unjust to
require Plaintiffs pay a $750 fee to petition Defendants to validate Camps Canyon Road wlien
Plaintiffs had already shown them the evidence for questioning the validity of Defendants claims
and Defendants stated that they were not interested and tlze Defendants were acting outside their
authority, to operate without a valid right of way; and (c) Defendants are estopped from claiming
Plaintiffs should file for validation proceedings when it is their duty for providing Plaintiffs with
a valid right of way (see @'are v. Idaho State Tux Comm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, at 483 (1977) (d) See
Owen, above).
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20) See above Plaintiffs have already replied to Defendants Tort claim notice defense.
2 1) Key Public Records: Defendants identification of Public records as Latah County
Records are misleading and insufficient for proper identification andlor location of any such
documents and some may contain unintended and inaccurate information.

IV. Disputed material facts: Plaintiffs petition Court to deny Defendants Motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiffs' claims as the following material facts are disputed:
1) Plaintiffs dispute the width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road right of way, in
the pertinent part (see this Court's Opinion and Order On Plaintiffs Motions For Summary
Judgment And Defendants' Motion For Protective Orders, For Enlargement Of Time And For
Attorney Fees (hereafter Opinion), at 6, 7, and 9);

2) Plaintiffs dispute the placement of Plaintiffs' fence and Plaintiffs' buffer is within
Defendants right of wayleasement of Camps Canyon Road right of way, in the pertinent part (see
Opinion, at 6-9);

3) Plaintiffs dispute that an unrecorded prescriptive right of way requireslhas a mandated
a width of 50 feet-25

feet from centerline for maintenance (see Opinion, at 6-9);

4) Plaintiffs dispute that an unrecorded prescriptive right of way requireslhas a mandated
width of 50 feet-25

feet from centerline for support (see Opinion, at 6-9);

5) Plaintiffs dispute that the Camps Canyon Road right of way, in the pertinent part, has
a width of 50 feet-25

feet from centerline of usage (see Opinion, at 6-9);

6) Plaintiffs dispute that the Camps Canyon Road right of way, in the pertinent part, has
a mandatedlrequires a width of 50 feet-25

feet from centerline for maintenance (see Opinion, at

6-9);
7) Plaintiffs dispute that the Camps Canyon Road right of way, in the pertinent part, has
a width of 50 feet-25

feet from centerline (see Opinion, at 6-9);

8) Plaintiffs dispute that the Defendants have any authority to regulate the use of
Plaintiffs' land (see Idaho Code I.C. 5 22-4504 prevents the adoption of ordinances or
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resolutions declaring as a nuisance any agricultural operations operated in accordance with
generally recognized agricultural practices ("When a conflict exists between a statute and a
regulation, the regulation must be set aside to the extent of the conflict", see Roeder Holdings
citing Idaho County hrursitzg Honze v. Dep 't of Health, 120 Ida110 933, 937, 82 1 P.2d 988,992
(1991)));
9) Plaintiffs dispute that the aerial photo Mr. Hodge has been given to analyze is from
the year 1940.
10) Plaintiffs dispute that the bare area on the eastern edge on the 3.4 acreage parcel on
the "1 940" aerial photo Mr. Hodge has been given to analyze is Charlie Harris' old driveway
entrance as that bare spot is the spring run off from the hill and draw to the south and west above
it.

I 1) Plaintiffs dispute that the Defendants have "properly discharged [their] statutory
responsibilities "to improve and to mairztain the public highway known as Camps Canyon".
12) Plaintiffs dispute that in regards to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, the
Defendants have a 50 foot-25

feet froin centerline right of way mandated by any Idaho Statute.

NONE OF THE ABOVE DISPUTED FACTS ARE MATERIAL TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING UNDISPUTED FACTS:

VI. Undisputed material facts: Plaintiffs petition Court to grant Plaintiffs' partial summary
judgment on Plaintiffs' claims of Defendants' liability, under the color of law, as matters of law,
as the following material facts arc undisputed:

I ) The width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road has not been factually determined
(see Opinion, at 6-9).
2) No public evidentiary hearing has ever been held to establish the unrecorded

prescriptive highway Camps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM as a public right
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3) No public evidentiary hearing has ever been held to establish the location, width, use,
centerline and/or other liiniting characteristics of the unrecorded prescriptive highway Camps
Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM.
4) No factual determination, public evidentiary hearing, of the width of the easement of
Canlps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM has ever been accomplished by the
agency, NLCHD, under whose jurisdiction Camps Canyon Road lies.

5 ) Defendants have 110 material, admissible evidence in the agency's records that Cainps
Canyon Road has ever been legally established as a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of

way.
6) Camps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM has never been laid out,
surveyed (except as called for by Plaintiffs and accomplished by Rinlrock Consultants in July
2006 and as amended by Rimrock Consultants in May 2007), and/or recorded by Defendants.
7) Defendants have not in all matters relevant afforded Plaintiffs in any form or manner
nor do they contend that they have in any manner attempted to provide Plaintiffs with due
process, notice of their intended actions, an evidentiary hearing on any matter relevant and have
furthermore denied and/or not allowed Plaintiffs reasonable access to any hearing, evidentiary
hearing or due process on any matter relevant.

8) Defendants have made alterations to Camps Canyon Road in SENE Sectioi~15 T39N
R3 WBh4 which include:
(a) In 1996, in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, the straightening of curves, the
relocation of the centerline to the northeast in varying anlounts and at varying places, and the
widening of the road surface and supporting structures;
(b) 111 2006, in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and on the northeast side of the
road widening of the road by at least two feet;
(c) From 2005 until present and as a continuing ~naintenanceactivity small
amounts of widening, as gravel moves outward tou.ard the convexity of curves and do\vnhill-in
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the present instance in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel to the northeast, "which serves to
support the road but does result in minimal, necessary widening of the road over time is
widening of the road and has had impacts on the width of the burden on the servient estate.
(d) None of the amounts of widening due to any reason or no distances of

movement of the centerline as a result of any widening and/or relocation of the centerline as a
result of alterations in curves are or have ever been recorded in any agency record keeping.
9) The only known recorded data to exist to cite any location of the centerline of Camps
Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3TxlBM, specifically in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre
parcel prior to the aforementioned surveys is Plaintiffs' and/or the Wagners' deed description.
10) The Wagners and the Plaintiffs have fee simple entitlement to the lands of the SENE
Section 15 T39N R3 WBM in their attributable portions as described in their deeds.
1 1) The NLCHD has an unrecorded prescriptive right of way across the SENE Section

15 T39N R3 WBM acquired prior to 1916, as circumstantially shown on Plaintiffs' deed and
which may predate any such "previously existing" status as cited in Meservey as may be
circuinstantially shown by the time period of homesteadiiig in tlie area.
12) In all matters relevant and at all times relevant, Defendants have operated under the
color of state law and in all matters of performance, whether discretionary or operational, as to
be described as the official acts of tlie final policy makers, and/or as under the customs, official
policies, or standard operating procedures of the NLCHD, and/or the approved acts/failures to
act of any subordinate by the official policy makers of the NLCHD.
13) The presence of Canips Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBhl on the
NLCHD's road map does iiot establish, without more, as in an evidentiary hearing, the section of
Camps Canyon Road in the pertinent part, as a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline, or as a public

highway, whether Plaintiffs choose to dispute Camps Canyon Road as a public highway or not.
14) The first Wagner driveway access permit was issued early in the year of 2006, on or

before March, 2006.
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15) Defendant Payne did intentionally destroy the first Wagner Access permit.
16) Defendants did intentionally alter, widen, straighten, and/or move the centerline of
Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM.

17) The first Wagner access permit was issued for an access to Camps Canyon Road in
the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM wholly on Plaintiffs' land.
18) Defendant Arneberg said that Camps Canyon Road in the pertinent part has never
moved at the 3/2 1/07 meeting of the Comn~issionersof the NLCHD.
19) Defendants have no material evidence in their agency records to support a
conclusion or finding that the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way needs to be 50
feet-25

feet from centerline wide, or in the present case that the width of Camps Canyon Road

in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM needs to be 50 feet-25

feet from centerline wide as a

matter of maintenance.
19) Defendants have nq material evidence in their agency records to support a
conclusion or finding that the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way needs to be 50
feet-25

feet fi-om centerline wide, or in the present case that the width of Camps Canyon Road

in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM needs to be 50 feet-25

feet from centerline wide as a

matter of support for the road,
20) Defendants have no material evidence in their agency records to support a conclusion
or finding that the width of the unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the
SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM needs to be 50 feet-25
of usage, that is, was ever used to the extent of 50 feet-25

feet from centerliile wide as a matter
feet from centerline.

2 1) Defendants have no material evidence to support a conclusion or finding that the
width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM, in the
pertinent part, as presently claimed is within the width of the unrecorded prescriptive right of
way as was originally acquired by use.
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22) Defendants have no material evidence to support a conclusion or finding that the
location of the easement of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T3 9N R3WBM, in the
pertinent part, as presently claimed is in the loction of the unrecorded prescriptive right of way as
was originally acquired by use.
23) Defendants have

material evidence to support a conclusion or finding that the

centerline of the easement of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM, in
the pertinent part, as presently claimed is in the same location of the unrecorded prescriptive
right of way as was originally acquired by use.
24) Defendants have no material evidence to support a conclusion or finding that the
strip of land now occupied by the easement of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15
T39N R3 WBM, in the pertinent part, as presently claimed is in the identical strip of land of the
unrecorded prescriptive right of way as was originally acquired by use.
VII.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON ALL OF DEFENDANTS'

DEFENSES AS A MATTER OF LAW OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THERE ARE GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLlJDE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR DEFENDANTS. Furthermore, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON ALL
OF DEFENDANTS' DEFENSES AS A MATTER OF LAW OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THERE

ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDE ENTRY OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS (see Plaintiffs' Motions For Plaintiffs Partial
Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009 and specifically of
Defendants liability under 42 U.S. C. 5 1983).
Generally:
Defendants have not set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial with
the exception of damages as to be determined or that Defendants are entitled to judgment on

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion is
conclusory, repetitive, generalized, speculative, confusing and disorganized. Further,
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Defendants rely fundamentally on factual assertions that are not admissible in evidence,
primarily because those assertions constitute hearsay or are made without personal knowledge
and or are not relevant. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motions also ignore responding to
complaints of Plaintiffs in great part, and briefing their own versions of Plaintiffs' con~plaintsin
this action, and Defendants have again pursued these defenses without supplementing this record
with additional, admissible facts. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion serves only to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of this litigation in violation of
Rule 1 1(a)(l)I.R.C.P.
Moreover, Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion ultimately fails because Plaintiffs
have shown through Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment And Reply To Defendants' Answering Brief And Objections To Plaintiffs' Motions
For Partial Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009 and Plaintiffs'
Motions For Partial Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26, 2009 filed
herein that there are genuine issues as to the material facts of Defendants' defenses and that
summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants on all
Defendants' defenses in this action.
Alternatively, affidavits and record supplements submitted by Plaintiffs that are part of
this record set forth specific facts wl~iclz,construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, at the
very least clearly preclude a determination that Defendants are entitled to jud,~ m e nas
t a matter
of law as to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs, I~owever,urge the Court to
determine that there are genuine issues as to any material facts in this action as so defended by
Defendants and that Plaintiffs are entitled to prevail as to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment as a matter of law and to enter summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs as the nonmoving party in Defendants' motion.
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Disputed Material Facts And Inadmissible Facts and Incorporation of Prior Affidavits and Briefs,
in regards to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment:
Specific facts admissible in evidence, from which the Court should determine that there
are genuine issues as are enumerated in this Answering Brief and as well as in Plaintiffs'
Motions For Partial Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26, 2009, and
as are contained in Ed Swanson's First Affidavit, Joe Yockey's First Affidavit, and Plaintiffs
Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment filed concurrently herewith and the Plaintiffs' Reply To Defendants' Answering Brief
To Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6, And
October 21, 2008, Defendants Motion To Strike And Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees,
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment/Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of Action Under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983,
Plaintiffs' First Record Supplement In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary
JudgmentiAdjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of Action Under 42 U.S.C.

5

1983,

Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
/Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Of The Nullification Of The Original Prescriptive Right Of
Way And Subsequent Burden Of Proof Of Prescription, Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of
Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment /Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of
Action Under 42 U.S.C.

5 1983, Plaintiffs'

Motion For Partial Summary Judgment /Adjudication

Of The Issue Of The Nullification Of The Original Prescriptive Right Of Way And Subsequent
Burden Of Proof Of Prescription And/or Validatinil Of A Legally Established Right Of Way,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Sumnlary Judgment /Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Facial
Validity Of The NLCHD's Standing Operating Procedure For Widening A Prescriptive RightOf-Way, Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement, Fourth Record Supplement, Plaintiffs' Affidavit In
Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted
January 26, 2009, Plaintiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

5 40-203a, Plaintiffs
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5 67-8003(3), Plaintiffs Motion For
Reconsideration of Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 40-203a and Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3) all
Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

of which were previously filed herein and all of which are incorporated herein by this reference
not only for purposes of the factual record but, as appropriate, also for the legal analysis of issues
addressed in this Plaintiffs' Answering Brief and Reply To Defendants Answering Brief. A
concise statement of dispute, admissible material facts at genuine issue is set forth starting on
page 56 above of this Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment And Reply To Defendants Answering Brief And Objections To Plaintiffs' Motions For
Partial Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009.

Admissible Facts and Incorporation of Prior Affidavits and Briefs, in regards to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment:
Specific facts admissible in evidence, from which the Court should determine that there
are no genuine issues of material fact as petitioned for in this Answering Brief And Reply To
Defendants Answering Brief and as well as in Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Summary
Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009, as are contained in Ed Swanson's
First Affidavit, Joe Yocltey's First Affidavit, and Plaintiffs Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs'
Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment filed concurrently herewith
and the Plaintiffs' Reply To Defendants' Ans~veringBrief To Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6, And October 21, 2008, Defendants ihlotion
To Strike And Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees, Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of
Plaintiffs' LMotionfor Partial Summary JudgmentIAdjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of
Action Under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, Plaintiffs' First Record Suppleinent In Support Of Plaintiffs'
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment/Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of Action
Under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs9Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment /Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Of The Nullification Of The Original
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Prescriptive Right Of Way And Subsequent Burden Of Proof Of Prescription, Plaintiffs'
Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment /Adjudication Of The
Issue Of The Cause Of Action Under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, Plaintiffs' h'lotion For Partial Summary
Judgment /Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Nullification Of The Original Prescriptive Right
Of Way And Subsequent Burden Of Proof Of Prescription And/or Validation Of A Legally
Established Right Of Way, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment /Adjudication Of
The Issue Of The Facial Validity Of The NLCHD's Standing Operating Procedure For Widening

A Prescriptive Right-Of-Way, Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement, Fourth Record Supplement,
Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments And Other
Motions Submitted January 26,2009, Plaintiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

5

40-203a, Plailitiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. § 67-8003(3), Plaintiffs Motion
For Recolisideration of Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 40-203a and Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3)
all of which were previously filed herein and all of which are incorporated herein by this
reference not only for purposes of the factual record but, as appropriate, also for the legal
analysis of issues addressed in this Plaintiffs' Answering Brief and Reply To Defendants
Answering Brief. A concise statenlent of undisputed, admissible material facts at genuine issue
is set forth starting on page 57 above of this Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment And Reply To Defendants Ansxverilzg Brief And Objections To
Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26, 2009.

VITI Standard for Surnmarv Judgment
"Judgment shall be granted to the illoving party if the nonmoving party fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish an essential element to the party's case." J\fcColun-Trilska v.

Baker, 139 Idaho 948,950-5 1,88 P.3d 767, 769-70 (2004).
"The requirement found in Idaho caselaw that a party moving for summary judgment
'present evidence7 is not a requirement that the party 'present specific facts' as Foster implies.
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'Evidence' and 'facts' are related but nonetheless different concepts. As a result, the summary
judgment process imposes different requirements on a movant than those faced by the adverse
party. Although the party moving for summary judgment must establish through 'evidence' the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, there is no requirement the movant present specific
facts. 'See Srnith [v. Meridian Joint Scli. Dist. No. 21, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588. Once the
movant has made and appropriately supported its motion, it is the responsibility of the adverse
party to come forward with evidence, id., and to 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial' I.R.C.P. 56(e)." Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005).
(Emphasis added.)
IX. Analysis of Defendants Defenses and Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. Cause of Action
I11 regards to Plaintiffs'

5 1983 Claim, Defendants bring forth no new defenses and

reference Defendants' Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summaiy Judgment pp. 12-26
as set forth in full.
Plaintiffs have responded to Defendants' Motion and will here recapitulate the elements
of 5 1983:
Plaintiffs have alleged Defendants have physically invaded and continue to occupy their
land and have permitted third parties to invade and occupy Plaintiffs' land in the SENE Section
15 T39N R3WBM in matters of the easement of Camps Canyon Road traversing their land from
the late fall of 2005 and up and through the present resulting in irreparable harm and threatening
imminent future irreparable harm. Plaintiffs claim Defendants are in wrongful possession of
Plaintiffs land and that Defendants have iinproperly interfered with Plaintiffs' property rights and
have violated Plaintiffs' liberty rights by arbitrarily and capriciously denying Plaintiffs
procedural due process and equal protectioil of the law and other statutory safeguards and
remedies for their erroneous deprivations of Plaintiffs property. In any and all matters
Defendants have denied Plaintiffs notice and hearing when practicable, predictable, and feasible.
In any and all matters Defendants have denied Plaintiffs evidentiary hearing when practicable,
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predictable, and feasible and sought and requested by Plaintiffs. In any and all matters
Defendants have denied Plaintiffs exhaustion of statutory agency relnedies for the erroneous
deprivations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are the proximate, direct, legal, and substantial
causes of the invasions of their land and the irreparable harm as thus resulted.
The matters here are not contested by Defendants;
1) At all times relevant, Defendants have actedlfailed to act under the color of state law
(see Lugar v. Edmo~~dson
Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922,937 (1982);
2) Local governments and individuals, Defendants are persons and subject to suit for
damages, declaratory, andlor injunctive relief and prospective relief (see City of Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); see also Kentucky 1,. G~aiiai~z,
473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

3) Defendants liability attaches for actions1 failures to act under agency's
policies/customs, approval of actionslfailures to act by final policy makers [see Mor?ell v.
Department ofsocial Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Gillette v. Llelnzore, 979 F.2d
1342, 1346 (9"' Cis. 1992) (per curiam), cei-t. denied, 114 S.Crt. 1345 (1993) (Municipal liability
may be established in one of three ways).
4) Defendants liability attaches for actions1 failures to act when agency fails to train its
employees and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such
training, and the failure to train will likely result in the enlployee making the wrong decision (see
City of Canton v. Hu~ris,389 U.S. 378 (1989).
5) Defendants liability attaches for policies, customs, standard operating procedures of
broad authority not circunlscribed by statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous remedies
(see Zinernzo12 v. Bur-ch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124; see also Zirnn.zerman v. City of' Oakland,

255 F.3d 734, (9"' Circuit, 2001); see also L o g ~ nv. Zimmem?an B a s h Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435436 (1983) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable,
predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized").
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6) Plaintiffs' legitimate claim to entitlement, constitutionally protected property interest
rests in their deed to the lands of the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM including lands
underlying Camps Canyon Road save for the 311- acre parcel.
7) Defendants rest their defense on their policies for improving public highways is
based on Idaho Code 540-23 12 (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 20, at 8-9)
("The District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho
Code 540-23 12 and the holdings of Adeservey and its progeny. The District is well within its
legal rights to widen a road without holding a public hearing when that activity occurs within the
area of the District's public right-of-way. Plaintiffs fail to accept or understand that the District
is empowered under law to improve and even widen public highways so long as it does not
exceed, under usual circumstances, the lawful 5- foot width of that highway ")). Defendants also
claim that all prescriptive rights of way are mandated to be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline by
Idaho Code fj40-23 12 (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 18, at 3-4, Requests
for Admissions Nos. 4,5, and 6). Defendants defenses rest entirely on their interpretation of
Idaho Code 540-23 12 and the holdings of hfeservey and its progeny citing their authority for a
mandated 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right of way and denial of evidentiary hearings-due

process. Defendants' exertions of their g o v e r m e ~ ~ tpowers
al
are in excess of their statutory
authority.

8) In regards to Defendants' policy to improve and to maintain public highways as it is
applied to Plaiiltiffs andlor Plaintiffs' situation is invalid as Canlps Canyon road in SENE
Section 15 T39 N R3 WBM is claimed to be a prescriptive right of way. As a matter of law
Defendants have exceeded their authority by mandating a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline right

of way and thsy have subverted the legislature's intentions by denying Plaintiffs an evidentiary
hearing. There are no disputed facts in this issue as Defendants say the law says that they do not
have to provide an evidentiary hearing. Defendants do not have substantial evidence in the
agency record andlor Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes andlor had failed
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follow the provisions of the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process
and/or equal protection of the law prior to widening Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part.
Defendants do not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or Defendants are in
excess of the authority of statutes to deny Plaintiffs due process when on 4/12/06 Plaintiffs
complained to Defendants that they did not have a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way to
widen Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part. Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions
and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.

9) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or Defendants
were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of the statutes
as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process andlor equal protection of the law
when on 4/12/06 Plaintiffs conlplained that Defendants had issued the first Wagner driveway
access permit for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land and/or to continue the permit and/or to not
revoke the permit and/or to not call for a survey and/or to not require the Wagners to call for a
survey andlor when Plaintiffs said they u-ould call for a survey, where a survey would be in
accordance with the United States manual of surveying instructions. Defendants actions/failures
to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, and/or illegal.
10) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or
Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of
the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection
of the law when on 3/21/07 Plaintiffs complained that Defendants had issued the first Wagner
driveway access permit for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land and Defendants had failed to
revoked said permit and had denied it was not within their authority to issue, continue, and/or not
revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit andlor permit anyone access to Camps Canyon
Road across Plaintiffs land and/or to add additional width to the road, change the drainage,
and/or injure Plaintiffs' fence whether the pushing of dirt and gravel into Plaintiffs' buffer and
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onto Plaintiffs fence was in retaliation for Plaintiffs being correct in the positioiling on the east
property line of the 31-1- acre parcel, andlor a matter of widening of and/or a matter of
maintenance and/or a matter of improving Camps Canyon Road. Defendants actions/failures to
act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion,
and/or illegal.
11) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or
Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of
the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection
of the law when on 312 1/07 Plaintiffs complained that the validity of the Camps Canyon right of
way was in doubt whether as a matter of the legal establishment of Calnps Canyon Road as a
public right of way and/or as a 50 foot-25

feet from centerline prescriptive right of way and

Defendants had issued the first Wagner driveway access permit for an access wholly on Plaintiffs
land and the Rimrock survey, as performed in accordance with the United States manual had
shown the intersections of the east and west property lines of the 3+/- acre parcel with Camps
Canyon Road were not in accordance wit11 the public record of Plaintiffs' deed description and
the Defendants had made numerous alterations to Canips Canyon Road, including 1996,2005,
2006, as well as multiple extensions of width as a result of Defendants policies of widening a
prescriptive right of wajr ;md!or maintenance and/or i~nprovementof a prescriptive right of way
by denying Plaintiffs a hearing andor by not initiating validation proceedings of Camps Canyon
Road under their own resolution in accordance with I.C. § 40-203a. Defendants actionsifailures
to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants'
discretion, and/or illegal.
12) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record andlor Defendants
were in excess of the authority of statutes andlor had failed follow the provisions of the statutes
as the jegislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection of the law
when in July of 2007, Plaintiffs had hired a lawyer and obtained and agreed on an informal
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meeting with Defendants and Ed Swanson to determine the width of the easement 011 site of
Camps Canyon Road and Defendants abdicated their duty to a written response to Plaintiffs of
their reasoned findings and coisclusions whatever those findings and conclusio~ssmay have been,
Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.
13) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or Defendants
were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of the statutes
as the legislature bad intended to deny Plaintiffs due process andlor equal protection of the law
when Plaintiffs filed Requests For Regulatory Takings Analysis for actions which Defendants
had already accomplished and adversely affected Plaintiffs property rights as alleged per se
takings and Defendants did not respond. Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions and
findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.
14) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or Defendants
were in excess of the authority of statutes andor had failed follow the provisions of the statutes
as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection of the law
when Plaintiffs requested to speak with Defendants' counsel directly at the 8/8/07 nseeting and
Defendants denied Plaintiffs' request unless Plaintiffs got a lawyer andor denied Plai~stiffsright
to represent themselves. Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions and findings were
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal.

15) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or
Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of
the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection
of the law when Plaintiffs attended the 9/12/07 meeting and after having obtained time on the
agenda to present Plaintiffs' analysis of the Defendants' aerial photos and were expecting to
receive Defendants' decision on Plaiistiffs proposal for settlement of Plaintiffs' clain~sas
requested by NLCHD clerk at the 8/8/07 meeting and Defendants deny Plaintiffs the opportunity
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to present their evidence of their analysis of the aerial photos and Defendants did not respond to
Plaintiffs' settlement proposal and Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to represent themselves
and were told to get a lawyer if they did not submit a $750 fee and an application for validation.
Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal.
16) There are no genuine issues of fact in these matters as Plaintiffs have shown that no
due process and/or equal treatment of the law was afforded to Plaintiffs and/or no evidentiary
hearings have been held in regards to Canps Canyon Road in section 15 of T39N R3 WBM and
Defendants have admitted that no hearings have been before the board on these matters and that
no final decisions have been made notwithstanding Plaintiffs allegations that such hearings
should have been afforded Plaintiffs and/or such final decisions were made as Defendants had
acted and/or failed to act arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion in these matters,
and/or had acted and/or failed to act illegally in these matters.
17) Plaintiffs have alleged that Plaintiffs land has been wronghlly invaded and occupied
by Defendants actions/failures to act and that Defendants had acted and/or failed to act arbitrarily
and capriciously, abused their discretion in these matters, and/or had acted and/or failed to act
illegally in these matters. Defendants have brought forth no specific admissible evidence to show
that they had not acted and/or failed to act arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion in
these matters, and/or had acted and/or failed to act illegally in these matters in denying Plaintiffs
due process and/or equal treatment of the law in any and all plausible, colorable clainls of
improper interference with Plaintiffs property rights and the 'ini-rongful per se taking of Plaintiffs'
land.

18) The Rimrock survey has shown the first Wagner driveway access to Camps Canyon
Road to be ~vhollyon Plaintiffs land and Defendants bring forth no specific, admissible evidence
to rebut this. Plaintiffs have alleged that Plaintiffs land has been wrongfully invaded and that
Defendants actions/failures to act have permitted third parties to wrongfully invade and occupy
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Plaintiffs' land and/or that Defendants have taken Plaintiffs land for not a public use and that
Defendants had acted and/or failed to act arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion in
these matters, and/or had acted and/or failed to act illegally in these matters.
19) As there are no genuine issues of material and admissible fact in these matters of
factual andlor plausible wrongful possessions of Plaintiffs' land by Defendants and/or third
parties and in that Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or
Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of
the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection
and that Defendants actionslfailures to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal and were a matter of agency policy,
custom, and/or standard operating procedure, andlor official acts andlor approval of
subordinates' actions/failures to act by the final policy makers of the agency and that there are no
genuine issues of admissible material facts that these actions and/or failures to act were not
"unauthorized" and that Defendants have not shown a relation to public health, safety, morals,
and/or general welfare to burden Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' land with additional andlor new
envelopnlents of more and/or new land and that Defendants are prol~ibitedfrom regulating
Plaintiffs' land as a nuisance and that Plaintiffs' use of their land is not unsafe, iinmoral,
unhealthful and/or results in any diminution of the public's general welfare and that all matters in
the issue of liability under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 are matters of law and not issues of fact, Plaintiffs
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Fzkentes v. Shevin, 407 U S . 67, 92 S. Cf. 1983, 32
Amendment even though possession is disputed);
L.Ed 2d 356 (7972) (chattels protected by 14~"

J?
620 F.2d 47 (5'" Cir. 1980) (Due Process required before road is
see A V c C ~ I l ~v ~Glasgow,
built over disputed land); see Carey v. Piphzis, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1012,55 L.Ed.2d 252
(1978) "(e) Because the right to procedural due process is "absolute" in the sense that it does not
depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, and because of the importance to
organized society that procedural due process be observed, the denial of procedural due process
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should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, and therefore if it is
determined that the suspensions of the students in this case were justified, they nevertheless will
be entitled to recover nominal damages"); see also Evers v. The County ofcaster, 745 F 2d 1196

(19861, (quoting Owen, 445 U.S. at 650-52, 100 S. Ct. at 1415-16 (1979) "The knowledge that a
municipality will be liable for all of its injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or
not, should create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about lawfulness of their
intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights. Furthermore, the
threat that damages might be levied against the city might encourage those in a policy-making
position to institute internal rules and programs designed to mininlize the likelihood of
unintentional infringements of constitutional rights"); see k i t e d States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341
U.S. 114 (1 95 1) (Government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike
of coal miners effected a taking); see Puvnyelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U S . (13 JYallj 166, 177-78

(1872); see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatfen CATV Carp., 458 U S . 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164
(1982); see U. S. v. Dickiuzson, 331 US. 745 (1947) ("When dealing with a problem which arises
under such diverse circumstances procedural rigidities should be avoided. All that we are here
holding is that when the Government chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by
a co~ltinui~lg
process of physical events, the owner is not required to resort either to pieceslleal or
to premature litigation to ascertain the just compensation for what is really 'taken'. . . When the
governmental acts/omissions deny the landowner the fundamental rights of owslership-the

right

to possess, right to exclude others, andlor the right to dispose of all or a portion of the propertythese are 'takings"'); see Kaiser Aetna v. CTnitedStates, 444 U S . 164, 179-80, 100 S. Ct. 383,

392-93, 62 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). (a property owner's right to exclude others is "universally held
to be a fundamental element of the property right"); see Lingle v. Chevron U S . A. Inc., (04-163)
544 U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F.3d 846, ("Conversely, if a govern~nentaction is found to be
impermissible--for instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary
as to violate due process--that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can
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authorize such action"); see Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. CiQ ofsun F'alley, 506 F.3 d 85 1, 855-56
(9th Cir. 2007); see Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497 (1990); see also Ware v. Idalzo
State Tax Comm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, at 483 (1977); (see Aztec Ltd, Inc. v. Creekside Investment

Co., 100 Idaho 566, 569,602 P.2d 64,67 (1979)' ("An increase in width does more than merely
increase the burden upon the servient estate; it has the effect of enveloping additional land.").
CONCLUSION
Defendants have no rational basis for issuing the first Wagner driveway access permit
and not revoking it when they were given fair warning that it mias located wholly on Plaintiffs
property. The only reasonable solution to the problem was a professional survey. Defendants'
decision to not get a suwey on their own resolution was arbitrary for both sides of the road.
Defendants' decision to require the Wagners to get a survey professionally done was arbitrary
Defendants' decision to not get a survey on their own resolution was arbitrary for both sides of
the road. Defendants' decision to not get a survey on their own resolution was arbitrary for both
sides of t l ~ eroad. Defendants' actions/failures to act in continuing/not revoking the permit when
Plaintiffs said they would get a survey were arbitrary. The only legal evidence Defendants have
to support their issuance of the perniit is the Riinrock survey which shorn-sthe first Wagner
driveway access to be ~vhollyon Plaintiffs' land. No reasonable person would debate that the
shortest distance between two points-the

west property line of the 31-1- acre parcel intersection

with Cainps Canyon Road and the east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel intersection with
Camps Canyon Road-is

not a straight line. It would be iiltuitively obvious that if Defendants

have admitted to straightening curves and altering the centerline of Camps Canyon Road that the
distance ~niouldbe shorter than previously calculated and/or that the previous calculation ivould
not be reliable. Furthermore, when "Dan Payne said to Mr. Wagner, to the effect of LCl~eclc
it. If
you are within any public prescriptive right-of-way, your driveway access permit is okay'", he
misleads Mr. Wagner; however, with regards to Plaintiffs he has "taken" their land and in effect
given it to the Wagners as he has said to Mr. Wagner you may ignore the east property line and
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parellthetically I and Mr. Arneberg do not then have to confess that it was the NLCHD which
destroyed the historical driveway access and left an 8 foot embankment in its place instead.
Whether Mr. Wagner wants to pursue Mr. Landeck's theories under the ITCA is up to Mr.
Wagner. Plaintiffs are here under

5

1983, as it is Plaintiffs' land and property rights Mr. Payne

has improperly interfered with. The Defendants were as final policy makers given a choice on
4112106 and with deliberate indifference to the erroneous deprivation did not withdrawlrevoke
the permit, refused to get a survey to provide a rational basis for their decision?and refused to
require the Wagners to get a survey to provide a rational basis for their decision to coiltinue the
permit. DefendantsICommissioners as fiilal policy makers approved the actions of Mr. Payile on
both sides of the road and all ~nattersrelevant are inatters of policy of the NLCHD. Furthermore,
Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion, andlor acted illegally when
they continuedlfailed to revoke the permit when Plaiiltiffs said that they would call for a sun7ey,
as Defendants only increased their risk for liability. They could have at no expense to
themselves and at no risk of liability to the Wagners have said that they would withdraw the
perinit until after the survey is conlpleted, as no reasonable person would quarrel with a decision
by the Defendants to re~naiiineutral until some data comes in. However this would not be in line
with whatever the Defendants inteiltions inay be. Did they want to avoid adnlission that the may
have improperly moved Camps Canyon Road? Did they siniply want to make sure that the
Wagners got their driveway? Did they simply \?-antto burden the Plaintiffs with the expense of
the survey and/or the providing of the land for the Wagners first driveway access? There is no
rational basis for a legitimate governmental interest in any of these questions as there is in not for
public use. Defendants' actslfailures to act, collclusiolls and findings are arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of the Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal.
The Rimrock survey shows that the 31-1- acre parcel has nloved to the north, that the road
frontage and acreage have been reduced, that the first Wagner driveway access permit was
issued: was continued and has failed to have been revoked for an access wholly on Plaintiffs'
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land; none of which is inconsistent with the undisputed facts. Defendants bring forth no
admissible, material evidence to support their rebutted testimony that there is a debatable issue of
the legal establishment of the Camps Canyon Road right of way, that the location of the Camps
Canyon Road right of way does not agree with the public record of the Plaintiffs' and/or the
M'agners' deeds, or that the Defendants, after numerous alterations are unsure as to the accurate
location of the Camps Canyon Road right of way. The Wagners' surveys as well as Mr. Payne's
survey are not professionally done surveys and the road frontage distance Mr. Payne measured
and the width of the right of way he established are not supported by a professionally done
survey. However it is, that they may be sure of the correct location and simply may want to
prepare false testimony (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplemenl, Item No. 5, at 3 ('Orland
Arneberg said he's lived out there his whole life and can testify that the road hasn't moved), is a
matter for the crinlinal courts, the tabloids and/or the tv or newspaper stories. The intentions and
mental states of the Defendants may have some issue in the final judgment of punitive damages
but the liability of the Defendants individuaIly is of a reasonable standard. Defendants have not
sought any qualified im~llunity.I~nmunityunder ITCA is for those who act in good faith and
simply may have erred. Defendants were given several chances to act reasonably.
Summary judgment belongs to Plaintiffs as it is the Defendants' arbitrary and capricious
exertion of their governmental powers, the abuse of their discretion and/or their illegal actions
and/or failures to act which have caused Plaintiffs harm; Defendants failures to provided due
process and equal protection when it is feasible to do so and when the actions/failures to act are
"not unautlzorized and when it is at that rnome~ltin time when Defendants need a rational basis
for what they do. There are no exigent circumstances. These are inte~ztionaldenials.
Defendants' findings and coilclusions are arbitrary and capricious as there is not substantial
evidence in the record to support their claims and all evidence in the record runs contrary to
Defendants conclusions and findings (a claim of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way is a self
admission of no substantial evidence in the record to support findings and conclusions);
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Defendants deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected property and/or liberty rights and
land without due process and equal protection andlor rational basis for a legitimate governmental
interest; and only the issues of
In District of Cotunzbia v. Robinson, 180 U.S. 92 at 108 (1901), 21 S. Ct. 283 ("It was
an easement in the land, not the fee to the land, which the public acquired by the road, and the
measure of the easement was the width of the road"), the debate was over the facts of the case
whether the Defendants could locate or even show they had intended to survey the road. The
question here is whether or not a factual debate is required and not whether two reasonable
people may differ on what the width of the easement might be. The width of the easement
equals the width of the road is the inference from both Robinson and Meservey as both consider
the width of the easement or the width of the road as a rebuttable presumption. Fifty feet is a
starting point at the outer extremity, unless there is a fence then the fence is the outennost
starting point. One may equally logically start at the narro~veststaring point-the

beaten used

path of travel and precede outu~ards,as many states do. The Defendants in this case want
nothing to do with either perspective-no

rebuttable presuinption at all.

Camps Canyon Road may be maintained in its physical attributes of location and width as
a presumption and must remain so unchanged for at least a period of five years of use and
maintenance to be so legally established; but when the status quo is interrupted, as it has been
here on several occasions, there must be authority for this interruption as the interruption denies
its unrecorded establishment. Not being arbitrary and capricious=evidentiary record which is
antithetical to unrecorded. Defendants would lose their absolute power if they should have to
inquire of any, save for their relatives, business partners, and/or friends (heaven forbid if they
should have to ask the Public what they might want) what should be done with Camps Canyon
Road. The prerequisite for two reasonable persons to disagree is that they both be reasonable.
We have yet to arrive at that point.
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Defendants thesis "This Brief will show that the District has, at all times relevant to
this action, properly dischar,ged its statutory responsibilities to improve and maintain the public
h i a w a y known as Camps Canyon."

Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8 "The District is well within its
legal rights to widen a road without holding a public hearing when that activity occurs within the
area of the District's public right-of-way. Plaintiffs fail to accept or understand that the District
is enlpowered under law to improve and even widen public highways so long as it does not
exceed, under usual circumstances, the lawful 50 foot width of that highway."
Between "the width", road and/or easement, and "to improve" and "to maintain" if in any
way, shape or form the infinitives imply the envelopment of more land lies a rebuttable
presumption.

Defendants' Brief, at 16 "The minimum width of public highways established by user in
Idaho has been 50 feet since 1887."

Meservey holds, "...and must be determined by the facts and circumstances peculiar
to the case, and is presumed to be 50 feet in width, unless the facts and circumstances of the
case clearly indicate that the owner, over whose land the road runs, has limited the width of
said road to less than 50 feet prior to the time the road became a highway by user." Is this
simply a Parratt "unauthorized" action, to stop at a comma in a reference and leave out the
determining factors; son~ethinglawyers learn in law school to purposely obfuscate the issues.
Clearly, Meservey calls for a rebuttable presumption and factual determination. There is nothing
in I. C.3 40-23 12 or iweservey to mandate a width of 50 feet, although it may be as wide as
required. How it gets to the desired width is another story and a taking can be as small as a cable
t.v. box (see Lorefto).
Defendants' Counsel spends a good deal of time trying to explain what it is that Plaintiffs
have argued, rather than to listen to what the Plaintiffs have complained of. Defendants have
exceeded their authority declaring that the minimum width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of
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way is mandated by Idaho law to be 50 feet (see Defendants' Brief, at 18). Plaintiffs have been
denied an opportunity for a meaningful response at a meaningful time to address the adverse
effects and improper interference Defendants actions have had and are continuing to have on
Plaintiffs land and property and liberty rights. "Specifically, the determination of the width of
the right of way of Camps Canyon Road must be addressed" (Opinion, at 9). Plaintiffs agree
with the Court's holding, I~owever,there is the matter not considered which is "at a meaningful
time". A meaningful time is not after the fact, at a time when the Defendants have already
destroyed the evidence for the factual determination. A predeprivation hearing is usually
required and a post deprivational hearing is inadequate if the actiodfailure to act is "not
unauthorized" and is predictable and foreseeable (see Zinermon). There are no exigent
circumstances nor are any of Defendants' legal theories of any merit. Defendant can not operate
under I.C.5 40-23 12. They can scream and holler and pontificate all they want about the width
of the right of way but when it comes to disturbing the status quo and putting the shovel to
Plaintiffs land they are first prohibited from the taking of Plaintiffs land without due process and
without a survey and an accurate description of the lands required (see 1.C.s 40-605 and I.C.5
40-1 3 10) as without both their actions and/or failures to act would be arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of the Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. Defendants' discretion, whether they abuse it
or not, does not allow them to break the law (see Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School District No.
231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 ("[D]iscretionary function does not shield negligent
implementation of statutes.. .").
'Ixiithout the survey and the description Defendants are left ~ ~ i t h osubstantial
ut
evidence
in their record for their findings and conclusiolls and even if the centerline was only moved two
feet to the northeast or the width was extended to the northeast the outskirts of the new claim of
25 feet from centerline envelopes more land (see Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside I~westmentCo.,
100 Idaho 566, 569,602 P.2d 64, 67 (1979), ("An increase in width does more than merely
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increase the burden upon the servient estate; it has the effect of enveloping additional land.")
This is a per se taking no matter how small (see Loretta).
"Each of our due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that
because 'minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not
diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem
adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.' Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480,491-(1980). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 166-167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part);
id., at 21 1 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the State to
destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has considered and
rejected such an approach: 'While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest, . . .
it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without
appropriate procedural safeguards. . . . [Tlhe adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of
a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.' Vitek 1,. Jones,
445 U.S., at 490--49 1, n. 6, quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 41 6 U.S., at 167-(opinion concursing in

part)." Logan v. Zimn7ermnn Brush Co., 455 U.S. 322, at 432 (1982).
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court's order for denying Defendants' Motion For
Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs respectfully request tliis Court's order for granting Plaintiffs' Motion For
Partial Suinmary Judgment for Defendants liability under 42 U.S.C.

8s 1983,188, et seq. with

damages to be determined.
On this 17"' Day of February, 2009

r',
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Don Halvorson
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b

1

e

County of Latah

)

Don and Charlotte Halvorson depose and say:
1. We are the plaintiffs named in the above case.
2. On information and belief and Plaintiffs observations, the maintenance of Camps
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel from 1996 until 2005 amounted to
an annual, sometimes biannual grading of the road. Plaintiffs and neighbors plowed
the snow for most of these years. In the late fall grading of 2005. the NLCHD floated
a small amount of gravel towards Plaintiffs' fence. This practice has persisted
through the present.

3. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescription and/or to a claim of 50
foot-25

feet from centerline right of way to the lands abutting to and underlying

Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in our fee simple title on
411 2/06 at the regular meeting of the Cornn~issionersof the NLCWD.

4. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescriptive right to damage our fence,
issue and not revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and to widen Camps
Canyon Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06.

5. MTegave Defendants fair warning of our disagreement with their claims of
prescription to our land and their claims of prescriptive right to damage our fence. to
issue and not to revoke the first driveway access permit, and to ~videnCamps Canyon
Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06.
6. We continued from 1/12/06 to give Defendants fair warning of our fact,'s opinion's of
f a d s and interpretation of the application of law to our facts and opinionJs of facts
and sought remedy and settlement with Defendants until they gave us the ultimatum
of either paying $750 and file for petition to validate Camps Canyon Road or getting
a lav\?ier in September of 2007.
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7. Plaintiffs identify their recorded deed as a warranty deed recorded in Latah County as
instr~iment$42441 1 dated 12'9i1996 as a fee simple and merchantable title for the
real property, situated in the State of Idaho, County of Latah as described in said
instrument, including that land which underlies Camps Canyon Road as described in
said deed.

8. In the fall of 1996, we were in the process of buying the farm which includes the

SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBh4 from Ed and Gladys Swanson. During that time
the NLCHD: on information and belief through foreman, Dan Payne, approached Ed
Swanson about alterations they wanted to make to Camps Canyon Road in the
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel to improve the road for new houses built in the
canyon. On information and belief the NLCHD wanted to cut down some old trees,
straighten curves at the east and west ends of the 31-1- acre parcel, move the road bed
to the northeast. and to skirt the rock outcropping. On information and belief. Ed
Swanson gave Dan Payneitl~eNLCHD permission to make the changes. Ed Swanson
told us about his dealings wirh Payne and we accepted the change in the road and
confirmed Ed Suanson's permission. Prior to these alterations Calnps Canyon Road.
in the vicinitj of the 3+/- acre parcel, was approximately 12 feet tvide, including
ditches and supporting structures; there were two curves in the road at the east end of
the 31,'- acre parcel. Traveling from southeast to northu~estthe HanrisiHuff historic
driveway left the road at the peak of the second curve creating a switchback (after the
first curve the road was traveling almost due north-lea~ing the road the dri1,eu.a~
u.as headed almost due south) and thereby skirting the east propert) line of the 3+/acre parcel. Northwest of the old driveway access the road passed over a rock
outcropping, then headed slightly to the southtvest, into rhe woods where a logging
road left the road at the peak of the curve and then the road switched back to the north
and then again back to the south descending a steep decline in the road and crossing
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the west property line of the 3%-'acre

parcel at the peak of the second curve. The

alterations of 1996 straightened the curves at both the east end and the west end of the

3+/- acre parcel. On information and belief in the straightening of the curves at the
east and at the west ends of the 3+/- acre parcel altered the geographical intersections
of the east and west property lines with Camps Canyon Road to the north as the
straightening moved the road bed to the northeast. The movement of the road bed to
the northeast also resulted in the dropping of the road bed as the terrain slopes to the
northeast and thus the northeast movement was downhill. The movement of the road
varied from just a few feet to more than 50 feet depending on where it is measured
and how it is measured. In its narrowest point of movement, the neu7road bed laid
northeast of the old trees: which were cut down and their stumps were excavated out,
and the old fence line. After the 1996 alterations, there was an 8 foot embankment
left where the historic driveway entered the road and since that time no one exited the
Harris place from the old driveway from that point on (the Harris place was owned bq
absentee owners-Martin

Huff, et. al). On his last year of farming the Huff place, the

renter, Larry Wansen, asked Plaintiffs if they could exit the Wuff Place through
Plaintiffs' land to carry on their farming operations and finally remove their
machinery as there u a s no driveway access left. Farming access from then on was
gained from the south out of the old Doug and Edna Ke113 place as the new renters.

+

Ridgeview Farms took over the farming at about the same time as the alterations took
place. In the spring of 1997. we rebuilt the fence leaving a buffer between the fence
and the northeast of the road bed and supporting structures of 5 to 10 feet in the east
end and the narsowest part of the buffer (a narrow strip of the road frontage abour 20
feet long at the peak in the curve of the new road). The buffer was left to prevent
damage to the fence from snow removal (ratio of space at edge of road to road
surface: 24 foot road surface in a 50 foot right of way=23/50=.48; .48X15 foot road
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surface=7.2 feet: there may have been a small area undersized (less than 5 feet).
however this formula includes a variable of supporting structures which also store
snow; in most of the length of the road the buffer exceeded 10 feet.) from the road
and no gift was intended of the buffer for future widening of the road. For several
years after the 1996 alterations. up until we moved the cows to a different wintering
ground in the early 2000.s we shared snow plowing of the road with the neighbors
and had no problems with the storage of snow.
3. The first time I, Don Halvorson, talked with Bob Wagner about his proposed plans

for a driveway access to Camps Canyon Road was in the fall of 2005. Bob Wagner
had done his own survey of the 3+/- acre parcel and he wanted to confirm his findings
with me. I told him his survey was wrong as the east property line of the 31/- acre
parcel was 40-k feet to the west of where h4r. Wagner had staked it out, that the old
historic driveway did not cross the grassy draw and did not approach Camps Canyon
Road in a easterly direction, but rather the old driveway ran along the east property
line and entered Camps Canyon Road in a northerly direction, directly across from
Plaintiffs' corrals. Because of the two sharp curves east of the 3+/- acre parcel a
switchback was created by entering the driveway from the east off of Camps Canyon
Road. I also told ,Mr. Wagner that the NLCHD had altered Camps Canyon Road in
1996 and where the old historic driveway approached Camps Canyon Road nomi
stood an eight foot e~nbankrnentas the NLCHD had straightened the two sharp curves
and moved the road bed to the northeast. The terrain slopes to the north-northeast
along the 3+/- acre parcel and movement of the road bed to the northeast necessitated
the lowering of the road bed and left the abrupt embankment. I told Mr. Wagner he
needed to get a professionaIlj done survey and talk with the NI,CWD about the
changes they had made in 1996. Subsequent to the initial call Bob Wagner called
se\-era1times in regards to his driveway and construction plans. I told Bob Wagner
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that the NLCWD had created the problem and that I would stand with him on the issue
but that his proposed plans were trespassing, and one way or another he needed to
correct the problem.
10. We first became aware of the construction of the Wagners first driveway access to
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3i-/- acre Parcel on or about 4/8/06. The
access to and into Camps Canyon Road crossed the east property line of the 3 4 - acre
parcel in its entirety. the west edge of the driveway being 20 feet east of the east
property line.
11. On 4/10/06,1, Don Halvorson, called SLCHD foreman, Dan Payne, and Clearwater
Power new construction foreman, known only to me as Clint, to inform them that the
Wagners driveway access was on our property crossing the east property line of the
3+/- acre parcel. On information and belief, Clearwater power did not attempt to
install the underground electric line as planned without confirmation by the M'/ agners
that t-he installation would be on the Wagners land and/or within the legal limits of the
higtnway right of way.
12. On the morning of 4/12/06.1, Don Halvorson, met with the Latah County Surveyor,
Ron h/lunson, in regards to the first Wagner driveway access permit and the position
of the property lines of the 3 4 - acre parcel and Camps Canyon Road. Ron h4unson
told me that the best first step was to get a survey; Mr. A4unson also said he had
talked with Bob Wagner about the problem and had suggested to Bob UTagnerthat
Bob X'agner's proposed survey plan mag not be accurate. That same morning, I
contacted Rimrock Consultants and talked with John Dunne. Mr. Dunne said he
would begin the paper work and I would get back with him. -4fier the NLCHD
meeting 1 told h'lr. Dunne to go ahead with the suwey.
13. On 4/12/06,1, Don Walvorson. attended the regular meeting of the NLCHD
Commissioners at 1132 'cT7hiteAve M o s c o ~Idaho.
~
The only person I had talked to
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in any regards of any NLCHD meeting, other than my wife, was Dan Payne. On
4/'10i06 I had asked Dan Payne when and where the Commissioners had their
meetings. I made no requests of Payne or any other member of the NLCHD to be put
on the agenda. My intention was, time permitting on 4/12/06, I would attend the
NLCI-ID meeting in order to see how the meetings were run and to ascertain the
procedure to speak with the Commissioners about the improper interference with our
property rights. To the best of my recollection, those in attendance were Orland
Arneberg, Richard Hansen, Ron Landeck, Dan Payne, Dan Carscallen, Paul Stubbs,
Don Brown, Gary Osborn, John Bolman, Bob and Kate M?agner, Francis and Patsy
Wagner, and a woman unknown to me. Orland Arneberg called first on me to speak
although I was not on the agenda. I brought the fact, that I was not on the agenda, to
Orland Arneberg's attention. Mr. Arneberg did not respond but Dan Payne
\~olunteeredthat lie had not notified anyone of the meeting and that Bob Wagner had
been in his office every day in regards to his driveway access. I then proceeded to
speak and complained to Commissioners that the permit for the

driveway

access was issued for access \vhoIly across our property and I showed them how the
driveway crossed the east property Line by showing them aerial photos and where the
east property line was and where the old driveway was. I also complained about the

dirt and gravel being pushed into the buffer between our fence and the road bed since
late fall 2005 extension of width to Camps Canyon Road and continuing with the
maintenance of the road. I told them we had not given them pem~issionto do so and
that the NLCHD did not have the authority to do so. I also complained of the injury
to our fence. on our information and belief, due to the pushing of a wind fallen tree
through the fence by the grader operator in the fall of 2004. Defendants stated all
matters were within their 50 foot/25 feet from centerfine prescriptive right of way
(Defendants called it their "prescriptive right"). I reminded Co~nmissionersthat the
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NLCHD had altered Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in

1996 and that, there no longer existed a prescriptive right of way in the vicinity of the
311- acre parcel and even if such prescriptive right of way did exist, there was no
extension of the right of way (prescriptive or otherwise) to 25 feet from centerline
encumbering our property greater than the width of Camps Canyon Road and its
supporting structures. Mr. Landeck quoted from the Idaho Code reading I.C. $4023 17 (an implied threat that a fine of $150!day could be enforced, however no notice
was given to us to remove our fence). I told the Defendants that they had 110 right to
destroy our fence regardless of the type or width of the right of way they 1naq7have. I
asked the NLCWD to conduct a survey to substantiate their claims that the driveway
access was within their right of way, if such right of way existed. I told
Commissioners that the driveway access crossed the east property line of the ;+/-acre
parcel. Mr. Paytle and Mr. *4rnebergstated that the driveway access perinit was still
valid as it was within the prescriptive right of way. I told them that there was no
prescriptive right of way alld even if there was, the NLCHD only had an easement.

Mr. Payne said the driveway access was within the 699 feet road frontage on the
Wagner deed. I pointed ortt to Dan Payne that in 1996 he had altered (straightened)
the road. Mr. Arneberg responded that the road had not been moved ill his tenure or
under his tvatch. I suggested that the U'agners and the NLCHD share the expelise of
the survey as the NLCHD was largely responsible for the driveway problem. The
meeting was totally without order, Defendants being biased, argumentative and
confiontational. It ended abruptly when the Commissioners refused to call for a
survey, I stated that the County surveyor stated that a survey was the correct place to
start. and then I stated that I would call for a survey. After the meeting, Patsy Wagner
started yelling that we were ruining her children's lives and Gary Osborn came up to
me and said that I was probably right. Gary Osborn stated that they [implying those
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in attendance of the meeting, including Orland Arneberg, and Dan Payne] should not
have done this [tried to ram the driveway through some sort of legal process], but that
he was interested in resolving the matter. I told him the place to start was a survey
and that the Wagners and the NLCHD needed to do so and cooperate. The Wagners
and their friends and contractors continued to use the driveway access, and on
Plaintiffs' information and belief were not restricted from any and all use at any time
by Defendants and that the first permit was not ever revoked and that the Defendants
still claim "a prescriptive right'" to issue a driveway access permit in the same area to
resident of the now Wagner place. Defendants have never said otherwise than the
First Wagner Permit was within their policy and valid.

14. In early June of 2006. Rimrock Consultants set out tlle stakes for the 3-i- acre parcel
propert!, lines revealing the trespass of the first Wagner drivewaq access across the
sast property line of the 34-acre parcel. The Wagner drjvewaj- access \%aswholly on
Plaintiffs' land.

15. Me: tried to work out an agreement with the Wagners by offering our cooperation in
bringing a deeded easement to the NLCHD. On our information and belief, Bob
U ' a g ~ ~told
e r us that the NLCHD turned down the idea of a deeded easement and the
M'agners obtained a second permit and built a new driveway access on or about

6/10/06. On information and belief, Bob Wagner stated the NLCHD turned down the
deeded easement on the grounds that the width of the easement would need to be 5 I
feet as measured from the northeast side of the road to wfiolly include the first
IYagner driveway access.

16. In the fall of 2006 the NLCHD blasted out some of the old rock outcropping, placed a
cul? ert for the second Wagner Drivewat opposite the culvert for our, Halvorsons'.
access to our corral and thus limiting the road surface to about 19 feet between the
two driveway accesses and extended the road surface to the northeast, immediately to
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the west of the culvert installation by pushing an old compaction roller and gravel and
dirt into our fence and realigning the drainage ditch. Prior to this the width of the
road in this area was about 15 feet incIuding ditches and supporting structures. This
alteration added 4 to 5 feet of width, including ditches and supporting structures to
the road on the northeast side of the road from the west end of Plaintiffs' corral.
17. In the winter of 2006-2007 we, the Plaintiffs, contacted Mr. Landeck about the
problems we were having with the KLCHD activities-the

improper interference

with our property rights. He said he was not authorized to talk with us although he
did not say he was not the NLCHD attorney. He only said we had to talk with the
NLCWD clerk if u7ehad a problem.

18. In the winter of 2006-2007 we. the Plaintiffs, contacted the NLCHD clerk about the
problems we were having with the activities of the NLCHD. He said he was not able
to answer legal questions and was unable to give us advice on how to proceed. We
proposed writing a letter containing our complair~tsand outlining our requests and
meeting with the Commissioners. It took several months to get what we expected to
be a hearing on the matter on 3/21!07.
19. On 3/2 1/07. Plaintiffs. Don Halvorson and Charlotte Halvorson. attended the regular

meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners at 1132 White Ave Moscow Idaho. Plaintiffs
had asked for a meeting vvith Commissioners and had received time on the agenda for
3/21/07. Plaintiffs supplied Defendants with letter (dated 3/8/07) in ad~anceof the
3 21/07 meeting indicating Plaintiffs' concerns and seeking resolution to the right of
\.yay issues with Camps Canyon Road in the l7icinityof the 3&/-acre parcel by means
of a validation procedure initiated on Commissioners ORTI resolution and/or some
other means expecting a formal type of hearing. At this meeting Plaintiffs showed
Defendants/Commissioners that after the 1996 alteration Camps Canyon Road no

longer agreed with the public record. and asked Defenda~lts/Commissionersto
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validate Camps Canyon Road under their ONTI resolution. Plaintiffs had supplied
Defendants with a copy of the Rimrock survej . Defendants brought forth aerial
photos from 1965 and 1949 without prior notice to Plaintiffs. M'e received no hearing
or meaningful response to our complaints. The Commissioners were biased and bent
only on finding reason not to have to listen to us.
20. Plaintiffs were not given any advance notice of the presentation of the aerial photos at
the 3/21/07 meeting--without the ability to make any advance analysis of the aerial
photos. Plaintiffs requested copies of the photos and it took about 6 weeks for
Plaintiffs to receive copies of the photos. These copies were of such poor quality that
they were useless for any analysis. Plaintiffs requested better quality copies afier
about three weeks Plaintiffs received somewhat better quality photos, assumed

Defendants'/Corni~issioners'averred authenticity and accuracy, and found these
aerial photos to show the movement of Canlps Canyon Road in the vicinitj of the

3-d- acre parcel as Plaintiffs had alleged. Plaintiffs showed Defendants counsel the
results of Plaintiffs analysis at the 7/07 informal meeting on site at Camps Canyon
Road.
3 1. On 8/8/07 Plaintiffs attended the regular meeting of the Comrnissioiiers and ask that

they could talk directly to the NLCHD attorney to try to work out a resolution to the
problems. The Commissioners felt that our representing ourselves was inappropriate
as without having an attorney to pay, we didn't have to spend enough money and
therefore the commissioners denied our requests.

32.On 8!28/07 ('letter dated 8/23/07) we requested the NLCHD to declare the
applicabilitj of I.C. 5 40-303a to the situation and the issues that were involved in the
probleins we were having with the activities of the NLCHD. T&'e received no
response.
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23. We asked for and received time on the agenda to show Colnmissioners the results of
our analysis of the aerial photos for 9/15/07. On 9'1 5/07 Defendants' counsel denied
us the opportunity to show our analysis and he told us to get a lawyer.
24. On information and belief, Plaintiffs believe Defendants to be final polic~.makers of
the NLCRD.
35. Plaintiffs sought and obtained 2ndWagner driveway access permit. as public

information from the KLCI-ID clerk. however were unable to obtain the first Wagner
driveway access permit as on Plaintiffs' ii~formationand belief. the KLCHD clerk
said the first Wagner dri~eu-ayaccess permit had been destroyed.

26. Defendants continue their widening and maintenance activities in the vicinity of the
3"/- acre parcel, covering Plaintiffs land with rock, dirt. gravel and debris, and
encroaching on and damaging Plaintiffs' fence.
27. None of the several miles of fence Plaintiffs have in the South Latah County Highway
District. and some of which has been in closer proximity to the edge of the road than
the 700 feet of fence abutting to Camps Canyon Road for many. many years and
man!-, many snow falls and gradings with occasional injuo to snow and gravel and
life goes on peacefully and amicably.

28. Plaintiffs hat-e spent time. money and effort to resol~rethese issues and have
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